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Abstract/Summary 
 
The impact of Irish nationalism on central Scotland, 1898 – 1939 
 
The years 1898 to 1939 were momentous ones for both Irish and Scottish history.  The 
rise of Sinn Fein, the impact of the First World War and the Easter Rising, followed by 
the formation of the Irish Free State in 1921 and Eire in 1937 all occurred within these 
forty or so years.  This thesis explores the nature and extent of the impact that Irish 
nationalism had on Scotland in this period. 
This thesis divides these years into four segments: from 1898 when Irish nationalists 
began to renew their activities in Scotland in earnest, to the Easter Rising in 1916 (i); 
from the suppression of the Easter Rising until the establishment of the Irish Free State 
in 1922 (ii); from 1922 until the 1931 census when anti-Irish prejudice was widespread 
again in Scotland, coming in particular from the Church of Scotland and associated 
institutions (iii); from the Depression to the coming of the Second World War in 1939, 
when these institutions altered their campaigns to become anti-Catholic in general and 
the IRA once again looked to Scotland for assistance. 
There can be little doubt that Irish nationalism had a profound effect on Scotland and 
had its many different aspects: the organisation of IRA supply and training activity; the 
military and intelligence responses by the British government; the reaction of the 
Protestant churches, and the anti-Irish or anti-Catholic campaigns of the Church of 
Scotland in particular; the influence on the movement for Scottish Home Rule and the 
founding of a nationalist political party with the NPS in 1928; the electoral benefits 
enjoyed by the Labour Party from an already politicised ‘Irish’ vote; and the conflict 
between constitutional and militant Irish nationalist politics.  This mixture of both 
positive and negative effects demonstrates the deep impact made on Scotland during a 
transitional period of economic adjustment amid continuing urbanisation.  It was in the 
industrial towns and cities of central Scotland that this impact was most keenly felt, on 
both sides of the religious divide, and this presents itself as an underlying cause of the 
continuing religious bigotry felt in central Scotland to this day. 
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A Note on Terminology 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis often uses the term ‘Catholic’ throughout, instead of the technically correct 
‘Roman Catholic’ to refer to people in Ireland or Scotland of this religion. 
 
The term ‘Irish-Scots’ is used in Chapter II to describe the immigrant Catholic 
community in Scotland.  Thereafter, for reasons explained in the Introduction, the term 
‘Scots-Irish’ is used instead. 
 
Between 1911 and 1964 the Conservative Party was known as the Unionist Party as it 
had merged with many former Liberal Unionists.  This thesis uses ‘Conservatives’ until 
1911 and thereafter uses ‘Unionist’ to describe the same group, unless it appears in 
lower-case which means a reference to any institution which supported the Union itself. 
 
All other errors in this thesis are my own… 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
The years between 1898 and 1939 were momentous ones for Irish history.  
The rise of Sinn Fein, the First World War, and the Easter Rising, the 
formation of the Irish Free State in 1921 and then Eire in 1937 all occurred 
within these forty or so years.  In this chapter the historical background to 
the events of this period will be examined along with the political legacies 
at work.  All these events had an impact on Scotland, but it will be shown 
that the cultural connections between Ireland and Scotland caused a varied, 
and in some respects, an unexpected impact on the Scottish people. 
The period between the beginning of the twentieth century and the coming 
of the Second World War represented years of culmination during which 
Irish nationalism arguably achieved most of what it had sought in the 
rebellion of 1798 and since the Union of 1801.  The activity of Irish 
nationalists throughout the nineteenth century – mostly peaceful but 
occasionally violent – will be discussed below; but this activity should be 
seen as a gradual movement towards the fulfilment of the Irish nationalist 
agenda which was arguably realised in 1921. 
The position of Scotland in relation to Ireland and Irish politics is a 
particularly interesting one.  Irish immigration and Irish nationalist activity 
affected the whole of Britain, but Scotland received proportionately more 
Irish immigrants than anywhere else in Britain and there was also an 
exceptional religious dimension at work which caused greater tension in 
Scotland throughout the period than in the rest of Britain.  This made Scots 
more palpably aware of Irish issues, as they were always brought sharply 
into focus by this peculiar politico-religious dimension. 
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It is possible to divide the years between 1898 and 1939 into four distinct 
segments of varying lengths.  Firstly, from 1898 when Irish nationalists 
began to renew their activities in earnest to the Easter Rising in 1916; 
secondly, from the suppression of the Easter Rising until the establishment 
of the Irish Free State in 1922; thirdly, from 1922 until the census of 1931 
when anti-Irish prejudice was widespread in central Scotland, coming in 
particular from the Presbyterian churches and other unionist institutions; 
and finally from the Depression to the coming of the Second World War in 
1939, when these institutions altered their campaigns to become anti-
Catholic in general and the IRA looked to Scotland once again for 
assistance. 
These divisions will aid analysis and should help to produce a clearer 
picture of the impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland, showing it to be 
more complex than previously thought.  This thesis proposes that there 
were, in fact, four separate and distinctive stages of reaction to Irish 
nationalism in Scotland between 1898 and 1939.  There is also the 
important issue of distinguishing between different types of impact to 
consider, as well as the issue of how impact can actually be measured.  The 
impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland ranges from the direct impact on 
government agencies like the intelligence services who monitored the 
evolution of Irish nationalism (and particularly Irish republican activity), 
and were aiming to minimise its effect on the internal security of the 
United Kingdom.  Another direct impact was on the immigrant Irish 
community in Scotland.  Support for Irish nationalism from the Irish-Scots 
peaked in the years before the First World War and began to recede 
thereafter, mainly due to the conflict between constitutional and militant 
methods after the renaissance of republicanism.  Wider public opinion in 
Scotland was also greatly affected by the Irish Home Rule debate before 
1914, and by the perceived threat of Irish republicanism in the 1920s.  The 
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impact of ‘republicanism imagined’ is perhaps the most interesting strand 
to be analysed as it coincided with the growing confidence and visibility of 
the Catholic community in central Scotland between the wars as well as a 
period of severe economic malaise.  Militant Irish nationalism arguably 
succeeded in shifting the focus of political debate in Scotland at key points 
in this study: 1916, 1921, 1931, 1933 and 1939; and the impact on key 
elements of Scottish society, like the Church of Scotland for example, 
cannot be taken for granted. 
All the principal public records for the study of the effects of Irish 
nationalism on Scotland have been consulted in Dublin, Edinburgh, 
Glasgow and London.  Various newspapers and other contemporary 
publications have also been consulted and their quality and value will be 
discussed throughout the text.  Although there has been a fair amount of 
research into the Irish in Scotland, what is surprising is the lack of 
historical study on the specific impact of Irish nationalism, both 
constitutional and militant, on Scotland – until now – in this particular 
period of the early twentieth century.  This thesis aims to contribute to this 
debate and I have included my historiographical comments throughout the 
text. 
Peter Hart, for example, has recently challenged the view of early twentieth 
century events in Ireland as a series of events, preferring to describe the 
period between 1916 and 1923 in particular as a ‘revolution’.  He discusses 
the traditional conflict between nationalist and anti-nationalist versions of 
events that have dominated historical debate between the 1970s and the 
1990s and advances a revised approach, “a new revolutionary history”1, 
freed from political agenda to use comparative, sociological methods based 
on extensive empirical research.  He notes that revolutionary violence in 
Ireland had three overlapping conflicts: anti-British, communal and 
intranationalist; and correctly argues that we should not focus on the anti-
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British conflict to the detriment of the other two dynamics.  The inner 
battles within the revolutionary movement were too significant a factor 
between the Easter Rising and the Civil War to neglect.  He also warns 
against too narrow a geographical focus as historians working on southern 
Ireland have often ignored the north and vice versa.  Moreover, a 
comparison with the United Kingdom as a whole for IRA activities and 
revolutionary identity would be useful he thinks.  This thesis explores the 
relationship between Scottish and Irish republican motivation and methods 
to that end. 
Although Hart’s recent work is compelling and rigorous, this approach has 
its origins in the 1970s with Charles Townshend’s The British Campaign in 
Ireland which used fresh sources to explore the response of the British 
authorities to the growth of Irish republicanism between 1916 and 1921.  
He innovatively used structures of bureaucracy and political decision-
making as the focus for his systematic investigation2.  In a similar vein, 
Eunan O’Halpin’s book on the Irish administration also examines the 
problems of government organisation3.  David Fitzpatrick and Tom Garvin 
have both used quantative analysis of Irish nationalist activity and, in the 
case of Garvin, also attempted to place the events of 1912 to 1939 in an 
extended comparative context4.  These historians and others have used the 
vast range of sources now available and combined this data with 
comparative and theoretical methods to encourage a broader debate.  Peter 
Hart describes Ireland as “one of the best historical laboratories in which to 
study revolution”5.  This thesis proposes that Scotland is one of the best 
historical laboratories in which to study reaction. 
 
*** 
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A study of any form of nationalism, militant or otherwise, requires an 
examination of the origins of that nationalism.  Modern Irish nationalism 
really began in the late eighteenth century, distilling influences from the 
American and French revolutions as well as other, older, historical 
influences6. 
In 1798 with assistance from the French, the United Irishmen, a clandestine 
republican organisation, attempted a revolution of their own in Ireland.  
Although Ireland supposedly had its own legislative independence, the 
rising precipitated full parliamentary union with the British state.  Catholic 
Ireland had retained close ties with France for well over a century, and was 
thus particularly sensitive to events occurring there.  When the revolution 
in France brought almost spontaneous emancipation, it is not really 
surprising that the Irish people began to clamour for it too.  However, 
although the French Revolution brought social reform to the French 
peasantry by abolishing tithes, among other measures, what could not be 
understood in Ireland was the distinct anti-clerical nature the revolution 
quickly adopted.  The Catholic Irish peasantry were essentially a socially 
conservative group and could not comprehend this attack on the Catholic 
Church, which for generations had represented an enduringly popular 
symbol of their identity.  This can be broadly contrasted with the reaction 
of Protestant Ireland to the treatment of the Catholic Church in France.  
Although the Penal Laws had been repealed by the early 1780s, attacks by 
Protestants on Catholics and their property were still commonplace in late 
eighteenth century Ireland, especially in rural areas.  These attacks 
eventually led to the creation of the Defenders, a secret society established 
to protect Catholics from Protestant violence such as the Peep o’Day Boys, 
for example.  Although many Irish Protestants were deeply suspicious of 
the Catholic Church and its motives, it would not be true to say that this 
was universal; several of the founding members of the United Irishmen, 
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such as Wolfe Tone, were Protestants who viewed collective action as the 
solution to Irish problems and regarded sectarian conflict with dismay.  
Moreover, the United Irishmen eventually merged with the Defenders to 
plan and then carry out the unsuccessful rebellion of 1798 which ultimately 
led to the imposed Act of Union between Britain and Ireland in 1801. 
However, the reasons for the revolution in France were never disputed in 
Ireland.  What has been described as the ‘deadlock’ in French society7, 
applied even more so to Ireland and “made nonsense of the nominal 
legislative independence won in 1782”8.  The United Irishmen, therefore, 
had an onerous task to combine seemingly incompatible ideals: discontent 
with English manipulation of Irish affairs and lack of popular participation 
in the political process, along with socially conservative notions of respect 
for the Catholic Church and the monarchy.  As a political organisation the 
United Irishmen had some success in inculcating a comprehensive and 
popular Irish nationalism which drew on the bitterness still felt among the 
Catholic Irish because of the Penal Laws, and also the patriotic principles 
held by both the Protestant gentry and middle-class9.  This new and, most 
importantly, equitable patriotism did much to counter the reservations 
many Irishmen had over some of the principles behind the revolution in 
France: 
“In the present era of reform when unjust governments are falling in every quarter of 
Europe…we think it our duty to come forward and state what we feel to be our heavy 
grievance, and what we believe to be its effectual remedy.  We have no National 
Government.  We are ruled by Englishmen and the servants of Englishmen whose 
object is the interest of another country, whose instrument is corruption, whose strength 
is the weakness of Ireland, and these men have the whole power and patronage of the 
country as means to subdue the honesty and the spirit of her representatives in the 
legislature.”10 
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This declaration, adopted at the inaugural meeting of the Dublin Society of 
United Irishmen on the 9th of November 1791, contains nothing overly 
contentious for the time, but the subtle radicalism of the language implies 
that more extreme measures could be invoked if deemed necessary.  The 
aims of the society were a union of all Irishmen, regardless of religion, to 
reverse the English influence in Ireland and to obtain both social and 
political reform.  These aims were almost universally popular at the time 
and it was these aims which ordinary Irish people related to, and not the 
implied radicalism of the leaders; Wolfe Tone, Napper Tandy, Samuel 
Neilson et al. 
It is possible that if the revolution in France had not taken such a radical 
direction, that a similar transition could have been made in Ireland.  
However, the excesses and the radical republicanism of the French 
Revolution shocked the majority of people in Ireland and in Scotland, thus 
making it very difficult for the radicals in the United Irishmen and 
therefore the United Scotsmen to make any significant popular progress.  
The failure of the rebellion in 1798 and the subsequent repression in Ireland 
further distanced the ordinary Irish people from the ideals of 
republicanism.  Although the United Irishmen introduced a more 
democratic and inclusive form of nationalism, their attempted rebellion 
failed because the Irish people just did not respond to their republican 
nationalism in any meaningful way. 
The events of 1798 precipitated a parliamentary union with Britain, and left 
Ireland with the status of a region, not a nation.  Support for the Union in 
Ireland did not correspond clearly to any party political positions.  The 
most vociferous opponents of the Union were, paradoxically, the 
Orangemen who feared a real threat to their dominance of Irish society.  
Nonetheless, the Union came into being on the 1st of January 1801 after the 
British government had secured its passage through parliament with 
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patronage and bribery11.  It must be understood that the threat of invasion 
from France was still very real up to about 1805, and the British 
government did not want a volatile neighbour across the Irish Sea while 
most of her military forces were occupied fighting in continental Europe. 
Yet the real threat was perhaps not from the United Irishmen, who had 
largely been suppressed by 1799, but from the biggest problem within Irish 
society.  This was the system of land ownership which prevailed in most of 
the country.  The British government’s land reforms, which would 
ultimately contribute to the rapid expansion of owner-occupancy, had little 
impact on agricultural efficiency or economic prosperity.  The key features 
of larger farm sizes, the erosion of landed influence, specialised cultivation 
and a declining rural population could also equally apply to Scotland.  Yet 
Ireland was unique in the sense that there was no concurrent industrial 
development in urban areas to smooth the difficulties of this transition or 
absorb the surplus rural population.  This explains why Irish nationalism 
was mainly an urban movement supported by relatively prosperous 
middle-class individuals, and those who aspired to such social status, until 
the 1870s.  Only with the Land War after 1879 was there any real attempt to 
bring the rural and urban movements together.  The orthodox view that 
Irish development was held back by the oppression of an exploitative 
landowning elite has been largely discredited by recent research which 
tends to concentrate instead on the influence of the famine on the 
development of Irish nationalism12. 
When the experience of parliamentary union with England in Ireland is 
compared to the experience in Scotland, it appears that the Scots have had 
by far the better deal.  Scots have participated fully in the British Empire, 
with many economic successes.  Although by no means popular when it 
was initially established in 1707 it has been generally accepted, until 
recently, that Scotland made the best out of the Union in sometimes 
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difficult circumstances13.  The Church of Scotland, the Scottish legal system 
and the Scottish education system were all preserved within the Union to 
ensure a lasting sense of Scottishness in ‘Northern Britain’.  This was not 
the case with Ireland.  For the 120 years of its existence, the direct union 
with Britain was characterised by undiluted control from Westminster.  
This contrast between the respective experiences of Scotland and Ireland in 
their union with England raises many questions.  Yet it is perhaps the 
question of religion which will shed most light on the present study.  After 
the Reformation of the sixteenth century, Scotland shifted its allegiance 
from France to England and has been influenced by its southern neighbour 
ever since.  Catholic Ireland, as has been described above, retained close 
links with France up to and including the rebellion of 1798.  As Scotland 
was a Protestant country which kept its own institutions to temper English 
influence, it had a much more beneficial experience of union with England 
than Catholic Ireland did.  The fundamental social and economic problems 
of Ireland were not seriously considered until the late nineteenth century, 
with the Union always seen as the root cause of all these problems14. 
The new movement which had as its main aim the national improvement 
of life for the ordinary Irish people was led by Daniel O’Connell and had 
various names, but has become known as the movement for Catholic 
Emancipation.  This was essentially a social movement, but came to 
represent a type of popular nationalism for the majority of the Irish people.  
Irish republicanism had become a minority political movement, and the 
success of the Catholic Emancipation movement clearly awakened the 
dormant power of the ordinary Irish people; after generations of suffering, 
this movement began to champion the cause of the majority of the 
population – Catholic Ireland.  O’Connell rejected separatism and wanted 
legislative independence within the British Empire.  This is perhaps why 
his policy was also attractive to many southern Irish Protestants; for 
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O’Connell, like the United Irishmen before him, Ireland did not just mean 
Catholic Ireland15.  O’Connell also abhorred bloodshed and terror so 
advocated legal demonstrations, organisation and discipline.  It was these 
last two qualities in particular which eventually wrought concessions from 
the British government with the introduction of the Catholic Emancipation 
Bill in April 1829.  O’Connell had succeeded in holding back the forces of 
agrarian violence, though he always hinted in his speeches that this control 
was conditional.  His election in County Clare in 1828 was a challenge to 
the political establishment, and they had no real alternative but to 
introduce the Bill in face of the monumental backlash which would follow 
in Ireland if they did not do so16. 
However, it was O’Connell’s campaign for repeal of the Union, with its 
‘monster meetings’, which consolidated in Ireland a popular and powerful 
national consciousness which became political, but not republican.  It 
proved difficult to sustain the momentum of public opinion generated by 
the Catholic Emancipation movement of the 1820s, but O’Connell was 
aided in his Repeal campaign by a group of young middle-class men, some 
Catholic, some Protestant, who were to become known as ‘Young 
Ireland’17.  Through their newspaper, The Nation, which first appeared in 
October 1842, they attempted to construct a new and dynamic Irish 
nationalism which demanded repeal of the Union and an Irish Parliament: 
 
“The work that should today be wrought 
defer not till tomorrow; 
the help that should within be sought 
scorn from without to borrow. 
Old maxims these – yet stout and true – 
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they speak in trumpet tone, 
to do at once what is to do 
and trust OURSELVES ALONE.”18 
 
The association between O’Connell and the Young Irelanders was not 
always a happy one, as O’Connell continually played on the deep 
emotional respect the ordinary Irish people had for the monarchy.  This did 
not go down well with the Young Irelanders, for they were supporters of a 
federal solution to the Union dilemma and were not ardent monarchists.  
They believed that a British Federation was all that could reasonable be 
hoped for out of their situation.  This was a similar hope to that of Irish 
nationalists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who 
pushed for Home Rule.  Throughout the 1840s, unionists in Ireland and in 
Scotland believed that any concession to Irish nationalism would have been 
“the thin end of the wedge of separation”19.  O’Connell was eventually to 
back down from his campaign of ‘monster meetings’ when the British 
government banned a proposed gathering at Clontarf in September 1843.  
This sign of weakness at a time when forcefulness was required to see 
through the repeal campaign disillusioned many in Ireland and 
exasperated the Young Irelanders.  The years between 1843 and 1846 were 
years of political deadlock, and the strain of between the empirical and 
constitutional approach of O’Connell and the more dynamic outlook of the 
Young Irelanders became increasingly apparent.  When the split finally 
came in the summer of 1846 the only real result was the satisfaction of the 
British government, and the strengthening of the Union.  At any rate, the 
political situation was thrown into turmoil by the potato famine in Ireland 
which began in the autumn of 1845. 
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Emigration from Ireland did not begin after the potato famine, as is widely 
believed; it actually developed gradually from about the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.  It did reach its peak in the period between 1845 and 
1852, due to the exceptional devastation caused by the potato famine which 
was only exacerbated by the over-reliance on agriculture in the Irish 
economy.  Many went to North America, many settled in London and 
north-west England, and many took the northern route, from Connaught 
and Ulster, to Scotland.  The main area of concentration for the Irish 
immigrants to Scotland was the west of central Scotland. 
Being concentrated so heavily in one part of the country, this population 
movement seemed more overwhelming than it was in reality21.  Even in the 
1840s, Irish immigration never accounted for more than a third of total 
population increases.  When the fact that the number of immigrants was 
roughly balanced by those going abroad is also taken into account, the 
reaction of many indigenous Scots is put into perspective.  However, at the 
peak of Irish immigration between 1845 and 1852 there was concurrently a 
growing awareness of urban decay and its problems.  This cruel 
coincidence made the Irish immigrants in the cities of mainland Britain 
convenient targets for condemnation.  The Irish were denounced as ‘aliens’ 
by the establishment, and the fears of the Scottish people were played on in 
this way for political ends from the 1840s right up until the 1930s.  
Although Scotland received a fair amount of Irish immigrants, more in fact 
than England in proportion to national population, this population 
movement was never the flood it was made out to be at the time.  The Irish 
were just easy targets and suffered severe hostility and discrimination, 
causing them to feel alienated from their host society.  This alienation bred 
a lack of confidence in themselves, which hampered any attempts at 
serious political organisation within immigrant communities for some 
considerable time.  The potato famine of 1845 was without doubt the most 
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terrible disaster in recorded Irish history; it is thus all the more galling that 
those who survived to come to Scotland experienced yet more hardship. 
The Young Irelanders had planned a confrontation with the forces of the 
British government in theory for late 1848.  What has been called the ‘rising 
of 1848’ in Ireland did not really measure up to any practical notions of 
revolt.  There was such a lack of organisation and no clear strategy that the 
British government never looked in serious danger.  Events dictated the 
whole affair, rather than the other way around.  The bloodless revolution 
in Paris in February 1848 encouraged the new Irish League to press ahead 
with its policy of pressurising the British government for repeal22.  
However, the mere act of repealing the Union would not end the suffering 
of the Irish people at a stroke.  In this sense the Irish League was out of 
touch with the views of the ordinary Irish people.  The second revolution 
in Paris in June, which was very violent and socialistic, shocked the 
middle-class supporters of the Irish League and made the clergy in Ireland 
distance themselves from the Irish nationalist movement.  The Irish League 
wanted to put on a show of strength to force some concessions from the 
British government, but the government took the initiative and made the 
possession of arms illegal as well as suspending the Habeus Corpus Act.  
Warrants were issued for the leaders of the Irish League, notably Smith 
O’Brien who had not really wanted a direct armed confrontation with the 
British government in the first place.  Alarmed by what was occurring on 
the continent, the clergy set about persuading their congregations to take 
no part in the rising.  Without the crucial support of the Irish people, any 
attempt at a rising was doomed to failure.  Coupled with the organisational 
mistakes and the tendency to be reactive instead of proactive, the 
attempted rising of 1848 in Ireland, apart from a few minor incidents, was a 
non-event. 
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The pointlessness of debating the finer points of Irish nationalist politics 
when thousands of Irish people were dying due to the potato blight was 
apparent by 1848.  Irish nationalist politics had to be brought closer to the 
people if they were to have any real substance or chance of success, so the 
1850s marked a slight change of direction in Irish politics.  There was a 
distinct shift towards constitutionalism and an independent Irish Party was 
established at Westminster to this end.  However, the Irish Party was 
initially unsuccessful due to its small numbers and an inability to exploit 
parliamentary procedures.  In 1864 a National League was founded to try 
and achieve an Irish parliament through constitutional means but, like the 
many organisations with the same purpose founded before it, its efforts 
came to nothing and support for it ebbed away. 
At about the same time, a new secret society was being established in the 
south-west of Ireland.  Secret societies had been active in Ireland for well 
over a century, but had never been as intentionally political as this new 
society, which also attracted greater numbers of middle-class members.  
This secret society did not really have a name as such until 1858 when it 
grew into the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), and later became the 
organisational nucleus of Sinn Fein.  The directing influence behind this 
society was James Stephens, an Irishman who had travelled widely in 
Europe and had first-hand knowledge of the revolutionary socialist 
theories active on the continent.  He was also an able organiser and the IRB 
skilfully exploited the Irish communities in North America and in Scotland 
for funds and supplies.  This was the first time that the large reservoir of 
tacit support for the Irish nationalist cause had been seriously tapped in 
this way.  Stephens had learnt the value of secrecy and effective 
organisation and control abroad, and the early years of the 1860s were 
spent moulding the IRB into a militantly republican secret society.  
Although an independent republic was their ultimate goal, the IRB also 
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had the reform of the land system at the head of their agenda.  They 
realised the importance of gaining the support of the ordinary Irish people 
in any future armed uprising, and through the influence of their Irish-
American division, the society came to be known as the Fenians, and they 
established their organisational base in London in early 186723. 
A rising was planned for the 11th of February of 1867 but it failed because, 
as so often before, the ordinary Irish people did not actively support it in 
large enough numbers.  The British government, through the use of spies 
and informers, had learned of the rising and took swift action to snuff it 
out.  Once the Fenian leaders had realised this they attempted to postpone 
the rising, but could not communicate quickly enough with all sections of 
the organisation.  Their proclamation appeared in The Times newspaper on 
the 8th of March 1867, calling for an Irish Republic, the reform of the 
iniquitous land system, and the complete separation of Church and State.  
What was different about this attempted rising was the fact that the leaders 
of this republican movement were so heavily influenced by revolutionary 
socialist theory. 
This examination of Irish nationalism reveals something of the complexity 
of its origins.  The historical background from which Irish nationalism 
emerged gives us the political vocabulary of the Irish immigrants to 
Scotland.  Their political ‘Irishness’ gradually grew into a sort of dualistic 
patriotism, an expression of a double identity: being Scottish but at the 
same time acknowledging the social and cultural ties to Ireland24.  Glasgow 
Celtic Football and Athletic Company (later just Celtic Football Club) is 
perhaps one of the best examples of this concept of a dual social identity.  
As Gerry Finn has written:  
“the Irish-Scots of the 1880s were a proud community, despite the range of prejudices 
aimed at them…The formation of Celtic symbolised the aspirations of this outward-
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looking community, and these high expectations were soon fulfilled by the footballing 
success of the team…Celtic represented a community which was Irish-Scots, and Celtic, 
above all other symbols, has reflected the desire of the Irish-Scots and their descendants 
to…take pride in their Irish ancestry.”25 
 
Although this pride referred to by Finn above would come to cause 
problems with the Protestant majority in Scotland, it encouraged the Irish 
immigrants to organise themselves effectively, and the years between 1867 
and 1890 arguably represented the pinnacle of popular Irish political 
organisation in Scotland.  During these years the energies of all Irish 
communities across Britain were directed towards gaining support for 
Gladstone and the Liberal Party or Parnell and the Irish Party.  The defeat 
of the Home Rule for Ireland Bill in 1886 only served to intensify the 
political activity of the Irish-Scots at that time.  The Home Government 
Association, founded in Scotland in 1871, directed the efforts of the Irish 
across mainland Britain.  The Glasgow branch of the Association, led by 
John Ferguson, was arguably the best organised and most vigorous of all 
the British branches.  However, after the second Home Rule Bill was 
rejected by the House of Lords in 1893, the Irish-Scots began to grow 
disillusioned with parliamentary politics.  They had made almost 
superhuman efforts – twice – to try and win Home Rule for Ireland but had 
failed each time.  Gladstone had always ensured that any Irish drift into 
ethnic-based politics had been cut short but, after 1893, and a second 
successive parliamentary failure to deliver, he could no longer exercise 
control over the Irish vote which collapsed, demoralised, in some areas or 
switched allegiance to the labour movement, as socialist candidates began 
to appear in election after 188826. 
The Irish-Scots split into warring faction after 1890, but unity was slowly 
restored by about the beginning of the twentieth century.  Many, though, 
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had lost their zeal for Irish nationalist politics and were actively looking for 
an alternative.  The United Irish League (UIL) was established in 1898 to 
redirect Irish nationalist political activity, taking over from the moribund 
Home Government Association.  New life was quickly injected into the 
political activity of Irish-Scots, but the UIL could not have claimed the sole 
credit for this; the Labour Party was beginning to win over many working-
class voters but, more significantly for this study, Sinn Fein began its Irish 
nationalist propaganda amongst the Irish-Scots communities at the same 
time.  This only confused many of the Irish-Scots; on the one hand they 
were definitely open to new political ideas and methods after the failure of 
the second Home Rule Bill in 1893 but, on the other hand, the Irish-Scots 
were being courted by the Labour Party and thus absorption into 
mainstream politics which caused them to question their previously held 
convictions. 
The emergence in Ireland of the National Literary Society and the Gaelic 
League in 1892 and 1893 respectively, put the issue of Irish nationalism 
very simply: Ireland had to be de-Anglicised.  They rejected the influence 
of English culture on Irish tastes and outlook, and declined the label of 
‘West Britons’27.  Although these two groups were essentially a minority 
movement, their creed of cultural self-respect gradually became 
incorporated within the Irish national ethos, and thus eventually into the 
general outlook of the Irish-Scots.  This growth of a national consciousness 
in the 1890s would eventually benefit Sinn Fein, as it provided the 
necessary and inevitable manifestation of the inherent cultural pride of the 
Irish people. 
The terminology used when examining the immigrant Irish communities in 
Scotland needs to be clarified.  Some writers have used the term ‘the Irish 
in Scotland’28.  Finn uses the term ‘Irish-Scots’, which is useful when you 
are describing members of immigrant communities not born in Scotland29.  
25 
 
The present study will use this term as defined above, but it best describes 
those who were actually born in Ireland.  This thesis is directly concerned 
with the period between 1898 and 1939 however, and during this time 
immigration from Ireland had slowed to a steady trickle.  Therefore, most 
members of immigrant communities would have been born in Scotland, 
thus making the term ‘Scots-Irish’ more accurate, particularly after the First 
World War. 
A useful description of Irish nationalism in the nineteenth century would 
be that of a see-saw; a movement continually oscillating between 
constitutional agitation and more radical republicanism.  The last example 
being the Fenian Rising which provoked a shift to another constitutionalist 
phase which contained two unsuccessful Home Rule Bills.  It has been 
argued that, if Home Rule had been achieved in the late nineteenth 
century, it would have kept Ireland in the Union and avoided the 
bloodshed and bitterness seen in the twentieth century.  An alternative 
view is that the achievement of Home Rule for Ireland in the late 
nineteenth century would not have halted the movement for an Irish 
republic; it would only have accelerated it. 
Tom Garvin describes the parliamentary leaders of Irish nationalism as 
“prisoners” of an aged and violent tradition and, to compete with violence, 
“constitutionalism had often to wrap itself in a very green flag indeed”30.  
Alvin Jackson and Matthew Kelly have described what they see as the 
“Redmondite-Fenian nexus” of the 1890s31.  After the Home Rule 
movement split into Parnellite and anti-Parnellite factions, the 
Redmondites (after John Redmond, the leader of the Parnellites) drew 
closer to the IRB as seen in the campaign for the amnesty of Irish political 
prisoners, for example.  By 1900, however, Redmond had severed the 
Parnellites’ links with the IRB to achieve the reunification of the Irish Party.  
The cultural mobilisation of the romantic nationalism of the 1890s and the 
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1798 centenary activities demonstrated to the new generation of Irish 
republicans the possibilities of a “dynamic separatism” in sharp contrast to 
constitutional nationalism32.  There is also the view that the Irish Party at 
Westminster only publicly revered Fenianism to manipulate the popular 
myth of the bold and noble Fenian men33.  This deliberate strategy was not 
patriotic or separatist but an attempt to convince the electorate that 
constitutional nationalism was not only close to success, but actually the 
legitimate culmination of all previous Irish nationalist activity.  This 
strategy continued to 1914 when the need for more militant action became 
clear once again. 
 
*** 
 
The evolution of Irish nationalism and the relationship of militant to 
constitutional nationalism is one of the most interesting aspects of this 
study.  Ireland was not unique in Europe in seeking to separate from the 
political control of a foreign government, nor was it even the first to try to 
do so.  Nationalism grew throughout Europe from about the middle of the 
nineteenth century onwards.  The Irish movement for Home Rule was not 
exceptional within the British Empire either:  Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and South Africa all obtained dominion status by the early 
twentieth century.  What was unique about the struggle for Irish Home 
Rule was the inflexible resistance of unionists Protestants in Britain and 
particularly in Ulster.  This resistance led to many setbacks and by the early 
twentieth century more militant methods were considered by more and 
more Irish nationalists as a necessity rather than a choice. 
27 
 
Militant Irish nationalism or republicanism has its origins in the ‘Atlantic 
Revolution’ of the late eighteenth century34.  Social Contract theorists like 
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau influenced the American colonials and 
French revolutionaries in their desire for good government.  At its most 
fundamental level, republicanism implies the absence of a monarchy in a 
country’s system of government, which was a very radical proposal in the 
late eighteenth century.  The main reason for the republican spark igniting 
the British colony in America and then the French to revolution was 
relatively straightforward: powerful groups in each society had very real 
grievances with their respective systems of government.  The American 
colonials rejected the inequality of being heavily taxed without fair political 
representation in return and, similarly, the bourgeoisie directed the 
revolution in France in order to redress the power imbalance against them 
in French society.  Although each context has its own peculiarities, both 
groups were enraged by patriarchal arrogance and political 
mismanagement; and both groups felt socially slighted so both movements 
aimed to reform their respective governments for the greater good.  
Moreover, the focal point in each case was the monarchy.  There can also be 
detected in each movement a developing sense of national consciousness 
which sought national renewal in a very positive way.  All modern 
European nationalism has been influenced in some way by the Atlantic 
Revolution of the late eighteenth century. 
Irish republicanism during the period of the present study was also about 
renewing a national consciousness, but it also contained a feeling of 
collective grievance against the British government and a sense of political 
impotence that only separation would satisfy.  This was expressed as a 
fierce Celtic or Gaelic pride which manifested itself in militant and often 
violent acts of protest.  There is also the great myth of noble failure and 
sacrifice which has been absorbed into the identity of militant Irish 
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nationalism.  The Fenians emphasised the republican continuity from the 
United Irishmen in 1798, through 1803 and 1848 to 1867, for example.  
Moreover, militant Irish nationalism or republicanism was also influenced 
by revolutionary socialist thinking from continental Europe from 1848. 
Irish republicanism integrated much of the theoretical legacy of the 
Atlantic Revolution of the late eighteenth century, but also contained many 
singular elements which seem to have more of a bearing on Scotland.  It 
essentially became a militant separatist movement with a distinctive 
national identity, driven by the IRB’s interpretation of revolutionary 
socialism.  Yet the period between 1898 and 1939 was not the first episode 
of Irish republicanism to deeply affect Scotland.  The reaction to Fenianism 
in the 1860s has been well documented and Elaine McFarland, for example, 
explains it as a ‘moral panic’ in the classic sociological sense35.  Scotland 
was particularly susceptible to the fear of Fenianism in the 1860s due to 
deep economic and religious insecurities.  Problems in India and fear of 
French invasion made the Empire look weak and vulnerable, and 
apprehension over the papacy’s intervention in the unification of Italy 
raised questions about the loyalty of the Catholic minority within Scotland.  
Industrial uncertainty, urban overcrowding and poverty, and Irish 
immigration only heightened this anxiety as McFarland has noted36.  She 
also traces the ‘pedigree’ of Irish underground organisation in Scotland, 
from refugee United Irishmen after the rebellion of 1798, through Ribbon 
societies in the 1820s and 1830s, Young Irelanders in the 1840s and 1850s, to 
the Fenians or IRB in the 1860s and beyond37.  She views the Fenians in 
Scotland as a reflection of the Irish community’s desire for “collective 
advancement and individual self-fulfilment”, and correctly sees continuity 
between IRB activities in Scotland in the 1860s and again in the 1920s38.  
Iain Patterson has also noted the evolution of Irish nationalist politics in 
Ireland being mirrored within the Irish community in Scotland as well as 
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the parallels between the 1860s and 1920s for IRB activity39.  The Fenian 
panic of 1865 to 1868 remained in the collective memory and should be 
viewed as an underlying influence on attitudes towards Irish republican 
activity in Scotland in the 1920s and 1930s. 
The nineteenth century in Scotland was generally one of progress and 
reform.  The Scottish people were mostly content with the benefits from the 
Union with England, largely brought about through successful economic 
integration and Empire-building.  Unlike in Ireland, in Scotland there 
existed a fairly diverse industrial base as well as an agricultural sector.  
Moreover, Presbyterianism was the dominant religion throughout the 
country and so there was much less social instability present to foster 
discontent on a similar scale to Ireland where Catholicism was the 
dominant religion but did not have a similar social status.  However, by the 
end of the nineteenth century old political certainties were beginning to 
disappear.  Attitudes towards Irish Home Rule began to polarise after 1885 
as urban Scotland struggled with the continuing expansion of its industrial 
base.  Support for some devolution of power from the Imperial Parliament 
in London to Scotland as well as Ireland grew, but minorities like unionists 
in Ulster feared the consequences of any change to the status quo.  Poverty 
and cultural alienation in Ireland consistently undermined any attempts to 
fully integrate Ireland into the Union.  It should also be stressed again that 
Scotland’s experience of the Union was in marked contrast with that of 
Ireland.  The much more sympathetic treatment of Highland crofters in the 
1880s compared to the treatment of Catholic Irish tenant farmers is a good 
example of contrasting attitudes and experiences40. 
In Scotland there was also a growing concern over the dilution of Scottish 
national identity.  Anglicisation began after 1603 and was consolidated 
after 1707.  The attacks on Highland culture after 1745 further undermined 
any traditionally Scottish cultural identity.  Emigration, mainly to North 
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America, renewed a sense of the importance of the past to any form of 
national consciousness.  This renewed nationalistic vigour manifested itself 
in different ways: the Gaelic revival of the 1860s to the 1880s being a 
cultural reaction, and the establishment of the National Association for the 
Vindication of Scottish Rights in 1853 being one of the first political 
reactions.  Scots disliked English indifference but were generally 
pragmatic.  They understood and enjoyed the benefits from the Union, but 
had been uneasy about the treatment of Scottish culture since 1745.  The 
monarchy had widespread, but not total, support and was regarded as a 
symbol of unity.  Republicans had been active in Scotland as well as 
Ireland since the French Revolution, but any serious attempts at popular 
political organisation were always thwarted by the British government.  
However, the increase in Catholic Irish immigration after 1845 caused 
alarm and tension, especially in the west of central Scotland.  The issue of 
Irish Home Rule also led directly to the formation of the Scottish Home 
Rule Association in 1886, for example, and illustrates the sensitivity of 
many Scots to the events associated with the evolution of Irish nationalism. 
The complexity of party alignments is also an essential concern.  The work 
of Alvin Jackson and David Miller provides much insight here41.  It is clear 
that the 1885 General Election ended Conservative and Liberal 
representation in the three southern provinces of Ireland, and the Irish 
Party dominated each subsequent election until 191842.  Both Jackson and 
Miller see the period immediately after 1885 polarising attitudes within 
and to Irish Home Rule.  Unionists in Ulster increasingly feared 
persecution, humiliation and dispossession; fears that bemused Irish 
nationalists who could not fathom why northern Protestants did not see 
Home Rule as a victory for all Irishmen instead of a potential disaster43.  
The fact that the 86 Irish nationalist MPs held the balance of power at 
Westminster led Gladstone to introduce the first Home Rule for Ireland 
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Bill, the immediate consequence of which was to split his own party and 
return the Conservatives to government supported by a group of unionist 
Liberal defectors.  Preparations for armed resistance to Irish Home Rule 
began in Ulster, and it even became socially acceptable for wealthy 
Presbyterians to join the Orange Order44.  In Scotland, as Elaine McFarland 
has noted, the Orange Order enthusiastically supported the 
Conservative/Liberal unionist pact, becoming an “autonomous pressure 
group within the Unionist Camp”45.  There was no Protestant unanimity on 
Irish Home Rule, however.  Scottish supporters of Gladstone and Home 
Rule were mostly Protestant and, even within Liberal Unionism, there was 
a desire for devolution within the United Kingdom so that Scotland would 
continue to benefit from the imperial connection but have a degree of 
control over its internal affairs46.       
 
*** 
 
Before assessing the extent of any impact which Irish nationalism had on 
Scotland, we must be clear on how this impact can be measured.  ‘Impact’ 
here generally means how far the ideas, methods and propaganda of Irish 
nationalism influenced or affected the people of Scotland.  Exactly who was 
affected and why is also important.  The scope of this study will therefore 
be as wide as possible, taking into account not just the immigrant Irish 
community and indigenous Scots and interaction between the two, but also 
the Scottish institutions that were affected like the Protestant churches and 
the various political parties, for example.  There is also the direct impact on 
the British government and its agencies like the intelligence services who 
monitored the evolution of Irish nationalism, and in particular Irish 
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republicanism, and were aiming to minimise its effect on the internal 
security of the United Kingdom. 
The extent of any influence can be determined through careful examination 
of public opinion.  Contemporary newspapers have been particularly 
useful in this regard, with the Glasgow Observer providing valuable insight 
into the Irish immigrant community since it was their primary organ.  The 
views in the Glasgow Observer are balanced with a study of unionist 
newspapers like the Glasgow Herald for the alternative perspective.  The 
Scotsman and Daily Record archives have also been consulted as well as any 
available local newspapers.  Reference has also been made to the archives 
and publications of the political organisations active at the time like An 
Poblacht, Forward and Protestant Action election literature from Edinburgh 
Central Library. 
In any piece of analytical research there will be problems of interpretation 
for the historian.  Any study of relevant contemporary sources, no matter 
how complete, will always leave gaps for hypothesis and subjectivity, 
especially in an area so close to the present.  This study has undoubtedly 
benefitted from access to many official sources in the National Archives of 
Scotland (formerly the SRO) which were released to the public for the first 
time in the late 1990s.  To a lesser extent, fresh sources were examined in 
the Public Record Office in London and in the National Archives of Ireland 
in Dublin.  Several other repositories have been used and the sources 
referenced throughout the text and detailed in the bibliography to 
encourage further research on this part of Scotland’s recent past. 
 
*** 
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The following chapters will continue an examination of Irish nationalism 
and its impact on Scotland in detail.  The next four chapters divide the 
period into the four segments put forward above; 1898 to 1916 (Chapter II), 
1916 to 1922 (Chapter III), 1922 to 1931 (Chapter IV), and 1932 to 1939 
(Chapter V).  Each chapter represents a discrete study of the influence of 
Irish nationalism on Scotland in that particular era, but together chart the 
evolution of Irish nationalism and its overall impact on the Scotland.  The 
final chapter discusses the conclusions reached from the research 
undertaken. 
This study aims to stick closely to the aims and objectives outlined in the 
original thesis proposal and explained at length in this Introduction.  As 
well as looking in as much detail as possible at the available evidence in 
order to assess the impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland between 1898 
and 1939, this study also attempts to take other recent research into account 
before drawing any necessary conclusions. 
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Chapter I: Notes 
 
 
1) HART, ‘The IRA, 1916-1923’, p.5. 
2) See TOWNSHEND, ‘The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921’. 
3) See O’HALPIN, ‘The Decline of the Union, 1892-1920’. 
4) See FITZPATRICK, ‘The two Irelands, 1912-1939’ and GARVIN, ‘The evolution of Irish 
nationalist politics’. 
 
5) HART, op. cit., p.29. 
6) See GARVIN, op. cit. 
7) KEE, ‘The Green Flag’, vol.I, p.41. 
8) ibid. 
9) The Penal Laws excluded Roman Catholics from all public life and most social activity.  
These laws (early 18th century) made it illegal for Catholics to buy land or make a decent profit 
from renting it out.  Moreover, if a Catholic converted to Protestantism, they immediately 
gained social and economic advantages.  These laws were designed to make Catholics feel 
inferior, and in practice they created deep divisions between both religions.  Some excesses 
were alleviated by the Catholic Relief Act of 1793, but it was not until the Emancipation 
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movement of the 1820s, led by O’Connell, that Irish Catholics received substantial redress 
from this discrimination. 
 
10) From the Declaration of the Dublin Society of United Irishmen at their inaugural meeting 
(Report of the Committee of Secrecy to the House of Commons, London, 1797, Appendix II) 
 
11) KEE, op. cit., pp.149-160. 
12) See FOSTER, ‘Modern Ireland, 1600-1972’; LYONS, ‘Ireland since the Famine’; 
DONNELLY, ‘Irish Peasants’; VAUGHN, ‘A new history of Ireland’; O’GRADA, ‘Ireland 
before and after the Famine’. 
 
13) See FINLAY, ‘A Partnership for Good?’, especially Chapter 1. 
14) Refer to the works cited in note 12 above, for example. 
15) GIRVIN, ‘From Union to Union’, p.7. 
16) Due to the oath an MP had to take on entering the House of Commons, which asserted 
allegiance to the crown and Protestant supremacy and accused the ‘Church of Rome’ of using 
superstitious and idolatrous practices.  See MITCHELL, ‘The Irish in the west of Scotland, 
1797-1848’ for an examination of the effects of O’Connell’s campaigns on Scotland, and also 
McCAFFREY, ‘Irish Immigrants and Radical Movements in the west of Scotland in the early 
nineteenth century’, IR39, 1988. 
 
17) After Mazzini’s ‘Young Italy’. 
18) The Nation, 3 December 1842. 
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19) KEE, op. cit., p.207 explains this in some detail. 
20) 400,000 Irish immigrants came to Scotland between 1845 and 1852 according to census 
figures.  See HANDLEY, ‘The Irish in Modern Scotland’, pp.44-5. 
 
21) A survey of contemporary Scottish newspapers reveals this.  See the Glasgow Herald of the 
1840s especially.  See also HANDLEY, op. cit. and GALLAGHER, ‘Glasgow: the uneasy peace’, 
especially chapter 1. 
 
22) A reunion of the Young Irelanders’ ‘Irish Confederation’ with the old Repeal Association. 
23) Taken from the legendary elite warrior legion of Fiona MacCumhail, the Fianna. 
24) For most Irish-born immigrants living in Scotland this would have been similar – 
identification with the motherland of Ireland, but wanting to contribute fully to Scottish 
society at the same time. 
 
25) FINN, ‘Racism, Religion and Social Prejudice’, IJHS, 8, 1991, pp.91-2. 
26) See McFARLAND, ‘John Ferguson, 1836-1906’ for a discussion of this. 
27) The parallels with Scotland being viewed as ‘North Britain’ are clear.  Although Scotland 
and Wales were also united with England to form Britain, British influences were still seen in 
Ireland as ‘English’. 
 
28) HANDLEY, among others. 
29) FINN, op. cit., pp.22-93. 
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32) KELLY, op. cit., p.231. 
33) McCONNEL, ‘Fenians at Westminster’, IHS39, 2004. 
34) GODECHOT, ‘France and the Atlantic Revolution, 1770-1799’, pp.1-27. 
35) See HANDLEY, op. cit.; NEWSINGER, ‘Fenianism in mid-Victorian Britain’; 
COMERFORD, ‘Fenians in context’; O’CATHAIN, ‘Fenianism in Scotland, 1853-1916’. 
 
36) See McFARLAND, ‘A Reality and yet Impalpable’, SHR77, 1998. 
37) ibid, p.205.  See also her ‘Ireland and Scotland in the Age of Revolution’. 
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39) PATTERSON, ‘The impact of the Irish Revolution on the Irish community in Scotland, 
1916-1923’, MPhil thesis, University of Strathclyde, 1991. 
 
40) See HUNTER, ‘The Gaelic connection: the Highlands, Ireland and nationalism, 1873-1922’, 
SHR54, 1975. 
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45) McFARLAND, ‘The Orangemen’s Unionist Vision’, in MacDONALD, ‘Unionist Scotland’. 
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Chapter II: 1898 – 1916; “all changed, changed utterly” 
 
The beginning of this period was marked by the aftershocks of the 
unsuccessful Gladstonian Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893.  The ‘Irish 
Question’ was still apparent in political debate, but had diminished in 
perceived relevance by the time of Gladstone’s death in May 1898, and this 
was for three main reasons.  Firstly, the Conservatives had by then 
replaced the Liberals as the party of government1, and were committed to a 
policy of ‘equality’ for Ireland – treatment comparable to the other 
members of the United Kingdom2 – but were absolutely opposed to any 
form of Home Rule.  Secondly, the Liberals, now out of office and with 
Gladstone dead, effectively shelved Home Rule as an identifiably Liberal 
Party policy.  This was because there were many Liberal MPs who were 
unionist in sentiment, and the party managers realised that a divided 
Opposition would not return swiftly to power.  Lastly, there was a severe 
and apparently irretrievable split amongst the Irish Nationalists or Irish 
Party.  This can largely be explained as the reaction to the failure of the 
Second Home Rule Bill of 1893.  The Irish Party had pinned their hopes on 
Home Rule being delivered at this second time of asking, and were 
palpably affected by its defeat.  As after any political setback, searching 
questions were asked of the Irish nationalist parliamentary leadership; 
when they could not agree on the way forward, especially concerning their 
relationship with the Liberal Party, a split occurred.  Serious tension had in 
fact been ongoing since the Parnell split during 1891, which was the 
underlying reason for all the internecine conflict within Irish nationalist 
politics until well into the twentieth century.  This in-fighting between 
Parnellite and anti-Parnellite factions killed any real hope of Home Rule 
success for a generation of Irish nationalists.  There was, not unusually for 
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the time, no clear manifestation of this split as far as parliamentary party 
organisation went, but Irish nationalist MPs could have been separated on 
which ‘leader’ they supported.  Broadly speaking, the larger half of the 
parliamentary party was keen to lick its wounds and press for systematic 
legislation to remove specific Irish grievances.  This section was led by John 
Redmond and John Dillon, but these two did not always agree.  The rest of 
the party, led loosely by Michael Davitt, William O’Brien and T. M. Healy, 
called for more militant action against the oppression of the ‘English’ 
parliament (sic) at Westminster3. 
The Irish nationalists at this time can be divided into moral or physical 
force advocates therefore.  The moral force advocates hoped to persuade 
the British public that Ireland’s needs were not properly addressed or 
satisfied with the status quo, and only a devolved Irish assembly would 
effectively solve this problem.  The physical force advocates within the 
Irish nationalist movement were the guardians of republicanism.  They 
regarded the continuation of Irish inclusion within the United Kingdom as 
an insult, a deliberate neglect of the wishes of the majority of the Irish 
people.  They too desired an Irish parliament, but an independent 
parliament not subject to the Imperial parliament at Westminster.  They 
believed that Irish national pride was being damaged by pleading for 
something which, in their opinion, Ireland had always been justly entitled 
to. 
The use of force was justified in claiming separation from the Union 
because the Union had not served Ireland well4; the Irish people had been 
coerced into it in the first place and, most importantly, all other methods 
seemed to have failed.  By 1898 two separate Home Rule Bills had been 
defeated and persuasion, even with moral force, had proved unsuccessful.  
The physical force Irish nationalists saw themselves as the protectors of 
Irish nationhood, and the law could and must be broken because the laws 
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from Westminster were unjust5.  It must be stressed that the physical force 
Irish nationalists at this time probably envisaged a campaign of civil 
disobedience to begin with, as most Irish nationalist meetings of any 
expected size were banned by the authorities.  However, the gradualist 
nature of their approach to the use of violence must also be stressed.  The 
republican heritage of Ireland was always on their minds, and that heritage 
implied violence, armed resistance and ultimately rebellion.  Parnell, in his 
later speeches, often gave sinister coded endorsements of violence, and the 
parallels are clear. 
1898 was an important year for Irish republicans – it represented the 
centenary of the first Irish republican rising in 1798.  The failure of that 
rising led directly to the union with Britain in 1801, and the beginning of 
the prejudice and oppression so often cited by Irish republicans as the 
genesis of their struggle.  In Ireland itself the centenary celebrations were 
overshadowed by yet another potato famine which resulted in many 
destitute Irish migrating to mainland Britain, but particularly to Scotland6.  
At any rate, the newspapers of the day dismissed the Irish Party of 1898 as 
harmless.  The Glasgow Herald is a good example of a typical unionist 
newspaper of the time.  Dismissing the disunited Irish Party, the issue of 
the 13th April 1898 turns its focus to the general political situation in the 
country, stating that “Ireland has been quiet for some time”7.  The credit for 
this tranquillity was wholly due to the Tory policy of ‘equality’ it argued, 
albeit with an “insignificant” ’98 revival.  The Conservative government’s 
policy of ‘equality’ actually meant ‘killing Home Rule with kindness’ 
which, when taken with unionist press ridicule of all Irish nationalist 
political endeavour, amounted to an effective propaganda machine.  The 
Scottish public were led to believe that Ireland’s grievances were being 
addressed, that the Irish people would want to stay in the Union if the 
increasing benefits were made clear to them, and that physical force 
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advocates were isolated, out-of-touch and few in number.  In other words, 
the British government was in control and resistance was unjustified but, at 
any rate, harmless.  This is best illustrated with an example from the 
newspaper itself.  In the same issue as cited above, a whole column is 
devoted to the report of a speech by a parish priest from rural Ireland; the 
important factor being the priest was advocating civil disobedience or 
physical force to achieve Home Rule.  The newspaper labelled the speech 
as “extraordinary” and argued, reasonably enough, that clergymen should 
stay out of politics8. 
However, this speech was also used as the excuse for a systematic attack on 
the Roman Catholic Church as a whole.  This can be contrasted with the 
Glasgow Observer from a similar date, which reported on the Home Rule 
movement optimistically, stating: “the only real remedy for Irish ills is the 
overthrow of English rule”9.  Anti-Catholic prejudice such as the demand 
for the inspection of convents appeared throughout the month of April 
1898 in the Glasgow Herald.  It is perhaps shocking by modern standards, 
but the important thing to remember about these attacks is that they had a 
purpose.  The Irish people had long been ridiculed in the Scottish and 
British press, but only really with resentment in regard to Irish 
immigration and competition for employment10.  In reality, the Irish were 
picked on because they had a different religion to the majority of the 
Protestant population of the United Kingdom.  For the Glasgow Herald to 
argue that religion and politics do not mix, and then do the same itself 
albeit indirectly, may seem hypocritical but anti-Catholic prejudice was 
more or less institutionalised in Scotland at this time.  It would have been 
too vulgar to openly attack militant Irish nationalism within the confines of 
a traditional newspaper, yet the implication was that every loyal (and 
therefore Protestant) Scotsman believed that all Irish nationalists were 
Catholic, and many Scots saw Irish nationalist activity as merely a cover for 
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the agenda of the Roman Catholic Church.  It is not really an exaggeration 
to say that Catholicism and therefore every Catholic was suspect and 
suspicious.  This explains why second, third or even fourth generation 
immigrant families from Ireland were still labelled ‘Irish’, even though 
they had all been born in Scotland.  Catholicism was still regarded as alien 
or foreign, so no true Scotsman could be a Catholic.  Catholicism in 
Scotland was synonymous with ‘Irishness’ and Irishmen were stereotyped 
as lazy, ignorant, untrustworthy and disloyal to the Crown and Empire.  It 
would be a mistake, however, to portray Protestantism in Scotland as 
monolithic and entirely reactionary.  A sizeable minority participated in 
anti-Catholic agitation certainly, but many Scottish Protestants were very 
wary of the connections between Ulster and the Conservative Party and 
had priorities other than Irish issues.  Perhaps it is because the anti-
Catholic prejudice and religious bigotry was so vociferous that many 
contemporary observers, and modern historians, have tended to 
overestimate its influence.  In reality, the 1890s were a time of cautious 
liberalisation in most of the Scottish Protestant churches, with reforms to 
the more doctrinally stern and socially conservative elements of evangelical 
faith which would pave the way for many Scottish Protestants to play 
leading roles within the growing labour movement – a key dynamic of the 
twentieth century urban Scottish experience. 
A study of contemporary newspapers reveals that the Glasgow Observer and 
the Glasgow Herald are the best sources for the study of the Irish-Scots, as 
between them they had the most coverage.  They also provide a good 
contrast, the Glasgow Herald taking a unionist perspective and the Glasgow 
Observer taking an Irish nationalist perspective.  However, it must be 
stressed that the Glasgow Observer was not a ‘quality’ newspaper in the way 
that the Glasgow Herald was.  The main attraction of the Glasgow Observer 
was its links to the Glasgow Celtic Football and Athletic Coy (later just 
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Celtic Football Club), something which guaranteed it a good circulation 
amongst the Irish-Scots community.  Although it served its owner, Charles 
Diamond, as his mouthpiece, it is still the most valuable source of material 
for investigating the political activities of the community it served.  This is 
because it reported on every meeting held by prominent Irish politicians in 
Scotland (which were often ignored by more mainstream newspapers).  
Moreover, all political groups submitted reports of their local meetings 
which, despite being dominated by social events, often contained political 
references.  There is a distinct lack of coverage for the Irish-Scots 
community in newspapers like The Scotsman or Daily Record, and even the 
Glasgow Herald only usually made comment during particularly heightened 
circumstances.  Local newspapers with sizeable Irish-Scots communities 
follow a similar pattern; the Motherwell Times, the Greenock Telegraph, the 
Partick and Maryhill Press and the Govan Press are all good examples. 
For about a year after these attacks on Catholicism and the Irish nationalist 
movement, there was no real mention of Irish affairs in Scottish 
newspapers.  This was because the split in the Irish Party had deepened, 
and the Conservative government’s concessionary policy towards Ireland – 
‘killing Home Rule with kindness’ – was having moderate success.  The 
Irish Party was slowly recuperating and healing its wounds, so much so 
that the Glasgow Herald reported that “the fervour of Irish nationalism has 
departed” in May 189911.  This lasted until a new Irish nationalist 
organisation was established the same month under the direction of 
Michael Davitt, the United Irish League (UIL).  “It is to be feared that this 
new Irish League means mischief” claimed the Glasgow Herald12, and made 
much of Davitt’s Fenian background and “methods”, but the newspaper 
did not have any real discussion of Irish political affairs throughout the rest 
of 189913. 
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The Boer War interrupted events at the turn of the century, and was used 
by the unionist press to good advantage against Irish nationalists.  The war 
was also used by the Irish Party, who seized the political opportunity.  
They were accused of being unpatriotic by the unionist press for 
continuing their demand for Home Rule when the country was at war.  
Irish nationalists in Glasgow were singled out as “disloyal” for still holding 
meetings and pressing for Home Rule14.  This sort of activity only served to 
reinforce the stereotype of ‘Irishness’ that Scots were being fed through 
newspapers like the Glasgow Herald.  The turn of the century also saw the 
Irish Party pressing the Boer case in Parliament and demanding peace.  
Although an unpopular move with the general public at the time (it would 
come back to haunt the Irish Party frequently), it succeeded in its aim of 
highlighting the need for reform at home as well as in South Africa.  The 
Boers wanted separation, the Irish wanted separation, but this policy of the 
Irish Party was dismissed as “arrogance” by the unionist press, which 
emphasised the necessity of a truly United Kingdom in times of national 
crisis15.  Irish nationalists pulled ranks, however, and issued a manifesto 
calling for Home Rule under the auspices of a new and united party for 
Ireland16.  There had been disunity since the failure of the second Home 
Rule Bill in 1893, but now Irish nationalists came together under the 
nominal leadership of John Redmond, a moderate moral force nationalist17.  
The Conservatives behaved arrogantly too, stating that Irish MPs and 
Liberal sympathisers should “make the best of a political connection which 
will never be severed”18.  Yet the ‘Union is working’ argument already 
sounded false to many ears.  The country was preoccupied with the war, 
but it was going too far to say that “the Irish people are content but Irish 
politicians are not”19. 
The close examination of the Union that the Irish Home Rule issue brought 
to Scotland resulted in a growing demand for some form of Scottish self-
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government.  As a consequence, the Scottish Home Rule Association 
(SHRA) was re-established demanding devolution on the 1st of August 
190020.  Scotland had benefitted much more from the Union than Ireland 
ever had, as has been explained above, yet the fact that the Imperial 
Parliament tended towards centralisation and regional neglect made for a 
persuasive argument against the status quo21.  Modern Scottish nationalism 
has its origins in this period, but was always something of an equivocal 
fellow-traveller to Irish nationalism.  It is, though, an indication of the 
influence of Irish nationalism on Scotland that such an organisation was 
even formed at this time.  The opinion of the bulk of the Scottish press 
towards demands for Scottish Home Rule was to good-naturedly dismiss 
them as nonsense and remind readers of the benefits the Union had given 
Scotland.  It must also be stressed that the good-natured dismissal of claims 
for Scottish Home Rule was in stark contrast with the tone of dismissal 
reserved for the Irish Home Rule movement.  This tone was unionist, anti-
Irish, imperialist, jingoist and decidedly Protestant in character. 
Throughout 1900 in the unionist newspapers of the period, the patriotic 
impulses the war generated were used to attack Irish nationalists for their 
“disloyal” rejection of the war22.  The truth is that the Conservatives were 
wary of the renewed vigour within the movement for Irish nationalism; 
“the most thoroughly organised effort on the part of the Irish nationalists 
since the fall of Parnell”, and sought to destabilise this restored unity using 
their propaganda machine23.  The Irish Party was quite entitled as an 
Opposition group to criticise the government’s handling of the war, but 
they were not spared for it.  All through 1901 Irish nationalist MPs gave 
anti-British speeches over the Boer War and as a result Irish affairs slowly 
gained more coverage.  It was beneficial to Irish nationalism that the death 
of Queen Victoria and the Glasgow International Exhibition (as well as 
continuing coverage of the Boer War) dominated most newspapers in 1901.  
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Otherwise the anti-Home Rule campaign being waged by the 
Conservatives would have been more successful.  Irish nationalist MPs 
were accused of obstructing the business of the House of Commons and of 
being unpatriotic, even traitorous – a strategy designed to distance public 
opinion from Irish Home Rule arguments.  Some might say that they need 
not have tried very hard to win over public opinion, but these reactionary 
views did confuse and alienate many readers of the popular press24. 
The Liberal Party abandoned Home Rule for Ireland as an official policy in 
1902, with the behaviour of the Irish Party throughout the Boer war given 
as the explanation.  The Liberals seemed anxious to begin the new century 
with a clean slate and showed some movement towards the Conservative 
position of ‘equality’ for Ireland.  Instead of direct rule, Ireland would be 
given local government and therefore be on the same footing as England 
and Scotland.  The Liberal Party wrangled and partially fragmented over 
Irish Home Rule, but one thing was certain: the Gladstonian ideal of Home 
Rule as set out in the Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893 seemed to be well 
and truly dead by 1902.  This Liberal wrangling caused Irish affairs to be 
put back on the political agenda again, but the renewed impetus in Irish 
nationalist circles was met with contempt and derision by the 
Conservatives.  The issue of Irish land redistribution or the ‘Land Question’ 
as it was known, reasserted itself and a conference of tenants and 
landowners proved quite fruitful.  The Liberals wanted to see minor Irish 
grievances resolved, hence the movement on the Land Question, but were 
also anxious to be politically independent of the ‘Irish vote’.  The unity and 
strength of the Irish Party and UIL at this time can be compared and 
contrasted with the Liberal disunity, and the feeling at the time was that 
something was going to happen over Ireland25.  The federal notion of 
‘Home Rule All Round’ was also given close examination in Scottish 
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newspapers in 1902, to further take the sting out of the Irish Home Rule 
tail26. 
The UIL demanded “the right to administer their own laws in their own 
country” and was kept under close surveillance in Glasgow after 1899.  
Files from Dublin Castle on the UIL are very meticulous and thorough 
from this time, which suggests that Irish nationalism was being taken more 
seriously than ever27.  The direct impact on the intelligence services of the 
British government is perhaps one of the most interesting elements to this 
study, mainly because of the significant amount of evidence now available.  
All the contemporary files from Dublin Castle show that they kept tabs on 
every Irish nationalist organisation in both Ireland and Scotland, and prove 
that considerable resources were employed by the British government to 
counteract the perceived threat of militant Irish nationalist activities.  
However, as a great deal of this information on Irish nationalism would 
have been gained from paid informants, questions arise about the validity 
of this evidence.  Many informants would have told the agents of Dublin 
Castle what they wanted to hear, perhaps for continued financial gain or 
perhaps to deliberately misinform.  It is also important to highlight the 
‘siege mentality’ within Dublin Castle at the time; throughout the 
nineteenth century it was the clearing-house for all intelligence gathered on 
Irish nationalist activity, and previous episodes of physical force militancy 
in the 1840s and 1860s would have been kept in mind by those intelligence 
officers undertaking surveillance duties.  ‘Prevention is better than cure’ 
seems to have been the prevailing attitude towards the examination of any 
Irish nationalist agitation and Dublin Castle saw itself as the state’s 
bulwark.  Their reports tend to throw suspicion on all Irish nationalist 
groups, and are only valuable in the sense that they provide the historian 
with an insight into the inner workings and mindset within Dublin Castle 
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at the turn of the century and beyond, but need to be studied with caution 
and corroborated with a variety of other sources. 
Further evidence of the religious animosity referred to earlier can be found 
in a report from the Liberal Party into the political situation vis-à-vis Home 
Rule in early 1903.  Although Irish affairs were not prominent in the first 
half of 1903, the report stressed the difficulty and passion the Irish Home 
Rule issue aroused and caused.  It stated that there existed an “unfortunate 
racial antipathy between Scotchmen and Irishmen”28.  The report did not 
just mean Protestant Scotland and Catholic Ireland in general, but also 
Protestant Scots and Catholic Irish including Irish-Scots and their 
descendants living throughout central Scotland in particular.  Even the 
Liberal Party reinforced the contemporary ‘racial’ stereotype of the ‘Irish’ 
in Scotland.  Either consciously or unconsciously, those who endorsed this 
negative image of the Irish-Scots community were contributing to a process 
of unjust victimisation.  It has always been easy to apportion blame to a 
distinct or separate group in society, and the ‘Irish’ were seen as the 
problem, the Home Rule Question was the ‘Irish problem’, and the ‘Irish’ 
just could not or would not make the best of things.  This religious 
animosity was a major factor in preventing the host community of 
Protestant Scots from ever making concerted attempts to successfully 
integrate Irish immigrants or their descendants until after the ‘Irish 
Question’ was partially answered in 1921. 
A royal visit to Ireland in the second half of 1903 discouraged dissent and 
proved that many ordinary Irish people still felt something of a connection 
to the monarchy.  Irish demonstrations at this time that were reported in 
Scotland were more moderate in tone so seem to bear this out.  At an Irish 
nationalist demonstration in Glasgow in August 1903, for example, the 
speakers stressed the need for ‘constitutionalism’ in securing Home Rule 
for Ireland – in other words moral force advocacy.  1904 also seems to have 
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been a poor year for Irish affairs.  The Russo-Japanese War dominated most 
of the headlines, and another royal visit to Ireland in May reinforces the 
impression that the cracks were being smoothed over.  This was also true 
for the Liberal Party, the natural ally of the Irish nationalists in parliament, 
since for the best part of the year they were still sorting themselves out and 
jockeying for position with an election looming.  The Union seemed very 
strong as both major parties now favoured some extension of local 
government, instead of Home Rule, to bring an element of democratic 
control closer to the Irish people.  This move was greeted with cautious 
optimism in Scotland, especially in Conservative circles.  England was seen 
as the dominant partner in the Union, and most Scots were content with 
the benefits from the relationship.  The Conservatives hoped to lessen Irish 
nationalist credibility further with the Irish Local Government Bill, and 
they certainly seemed in a strong position to do so, the Glasgow Herald 
distinguishing between the British “lion” and the Irish “lamb”29.  The truth 
was, of course, that Irish nationalist activity was still very much feared, and 
the UIL and other smaller organisations were increasing their protests and 
were also beginning to receive Irish-American donations to their cause.  
Some form of Home Rule for Ireland was becoming a reasonable demand 
again. 
The vital question in 1905 was not what the Conservatives intended to do 
about Ireland, but what the Liberals were prepared to do.  The Irish Local 
Government Act of 1905 changed the situation.  In Scotland, Irish 
nationalists felt it was long overdue and that it brought Home Rule a step 
closer.  The Conservatives began to see that their policy of ‘killing Home 
Rule with kindness’ would not guarantee the longevity of the Union after 
all.  The Liberals preferred the status quo; good government of Ireland 
directly from London, but no Home Rule.  However, there were many 
Liberal MPs who were not unionist in sentiment, and thus outbreaks of 
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‘disloyalty’ were common30.  There was a growing belief that the Irish 
Question had persisted for so long that it could not be ignored indefinitely.  
This was a reaction to the Local Government Act eventually giving Ireland 
some control over her own affairs; but also, and perhaps more importantly, 
to the activity of Irish nationalist in Scotland and in Ireland.  Outside of 
Ireland, the main centre for Irish nationalist activity was Glasgow.  An IRB 
‘Centre’ was appointed in 1905 to visit various towns in Scotland and 
retained close links with the IRB in Ireland.  By the end of the year, 
organisations like the Ancient Order of Hibernians were condemning what 
they called “constitutional agitation”31.  Scottish unionists, either 
Conservative or Liberal, remained firmly opposed to Home Rule.  The 
Liberal leaders began to accept that some form of Home Rule was 
inevitable but, uncertain of their exact policy, did not really want to 
cooperate with the Irish Party.  Irish affairs had been brought back to the 
boil, and the Local Government elections in Ireland in early 1906 brought 
the tension further on.  Most interest and activity centred on Ulster, where 
Home Rule was the sole focus of the elections; candidates declared 
themselves either for or against, plain and simple. 
The issue of Home Rule also dominated the General Election of 1906.  
Voters in Scotland were urged by the UIL to support pro-Home Rule 
candidates, either Labour or Liberal32.  The Conservatives maintained that 
they would not have Home Rule; they believed a subordinate Irish 
parliament would only lead to an independent Ireland eventually.  The 
Conservatives’ real fear was for Ulster; they feared the trade advantages 
enjoyed in Ulster would vanish if Home Rule was realised, indeed they 
feared a Catholic majority would persecute their Presbyterian stronghold 
in the north-east of the country.  This fear was so real and persistent 
because Unionists in Ulster knew they had been historically favoured over 
the rest of Ireland and, as Protestants, had participated zealously in 
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discrimination against Catholics, and hence there was this abiding fear of 
revenge from Irish nationalists.  In reality, however, defiance and not 
regret was what manifested itself in the political language of Ulster.  
Letters in the Glasgow Herald do well to illustrate the difference in political 
opinion over Ireland that existed in Scotland at this time.  One writer 
argues that Irish Home Rule will only ever cause disunity and would 
surely lead to civil war33.  Several days later, a rebuttal appears, arguing 
that Home Rule for Ireland is “logical” and only the “bigoted obstinacy” of 
Protestant Ulster prevented it34.  Brian Girvin has argued that Irish 
Protestants were effectively, but unwittingly, excluded from the national 
community by what he describes as “Catholic Nationalism”, and this is 
what made a united Ireland so difficult to achieve.  Protestant unionists 
rejected Irish nationalism in the same way that Catholic nationalists 
rejected Anglicisation.  The ‘bigoted obstinacy’ charge referenced above is 
typical of what Girvin sees as the “base motives” attributed to Protestant 
unionists by Irish (Catholic) nationalists who failed to comprehend their 
complex sense of identity35.  A Protestant unionist in Ireland would have 
seen himself as both British and Irish; in much the same way as a 
Protestant unionist in Scotland would have seen himself as both British and 
Scottish.  However, in Ireland the Union was a symbol of oppression for 
Catholic nationalists and it was this dilemma that compromised Irish unity.  
Only if Irish nationalism had developed in a more inclusive manner would 
there have been any real chance for Home Rule after 1906. 
It is clear that Irish Home Rule as a policy divided the Liberal Party into 
feuding sections.  Patricia Jalland has noted the importance of Home Rule 
in the ultimate decline of the Liberals36.  She highlights the internal feuds 
after Gladstone’s retirement between Lord Rosebery (former Liberal PM), 
John Morley and Sir William Harcourt amidst the shifting attitudes 
towards Irish Home Rule.  Partly as a result of these feuds, and partly as a 
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response to unionist electoral success in 1895, the Liberals adopted a more 
gradualist approach to the Irish Question between 1895 and 190537.  Their 
commitment to Ireland did not disappear, but this ‘step-by-step’ policy did 
repair party unity to the extent that victory was secured in the General 
Election of 1906. 
The new devolution scheme was supported by Redmond and Dillon and 
most of the Irish Party.  Sinn Fein, active since 1900, completely rejected the 
scheme as a sellout38.  The Liberal government under Asquith firmly 
committed itself to introducing an Irish legislative devolution scheme 
sometime in 190739.  The Irish Council Bill of 1907 did not prove to be 
acceptable to Irish nationalists, even devolutionists, as both groups felt that 
it did not go far enough in any direction.  The Conservatives responded to 
the Bill by setting up the Union Defence League with its headquarters in 
London, but later it had offices in Glasgow.  The Glasgow Herald announced 
that “Scotland and England are as hostile today to Home Rule as they were 
in 1886”40.  This was part of the impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland; for 
unionist Scots, whichever party they supported, Home Rule for Ireland still 
implied the eventuality of an Irish republic41.  Home Rule was seen by 
them as a stepping-stone, a halfway house; and they believed that all Irish 
nationalist activity was geared towards this – Irish nationalism and 
republicanism were, to them, tantamount to the same thing.  It therefore 
did not matter what Irish nationalist said or did, unionists only heard the 
same message.  Unionist Scots rejected Home Rule with a variety of 
arguments: they argued that the Liberals’ proposals for devolution were 
really Home Rule by the back door, the Liberals had no electoral mandate 
for introducing such a measure, and finally that loyal Ulster would be 
handed over to the Irish nationalists.  On the other side, the UIL was not 
impressed with the Bill and, sensing a struggle was on the cards, initiated a 
strong membership drive in Glasgow42.  After the Bill was introduced to   
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the Commons in May there were repeated demonstrations and 
disturbances from both sides, and both sides sought to make political 
capital out of the others apparent lawlessness.  When the Irish Council Bill 
folded due to being starved of parliamentary time, Home Rule activity 
intensified dramatically; letters flooded in to newspapers urging the public 
to recognise the disaffection of the Irish43, while others stated that Scotland 
would have indeed supported Home Rule, and not the contrary, as had 
been continually predicted by the Conservatives44. 
Irish nationalist activity was beginning to have an impact again.  Sinn Fein 
activists seized the opportunity to highlight the differences between 
themselves and the moderate Irish nationalists: complete separation versus 
subordinate devolution.  Sinn Fein accused the ‘Westminster Nationalists’ 
of being ineffective, and called for a boycott of English manufacturers.  
They argued in their manifesto that only extreme nationalism could deliver 
Irish independence45.  The dynamism of Sinn Fein provoked unrest in 
Ulster along strictly religious lines46, and also caused disquiet in Scotland.  
Special Branch of the RIC had a man, Sergeant Maguire, permanently 
stationed in Glasgow from 1906 to observe Sinn Fein activity in and around 
the city.  He reported that the Sinn Fein policy slowly gained popular 
support; regular meetings and organising tours by activists denounced 
purely parliamentary agitation47.  Discussion within the Irish Party at 
Westminster also occurred, as many recognised the growing influence of 
Sinn Fein.  Faced with this growing strength, and the fact that the UIL was 
then also demanding complete autonomy for Ireland, public opinion began 
to modify its position to accept some form of Home Rule but by 
constitutional means only48.  In other words, the spectre of violence 
brought the reality of the situation into sharp focus; better half a loaf than 
no bread at all.  The strenuous activity of Sinn Fein and the UIL in Scotland 
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had played its part in moving many people to accept the case for a measure 
of Irish Home Rule – the Union bubble seemed about to burst. 
Tom Garvin has skilfully analysed the historical development of Irish 
nationalism49.  He notes that there is only a “partial continuity” between 
the Sinn Fein of pre-1914 and the republican Sinn Fein of 1917 and 
onwards50.  Arthur Griffith’s original social and political programme was 
monarchist, as he initially accepted the sovereignty of the British crown in 
Ireland.  He viewed the Union of 1801 as unconstitutional and called for 
the Irish MPs elected to Westminster to withdraw from London and meet 
in Dublin instead as an Irish Parliament.  It was only after the Easter Rising 
of 1916 that Sinn Fein became the basis of a new and republican mass 
movement for Irish nationalism. 
1908 saw Sinn Fein making good its foothold in Scotland.  Arthur Griffith, 
the Sinn Fein President, spoke in Glasgow in March to reaffirm the 
commitment of the organisation to complete independence51.  After a 
motion in favour of Irish Home Rule was passed by Parliament in the same 
month, the Conservatives began to panic.  The Glasgow Herald gave a 
platform to the Conservatives in Scotland who maintained that the Scots 
supported Ulster52.  However, attacks on the Union began to come from 
much closer to home.  The Liberals, after repeated questioning in the 
Commons, stated that they saw Home Rule for Scotland as “desirable”53.  
In this spirit, they commenced the moving of local government and some 
government department functions to Edinburgh.  The federalist idea of 
‘Home Rule All Round’ to defuse the complex political situation was 
reintroduced to political debate.  The renewed demands for Scottish Home 
Rule had much to do with the perceived success of the Irish Home Rule 
movement, but many in Scotland looked on federalism as the sugar on the 
pill of Irish Home Rule.  Throughout this period, and up until the 1920s, 
the movement for Scottish Home Rule ran along on the coat-tails of Irish 
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Home Rule; there was a legitimate and growing demand for Scottish Home 
Rule, but it only seemed to hold sway in periods of successful Irish Home 
Rule activity, and this seems to bear out the impact of Irish nationalism on 
Scotland.  As a consequence, Scots of a unionist persuasion always looked 
on Scottish Home Rule as just a decoy for Irish Home Rule.  At the close of 
1908 the Conservatives were in more determined mood, pressing the 
Liberal government for a definitive statement on Irish Home Rule. 
The Conservatives had realised that they had plenty to lose by 1909, and 
thus went on the offensive.  They ridiculed the ‘decoy’ of federalism, 
attacked the Liberals as being unfit for government, and labelled Sinn Fein 
as an “audacious sect”54.  Some 50,000 members of the Orange Order 
assembled at Pollokshaws in Glasgow on the 12th of July, where various 
anti-Home Rule speeches were delivered.  Asquith, the Liberal leader, had 
promised “self-government for Ireland”, but unionist Liberals accused him 
of seeking only to retain his parliamentary majority by doing deals with 
Irish Party MPs55.  Once again, unionist Liberal MPs had to face a loyalty 
dilemma:  Archibald Cameron Corbett, MP for Glasgow Tradeston (who 
had returned to the Liberal Party after joining the Conservatives in 1886), is 
a good example of a Glasgow MP who struggled with his conscience.  
Another General Election looked imminent by the end of the year, and 
voters were urged in the press to realise their “special responsibility”56.  
The tenor of the Conservative argument is best encapsulated (as ever) by 
the Glasgow Herald: “the Irish peril…[republicanism]…must be averted at 
all costs”57. 
The new Parliament of 1910 was finely balanced.  The Liberal Party just 
retained control with the support of the Irish Party and the Labour Party.  
The Irish Party had split into two ‘parties’ during the election: the followers 
of Redmond against the followers of O’Brien.  The Glasgow Herald took the 
opportunity to ridicule Irish nationalist politics by remarking that “this 
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four-horse coach will take careful driving”58.  The Conservatives were 
bitterly disappointed that they had failed to take power, but the fact that 
the majority of MPs elected were in favour of some form of Irish Home 
Rule seems to have made no difference to them.  The Duke of Abercorn, a 
senior Conservative, wrote in a letter to the press: “Ulster will stay loyal at 
all costs…Do not be ignorant of or underestimate our resolve”59.  In other 
words, once Home Rule looked likely the Conservatives began to make 
veiled threats of violence in Ulster; anything, in fact, to prevent the 
checking of the “Protestant ascendancy”60, and this led directly to the 
creation of paramilitary groups in Ulster at first but then across the rest of 
Ireland.  Throughout the course of 1910, a series of articles on Devolution, 
Federalism and Scottish Home Rule ran in the Glasgow Herald61.  All of 
these articles were fairly objective, sometimes even favourable to Scottish 
Home Rule, and this shows the movement for Irish nationalism had 
enough of an impact for the unionist Glasgow Herald to begin to examine 
the different methods of separation seriously.  These articles would 
certainly have had a considerable effect on the newspaper’s readership and 
advanced, to a certain extent, the prospects of Irish nationalism. 
The idea that Irish Home Rule would have been part of a federal settlement 
had gained much more credibility by 1911, during a year that was 
characterised by strained political wrangling over Ireland.  Both Scottish 
and Welsh Liberal MPs stated that they had no quarrel with Ireland and 
they regarded Irish Home Rule as the first step towards complete federal 
devolution62.  The concept of federalism was also given serious 
examination at Westminster.  The main thrust of the Conservative defence 
of the status quo was constitutional; they argued that the Liberals had no 
mandate to introduce Irish Home Rule as it had not been an important 
campaign issue during the General Election (not altogether true), and that 
Ireland was unfairly over-represented in Parliament whereas England was 
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under-represented which created an artificial majority for Home Rule.  
There was some truth in this, but the Conservatives had not given high 
priority in the past to constitutional or electoral reform, laying them open 
to charges of expediency now that Irish Home Rule looked like being 
secured.  All through 1911 there were large Protestant demonstrations 
against Home Rule in Ulster and, led ably by Sir Edward Carson, the Ulster 
Unionists began to fight Home Rule in earnest.  Huge support for Ulster 
came from Scottish Protestants, so much so that “the problem of Ulster” 
began to merit widespread attention in the Scottish press63.  Once the Ulster 
Unionists realised in 1911 that some form of Irish Home Rule was probably 
inevitable they initially pressed for their own “loyal” government in 
Belfast, but when this was dismissed out of hand they adopted an 
exclusionist stance which became a very effective political strategy64.    
Ulster Unionists at first argued that it would be impossible to consider Irish 
Home Rule without the consent of Ulster, but they became increasingly 
defiant and belligerent from 1911 onwards.  It would be fair to say that the 
Liberal government initially underestimated the resolve of the Ulster 
Unionists.  Public opinion in mainland Britain, and especially in Scotland, 
looked on the political situation in Ireland with a mixture of curiosity and 
anxiety, and it is testimony to the skill of the Ulster Unionists that their 
propaganda was as effective as it was. 
Ireland consists of four provinces: Leinster, Munster, Ulster and 
Connaught.  Of these four provinces, only Ulster was really against Home 
Rule and only in six out of the nine counties of Ulster were there majorities 
against Home Rule.  Needless to say, Protestants were by far the largest 
social group in these six Ulster counties.  Irish nationalists looked upon the 
situation as allowing six Irish counties to dictate the country’s future to the 
other twenty-six, and it depends how much value is placed on the rights of 
minorities in a society65.  Brian Girvin has argued that partition was 
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effectively in place in Ireland well before it was institutionalised in the 
1920s66.  Since Protestant unionists in Ulster were as determined to exist 
outwith a state dominated by Catholic nationalism as Catholic nationalists 
were determined to exist outwith a state dominated by Protestants, there 
were in reality two nations occupying one island.  The British state had 
consistently rejected the Irish nationalism’s claim for self-determination 
because the majority of citizens in the British state did not support it.  
Although Protestant unionists were a minority within the Irish nation, they 
were in the majority within the British state as a whole.  The fact that 
Catholic nationalists failed to appreciate the legitimacy of this position 
effectively divided Ireland and made civil war a real possibility.  As a 
result, Irish nationalists were fighting a losing battle to keep Ireland as a 
nation intact.  Andrew Bonar-Law, the new Conservative leader, stated in 
November 1911 that “Ireland is divided into two nations”67, further 
entrenching the idea that the two sides in Ireland were irreconcilable, an 
idea that had been consistently asserted by the Ulster Unionists and their 
supporters in Scotland68. 
The passing of the Parliament Act in 1911, which removed the power of 
veto from the House of Lords, was the catalyst that made Irish Home Rule 
by constitutional means a probability.  As Patricia Jalland has noted, there 
was a “unique opportunity” for the Liberal Party to enact an Irish Home 
Rule Bill in 1912 before Sinn Fein developed into a republican mass 
movement.  However, the fact that Asquith’s government failed to 
understand the significance of the Ulster issue left them woefully ill-
equipped to combat the Unionist assault69.  A peaceful solution to the issue 
of Ulster therefore became very unlikely.  The pacifist views of many 
Liberal MPs made them as reluctant to coerce Ulster as they were to enter 
the First World War.  Jalland suggests that Redmond may have agreed to 
‘Home Rule within Home Rule’, or even exclusion for Ulster in 1912 but, 
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because Irish nationalists were offered their ultimate goal first (which was 
then withdrawn incrementally) they lost faith with the Liberals and did not 
trust them to fulfil their ‘obligation’ to Ireland70. 
The issue of Ulster is crucial to understanding the events between 1910 and 
1912.  The imminent prospect of Irish Home Rule led directly to a coalition 
of what David Miller has called “counter-revolutionary forces”, which 
produced Ulster’s Solemn League and Covenant in September 191271.  This 
document committed its signatories to defying an act of Parliament, by 
force if necessary, as soon as it was made law.  Ulster Protestants felt that 
their civil and religious liberties were under attack and Home Rule would 
be ‘destructive of our citizenship’, so they were morally if not legally 
justified in disobeying what they saw as no ordinary law72.  There was 
simply no trust between Unionists and Irish nationalists in Ulster, they 
both suspected the other of seeking to dominate.  Moreover, Ulster 
Unionists looked on Ireland as two nations or no nation at all, and if one of 
these two had a right to self-determination then the other had it equally.  
This does raise the question of how much of a real bond of national feeling 
there was between Ulster Protestants and the rest of the population of 
Britain.  As David Miller has shown, the answer is not a straightforward 
one; “they had quasi-national feelings of attachment to Ireland, to ‘Ulster’ 
and to a Britain which was less the real Great Britain than a vague concept 
of a Greater Britain which somehow the Empire might come to 
embody…they thought not in terms of nationality, but in terms of a treaty 
or contract”73.  In a constitutional democracy, no rights can reach beyond 
the length of each new parliament; no binding promises can be given 
because the next parliament always has the right of repeal.  Therefore, 
Ulster Protestants became bound by the wishes of the whole British people 
which created a loyalty dilemma as they saw themselves as a special case 
for consideration. 
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Alvin Jackson has explored similar themes and noted that after 1911 
Loyalism (as it came to be known) in Ulster was “more embattled and self-
reliant”, mainly because of an increasing recognition of the failing 
relationship with unionism in the rest of Britain74.  He describes the process 
of replacing constitutional or parliamentary resistance with local strength 
as “Ulsterisation” and, like Miller, sees this as a direct consequence of 
Ulster Loyalists’ disenchantment with British politics75.  Graham Walker 
has also highlighted the complex question of ethnic identity in Ulster76.  
Throughout the Home Rule era the “myth of the Ulster-Scots” as a 
distinctive ethnic group was developed and popularised.  They were seen 
as “a pioneering people with a history of civilising achievement”, and 
Walker notes the amount of published works on this theme which mainly 
sought to distinguish the ‘Ulster-Scots’ from Catholic Irish ‘natives’ for 
propaganda purposes77.  He also notes that these attempts to encourage 
stronger bonds of British solidarity by Ulster Loyalists had most success in 
urban west-central Scotland among Liberal unionist economic elites and 
the Orange Order-influenced working class78.  Indeed, when the 
Conservatives and Liberal unionists in Scotland merged into a Scottish 
Unionist Party in 1911, the West of Scotland Liberal Unionist Association 
minuted this message of support to the ‘Ulster-Scots’: “closely united to us 
by ties of race and religion…we in the West of Scotland, of all in the British 
Isles, should hold out a strong hand to them in their hour of distress”79.  
The plight of Unionist Protestants in Ulster did not, however, make much 
of an impact on many Scottish Presbyterians who could not bring 
themselves to align with the Conservatives because of their traditionally 
Liberal and, in some cases, radical politics.  Issues of Scottish identity, land 
ownership, patronage and even disestablishment meant much more to 
them80. 
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Yet it could be argued that, by 1912, it was probably too late to reconcile 
Ulster with the rest of Ireland.  The British government did not, 
understandably, want to send troops to Ulster to enforce Home Rule and 
thus provoke a civil war, but the situation should not have been allowed to 
deteriorate so damagingly in the first place.  The Liberal government could 
have done more to counteract the propaganda of the Ulster Unionists, and 
the Irish Party could have put aside what differences they had temporarily 
to take on the common enemy.  More could have been done by previous 
governments to redress legitimate Irish grievances like the Land Issue 
sooner; more could have been made of the Irish Council Bill of 1906-7 and 
the concept of federal devolution for the whole United Kingdom could 
have been explored more seriously.  The Imperial Parliament at 
Westminster had too much business to cope with at the time, and some 
devolved powers to every member nation would have checked the 
intransigence of Ulster Unionists, especially if Ireland had been granted an 
assembly in Belfast as well as in Dublin.  A federal solution did receive 
some examination, but the exclusiveness of Irish nationalism and the self-
interest of Ulster Unionists prevented it from becoming a reality; certainly 
after 1912 each side was so deeply entrenched that there seemed no 
possibility of any constructive political dialogue or an all-Ireland solution81. 
The belief that the Irish Home Rule issue was too difficult to resolve was 
advanced on two fronts by the Unionists from 1912.  On the one hand they 
argued that recent history, particularly the unsuccessful Home Rule Bills of 
1886 and 1893, proved that Irish Home Rule was not popular with the 
electorate and so should be dropped altogether.  On the other hand they 
argued that whatever form of Home rule was adopted, some groups would 
not be happy as it was just impossible to please everybody - Ulster, 
especially, deserved special treatment82.  Certainly, the case for Ulster was 
beginning to have increasing success at Westminster.  The Liberals outlined 
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a “Federal Trail” to Home Rule in February, for example83.  Unfortunately, 
while doing so, Asquith acknowledged that “in Ireland there is an acute 
racial difference” to the dismay of Irish nationalists.  The Unionist smelled 
blood, and began again to turn the argument along sectarian lines. 
Every unionist institution in Scotland was involved in this propaganda 
campaign.  In Scotland, the Glasgow Presbytery of the Church of Scotland 
passed a motion in sympathy with Ulster Protestants, and the enduring 
embers of anti-Catholic prejudice began to flicker once more84.  In April 
1912 the Unionist Party released a pamphlet entitled Against Home Rule, 
which was given widespread and usually favourable press in Scottish 
newspapers85.  The pamphlet argued that “…[Home Rule would 
be]…subjecting Protestant Ulster to the uncontrolled domination of Roman 
Catholic Leinster, Munster and Connaught”86.  Anti-Catholic prejudice ran 
right through the pamphlet, renewing traditional fears in Scotland, and 
demonising Irish nationalism which, as has been explained above, was 
synonymous with republicanism in the eyes of many Protestant Scots.  By 
the middle of 1912 the case for exemption for Ulster from any forthcoming 
Home Rule Bill had great support in Scotland.  Sizeable demonstrations 
against Irish Home Rule were organised in July 1912 by the Orange Order 
and took place throughout Lanarkshire87.  The solidarity felt for Ulster in 
Scotland prompted the Glasgow Herald, for example, to remind its readers 
that Ulster was still “a Scottish colony”88.  The gloves were well and truly 
off; many Protestants in Scotland as well as in Ulster were prepared to fight 
if necessary.  Even reasonable suggestions like a federal solution were met 
with indignation in this volatile political climate, and the Unionist Party 
described federalism as “a thinly veiled apology for Home Rule”89. 
The need to defuse the situation seems to have been lost on Irish 
nationalists in Scotland.  All this time they had been working for Home 
Rule and were, with some justification, shocked by the tactics of unionists.  
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Sinn Fein, which had been organising in Scotland since 1900, was growing 
in strength and support and regarded Irish Home Rule as a platform upon 
which to build90.  When Unionists in Glasgow brought Sir Edward Carson 
to speak in the city against Home Rule in October 1912, Irish nationalists 
responded by bringing the Lord Mayor of Dublin to the city to speak in 
favour of it the same month – and both meetings were well-attended91.  
When the third Home Rule for Ireland Bill entered the Report stage in 
Parliament in December of 1912, the debate between both sides used 
unambiguously warlike language and imagery. 
Iain Patterson has noted that it is very difficult to judge the numerical 
strength of Sinn Fein within the ‘Irish’ community in Scotland between 
1912 and 191492.  A study of the Glasgow Observer suggests that there was 
only one active Sinn Fein cumann in Glasgow before the First World War, 
but there were 200 paying members of the IRB in Scotland in 191293, and as 
there is some evidence of overlapping memberships in Glasgow between 
Sinn Fein and the IRB, this is a useful baseline94.  Bulmer Hobson addressed 
“about 500” at a Sinn Fein rally in Glasgow in 1912, for example95.  By way 
of comparison, an estimated 50,000 heard Joseph Devlin in Kilmarnock the 
following year, which does suggest the Irish Party was still dominant until 
at least the outbreak of war96.  There is also some evidence to suggest that 
both Sinn Fein and the IRB in Scotland were much more socialist in outlook 
than their parent organisations in Ireland.  Tomas O’Ban (Tom White) and 
Charles Corrigan were both members of the IRB, Sinn Fein and the 
Catholic Socialist Society organised by John Wheatley, for example97.  The 
Glasgow branch of Sinn Fein also criticised Arthur Griffith for not 
supporting the Dublin transport strike in 191398.  There is even evidence 
that the Irish Citizen Army (formed as a result of this strike by James 
Connolly) received a consignment of smuggled arms from Glasgow in 
191499.  Patterson estimates around 100 Sinn Feiners in Glasgow prior to the 
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Easter Rising, but this does not take into account the probable difference 
between a paying membership and an active membership, as has been 
previously discussed above100.  Other sources indicate about 70 Irish 
Volunteers in the city at the same time101.  Yet for most Irish-Scots, political 
activity before the war still centred on the UIL and Irish Party politics.  
However, the postponed implementation of the Home Rule for Ireland Act, 
the issue of recruitment and then the Easter Rising would soon combine to 
fragment Irish nationalist politics forever. 
The fact that events were unquestionably on a war footing was emphasised 
by several cases of illegal rifles being seized in Belfast in June 1913 – they 
had all come from Scotland.  The IRB in Glasgow had resolved to supply 
the Irish Volunteers with arms at a meeting in November 1913102.  Sir 
Edward Carson spoke again in Glasgow during the same month and 
issued “a call to arms” to defend Ulster103.  The General Assembly of the 
Irish Presbyterian Church passed a motion against Home Rule, also in 
June, and repeated the Unionist Party argument that Ireland was “ a 
special case…religion and politics in Ireland cannot be separated”104.  
Unfortunately for the unity of Ireland this had indeed become the case; 
antagonism and intolerance had ensured that there would be no inclusive 
settlement, despite assurances from Irish nationalist leaders like T. M. 
Healy that civil and religious liberty would be guaranteed within a self-
governed Ireland105.  There was simply too much animosity, too much 
socio-political baggage on both sides for reason to prevail.  Preventing 
Home Rule had become a narrow religious crusade for some, just as 
achieving Home Rule had become a similar obsession for Catholic 
nationalism; both sides were even prepared to risk civil war with mass 
bloodshed.  Irish nationalism had endured far too many setbacks to accept 
anything less than Home Rule, and since Ulster Unionists had never had 
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their own identity or status recognised by Irish nationalists they would not 
be coerced.  It was a long way from ‘killing Home Rule with kindness’. 
What both of these intractable stances achieved was the conviction of the 
Liberal government that they were not, in fact, bluffing.  The unionist 
movement continued to threaten civil war and by 1914 the exclusion of 
Ulster from the Home Rule Bill looked certain but was not to be regarded 
as a permanent solution.  The Liberals were even said to be contemplating 
“Home Rule within Home Rule” for Ulster106.  The eventual exclusion 
scheme unveiled by the government involved plebiscites for all Ulster 
counties on Home Rule, with a time-limit for the period of exclusion set at 
six years.  This was as far as the Liberals were prepared to go, and the Irish 
Party at Westminster was not happy with any compromise at all.  
Moreover, support for Sinn Fein grew when it became clear that Ulster had 
gained a deal of this kind.  The Liberals offered this concession to the 
unionist movement because they had come to believe that Ulster was not 
bluffing but they also wished to avoid a General Election until at least 1915, 
as they had other major pieces of legislation they wanted to secure107.  
Needless to say, the Ulster Unionists rejected the time-limit on exclusion, 
determinedly trying to evoke their Covenanting heritage.  Rallying to the 
cause, the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland passed a motion in 
sympathy with their Irish Presbyterian brethren, and sent a deputation to 
ascertain the “true facts” of the situation108.  Unionists in Ulster had been 
very successful in mobilising support for exclusion amongst a largely 
sympathetic Protestant community in Scotland.  The RIC then stationed 
more men in Glasgow to liaise more closely with the Scottish police109, no 
doubt worried about further consignments of illegal arms being shipped 
across to Ulster. 
The third Home Rule for Ireland Bill was passed by the House of 
Commons and sent to the House of Lords on the 27th May 1914.  The 
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Glasgow Herald was typical of most unionist newspapers by calling for a 
General Election to settle the Irish crisis, as the Liberal government were 
merely “spectators” in their opinion110.  It was a bitterly ironic coincidence 
that the First World War intervened in August 1914 and began to split the 
Irish nationalist movement in Scotland.  The UIL quickly came out in 
support of this ‘anti-German war’, realising the dangers of being branded 
as disloyal.  However, Sinn Fein rejected the war as an English affair and 
encouraged all its supporters to resist recruitment in Scotland as well as in 
Ireland.  The Volunteer Corps of each side, fully trained for the event of 
civil war, were faced with difficult decisions.  The Ulster Unionists did not 
want to leave Ulster totally defenceless, and large sections of the Irish 
Volunteers totally refused to get involved in a war they dubbed as 
imperialist.  Special branch of the RIC reported in October 1915 that “there 
are about 70 Irish Volunteers in Glasgow, and that about 35 of them meet 
for drill, without arms, on Sundays at their Hall”111. 
The war signalled the eclipse of constitutional or parliamentary Irish 
nationalism in Ireland and in Scotland.  Sinn Fein began to take control of 
the Irish nationalist agenda, and behind Sinn Fein was the IRB – the 
nucleus of republican activity at the time.  To a certain extent then, the fears 
of the unionist movement in Scotland had been realised.  Stories of 
Germany trying to provoke revolt in Ireland began in 1914 and appeared 
periodically until 1916112.  Irish nationalist newspapers like Sinn Fein, The 
Irish Volunteer, Irish Freedom and The Irish Worker were accused of sedition 
or having German backing and the Unionists urged the Liberal 
government to take immediate action.  Special Branch of the RIC reported 
that German arms would be supplied to Ireland “if paid for”113.  The 
Liberals did not seem keen to act, no doubt conscious of the 
disappointment within Irish nationalist circles that Home Rule had been 
achieved but not implemented because of the war.  Sean McDermott, the 
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editor of Irish Freedom was arrested, but no action was taken against the 
other newspapers or indeed the Irish Volunteers, as recruitment was not 
pursued in Ireland114.  Many eligible Irish-Scots took advantage of this 
arrangement by leaving their Scottish homes for Ireland115.  This obviously 
laid the Irish-Scots open once again to charges of disloyalty, and reinforced 
the stereotypes held by many Protestants Scots that the Catholic Irish-Scots 
were all republicans and hence would not fight for King and country.  The 
dilemma for the Irish-Scots was their dual national identity; their 
community was increasingly Scottish by birth but had a strong cultural 
bond with Ireland and were thus reluctant to be identified as British116.  
However, many Irish-Scots did join the army117, but these recruits would 
have been Liberal or perhaps Labour voters, and would have supported 
Home Rule probably through the UIL if they were even involved in the 
Irish nationalist movement at all; they certainly would not have been Sinn 
Fein supporters118.  Those that did not or would not enlist were attacked by 
the unionist movement repeatedly from 1914 to 1916, the Glasgow Herald 
advising its readers to “drop the ‘Sinn’ and call them ‘Feigners’”, for 
example119.  Despite this, Sinn Fein in Scotland organised an anti-
recruitment campaign, centred on Glasgow and Lanarkshire, using mainly 
postcards and leaflets120. 
Tom Garvin has noted that, in Ireland, the authorities were concerned 
about the reluctance of rural youths to volunteer for the army121.  Catholic 
Irishmen volunteered less than Protestants, and rural Catholics least of 
all122.  Elaine McFarland has explained the difficulty in expressing Irish 
recruitment figures as a reliable percentage of adult males of military age 
(the 1911 census does not specify religious denomination for those of Irish 
birth) but, based on statistics from the UIL, Glasgow provided 8,000, 
Edinburgh 1,648, and Dundee and Clydebank 2,000 enlistments each123.  
Moreover, she points out the hitherto ‘forgotten’ nature of the Irish-Scots’ 
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contribution to the First World War.  Enlistment was one way to escape 
economic hardship, and “ambivalence rather than alienation” explains 
their attitude to defending the British Empire124.  Both the Irish Party and 
the Catholic Church stressed the concept of duty, and hoped for enhanced 
roles in post-war society125.  Although it must be emphasised that it would 
have been very difficult to disengage from such a huge national 
mobilisation, the contribution of Irish-Scots to the war effort shows a 
community keen to participate as fully as possible in the society they had 
chosen to settle in. 
When the Easter Rising occurred in April of 1916 it took several days 
before concrete details appeared in Scottish newspapers.  This was no 
doubt because of war censorship, and once the situation was contained the 
government allowed some publicity, hoping to boost the war effort with 
patriotic outrage.  The Irish Party at Westminster reacted similarly, fearing 
that Home Rule and Irish liberty were in jeopardy.  The Easter Rising was 
generally labelled as insignificant, nothing more than “foolish local 
disturbances”126, but these observers were ignorant of the significance of 
the myth of sacrifice in Irish republican heritage127.  The Easter Rising of 
1916 brought Irish republicanism fully into the mainstream of not just Irish 
nationalism but of British politics as a whole. 
Iain Patterson estimates that about 50 Irish Volunteers from Glasgow took 
part in the Easter Rising128.  Once taken prisoner they were eventually 
transferred to camps in mainland Britain before being released by the end 
of 1916.  As Tom Garvin has pithily commented: “before 1916, everybody 
in radical politics knew everybody else, and after 1916, thanks to the 
camps, they knew each other rather better”129.  Patrick Pearse had counted 
on the British reaction to the Easter Rising being ruthless and extreme, 
knowing that this would allow the republicans of 1916 to take their place in 
the pantheon and renew this part of the Irish nationalist mythology for at 
71 
 
least another generational cycle.  John Wheatley succinctly explained his 
(and most Irish-Scots) reaction to the British response: “it appeared as if in 
the most miraculous manner the Irish heart had been completely captured 
by the British Empire.  I firmly believe that had the Government at that 
moment treated the Irish rebels as they did the Boers, then the Irish 
problem was solved forever.  But no, they insisted on their pound of 
flesh”130.  Whether the thousand or so Irish Volunteers who joined Pearse 
on Easter Monday in 1916 were genuinely seeking martyrdom as well as 
him is an issue that has been raised by Peter Hart131.  He does not see them 
all as members of “a mystical republican cult”, but as an “intelligent and 
dedicated” group of people fighting for each other and an Irish republic.  
They had nothing but contempt for the compromises of the Irish Party and 
saw themselves as upholding their national honour132.  The Irish 
Volunteers certainly saw themselves as part of the republican continuum 
though, as their Easter Proclamation attests.  What we should perhaps see 
is a merging of IRB thinking with a more populist Irish Volunteer ideology. 
It would seem therefore that the impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland 
between 1898 and 1916 was gradual and varied.  The main impact was felt 
by Protestant unionists who feared the republican agenda in particular.  
They felt solidarity with the Protestants of Ulster, but were also deeply 
suspicious of the Irish-Scots in their midst.  As most Irish-Scots families 
were Roman Catholic, this suspicion grew into anti-Catholic prejudice.  
Coupled with the stereotyping of the Irish-Scots as disloyal and republican, 
this religious prejudice and bigotry reinforced the conspiracy myth 
common to many Scottish Protestants: the Irish were all republicans, and 
all Catholics were looking to overthrow the Protestant faith and monarchy.  
Public opinion was skilfully manipulated by Protestant unionists against 
Home Rule and the legitimate grievances of Catholic Ireland.  Both 
propaganda and bigotry filled the unionist newspapers of the time, and the 
72 
 
amount of coverage and its tone proves that there was a substantial impact 
on the sensibilities of unionists.  This propaganda also affected Scottish 
institutions as well as members of the general public; the Church of 
Scotland, in particular, participated fully in the anti-Irish nationalist 
campaign.  The latter focus on Ulster and the demand for it to be excluded 
from the Home Rule Bill by 1914 showed the unionist movement reacting 
to the inevitability of Home Rule by advocating the disintegration of 
Ireland as a complete nation.  This was perhaps inevitable anyway as the 
fatal mistake of Irish nationalism was to develop in an exclusive way that 
denied the complex sense of identity that Irish Protestants in Ulster 
possessed, making Irish nationalism really just Catholic nationalism.  The 
antagonism and intolerance within the debate on the Irish crisis before 1916 
also shows that the fear of Irish republicanism was very real, even if the 
republicans themselves were not really that strong in Scotland yet.   
The movement for Scottish Home Rule also owes much to the struggle for 
Irish Home Rule.  As a fellow-traveller on the coat-tails of Irish Home Rule, 
moves for Scottish Home Rule were proposed several times and several 
organisations were also established to this end during this period133.  The 
largely sympathetic hearing that Federalism received throughout this 
period is also testimony to the influence of Irish nationalism on Scotland.  
A federal solution to the Home Rule crises may well have been the most 
practical conclusion, but politics and religion were never separated or 
reconciled long enough for any lasting scheme to be realised.      
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Chapter II: Notes 
 
 
1) The Conservatives replaced the Liberals as the part of government in 1895.  The Liberals 
returned to power in 1905 and remained in government (albeit in coalition from 1915) until 
1922, but would never win another election. 
2) General taxation and the issues of land redistribution and a Catholic University were the 
main bones of contention. 
3) Irish nationalists always made this distinction – see discussion of this in Chapter I. 
4) Admittedly, this does not apply to Ulster, but this argument will be discussed later in this 
thesis. 
5) This is textbook Thoreau. 
6) Irish migration to Scotland began to increase again from 1898 (1,142 in 1898, 1,508 in 1899, 
1,968 in 1900, 2,207 in 1901 compared to 642 in 1896 and 877 in 1897; see HANDLEY, ‘The Irish 
in Modern Scotland’).  See also the Crime Branch Specials 16160/S and 16827/S in the National 
Archives of Ireland, Dublin. 
7) GH, 13 April 1898, 6c.  See also GH, 18 March 1898, 6f. 
8) GH, 13 April 1898, 7h. 
9) GO, 19 February 1898, pp.10-14. 
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10) SWIFT/GILLEY, ‘The Irish in Britain, 1815 – 1939’, pp.104, 128. 
11) WOOD, ‘Irish Immigrants and Scottish Radicalism’, SLHSJ, 9, 1975.  See also GH, 19 May 
1899, 6e. 
12) ibid. 
13) The vast majority of letters to the Glasgow Herald in these months support the Conservative 
government, but that is only to be expected in a unionist newspaper.  
14) See McFARLAND, ‘John Ferguson, 1836 – 1906’.  See also GH, 24 November 1899, 6g. 
15) GH, 1 February 1900, leader. 
16) GH, 12 February 1900, 6d. 
17) There still remained a Dillon faction, a Healy faction as well as a Redmond faction. 
18) GH, 22 February 1900, 4d. 
19) GH, 26 May 1900, 6c.  See also WOOD, op. cit. 
20) FINLAY, ‘A Partnership for good?’, esp. Chapter 3.  See also GH, 1 August 1900, leader. 
21) See Chapter I.  See also FINLAY, op. cit. 
22) See GH, 13 November 1900, for example. 
23) GH, 4 January 1901, leader. 
24) See the letters pages of GH, February to November, 1901. 
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25) BOYCE, ‘The Irish Question in British Politics’.  See also GH, 27 November 1902. 
26) KENDLE, ‘Ireland and the Federal Solution’.  See also GH throughout 1902. 
27) PRO, CO903/8, Irish Crime Records on UIL, 1898 – 1901. 
28) GH, 6 February 1903, 8e. 
29) GH, 17 May 1904, 6e. 
30) In 1903 there was less of a notion of collective responsibility outside of actual government 
ministers.  Backbenchers frequently argued against their own Party’s official position on issues 
like Irish Home Rule.  See BOYCE, op. cit. 
31) PRO, CO904/117, I, III, VIII, Special Branch of RIC, 1905 – 1907. 
32) GH, 1 January 1906, 10d. 
33) GH, 12 January 1906, 9g. 
34) GH, 19 January 1906, 13d. 
35) GIRVIN, ‘From Union to Union’, p.27. 
36) See JALLAND, ‘The Liberals and Ireland’. 
37) ibid, pp.22-4. 
38) See Chapter I for an examination of Sinn Fein origins.  See also KEE, ‘The Green Flag’, 
vol.III, part 2, Chapters 8 and 9. 
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39) Interestingly, taking into account the widespread tension of the time, the Peace 
Preservation Act of 1881 was repealed at the end of 1906; this Act had been intended to quell 
political risings and forbade the possessions of firearms in Ireland – a curious move at a 
volatile time. 
40) GH, 19 January 1907, 6d. 
41) Generally speaking, the majority of Protestant Scots supported the Union, as at its head 
was a monarch who was sworn to defend their faith.  In Scotland, most Protestants were 
Presbyterian and many had a particular antipathy towards Catholics and Catholicism, making 
it easier to believe that Irish nationalist activity was just a thinly veiled cover for a republican 
movement.  It would also not be going too far to say that the Irish-Scots were therefore 
suspected of being the vanguard of this movement. 
42) GH, 23 May 1907, 9d.  See also HANDLEY, op. cit. 
43) GH, 31 May 1907, 10h. 
44) GH, 3 June 1907, 4g. 
45) GH, 24 June 1907, 9d and GH, 28 June 1907, 10c.  See also KEE, op. cit. 
46) GH, 6 July 197, 9a. 
47) PRO, CO904/117/2, II, III, VI, XI, Special Branch of RIC, 1905 – 1907. 
48) GH, 6 September 1907, 6c. 
49) GARVIN, op. cit. 
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50) ibid, pp.105-6. 
51) GH, 16 March 1908, 12b. 
52) GH, 14 April 1908, 8f et seq. 
53) GH, 7 May 1908, 9c.  See also MITCHELL, ‘Strategies for Self-Government’. 
54) GH, 5 February 1909, 8d; 19 April 1909, 8d; 15 June 1909, 6f. 
55) GH, 13 December 1909, 8d. 
56) GH, 20 December 1909, 8d. 
57) GH, 30 December 1909, 6e, but my addition. 
58) GH, 2 February 1910, 6e. 
59) GH, 11 November 1910, 3e. 
60) See BRUCE, ‘No Pope of Rome’.  See also GH, 12 January 1910, 12h. 
61) GH, 25 October 1910, 6d; 26 October 1910, 8d; 29 October 1910, 8d. 
62) See KENDLE, ‘Federal Britain: a History’ and ‘Ireland and the Federal Solution, 1870-1920’ 
as both works give a thorough examination of the problem.  See also GH, 14 April 1911, 10b. 
63) GH, 5 October 1911, 8d.  The new leader of the Conservative Party, Andrew Bonar-Law, 
was particularly supportive. 
64) See essays in WOOD, ‘Scotland and Ulster’.  See also GH, 26 September 1911, 7f. 
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65) KEE, ‘The Green Flag’, vol.I, pp.182-7. 
66) GIRVIN, op. cit., p.17. 
67) See MITCHELL, ‘Conservatives and the Union’.  See also GH, 1 November 1911, 8e. 
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Chapter III: 1916 – 1922; “and shake the blossom from the bud” 
 
The Easter Rising of 1916 served to precipitate events in Ireland 
considerably.  Dismissed as “foolish local disturbances” by the British 
government, the Unionists, the Irish Party and the UIL, the Rising 
reminded everyone that the ‘Irish Question’ was far from resolution1.  It 
can be argued that the rebels of Easter 1916 achieved their secondary 
purpose2.  Their primary goal was to establish and hopefully defend an 
Irish republic but, at the very least, their ‘blood sacrifice’ was intended to 
gain attention and provoke debate3.  When the Republican proclamation 
eventually appeared in the press in May 1916, it was described as 
“remarkable”4.  The Rising was widely denounced, and the Unionists 
gained useful ammunition in their campaign to brand the southern Irish as 
disloyal and unpatriotic.  The following extracts, from the Glasgow Observer 
and the Glasgow Star and Examiner which advocated constitutional 
agitation, and The Scotsman which was cautiously in favour of Home Rule, 
support this: 
“The vast and overwhelming majority of Irishmen everywhere have accepted and 
approved the international bond of peace between Great Britain and Ireland embodied 
in the Home Rule Act…Individual Irishmen here and there may stand apart – they are 
entitled to do that.  There are British republicans…whose whimsicalities nobody 
troubles to interfere with so long as peculiarities are confined to mere harmless 
verbosity or the writing of anonymous letters…But, if the Irish counterparts of such 
oddities should attempt to make their treason operative, they cannot count on either the 
tolerance or sympathy of sensible Irishmen who have made an honourable pact with 
Britain and mean to honourably keep it.”5. 
“Dublin antics should bring no discredit nor prejudice to the constitutional Irish 
movement…The Irish people in Great Britain…will not manifest the slightest sympathy 
or approval with the madly criminal action of the pro-German plotters who resorted to 
85 
 
insurrection in Dublin…and flung themselves into armed conflict with the forces of the 
Crown.”6 
“Sinn Fein has made the fatal mistake of putting out its head too far; and at a time and 
in a manner that make it impossible to mistake its true character and intentions…We 
may feel confident that the great majority of the Irish people, by whatever party name 
they may call themselves, will abide this ordeal, and will make haste to disavow and 
condemn Sinn Fein and all its works.”7. 
However, although this campaign was relatively successful in Scotland, the 
imposition of martial law, mass arrests and the summary executions of 
rebel leaders created a backlash of public abhorrence in Ireland, no doubt 
influenced by the horrors of the western front.  As the pro-Labour journal 
Forward put it, “if Great Britain had had the good sense to adopt Home 
Rule in 1886 or 1893, the events of the past three weeks would not have 
happened”8.  The Nationalists, still led by Redmond, pressed for an inquiry 
into the executions and also urged action on the Home Rule Bill.  Delay, it 
was stressed, caused confusion.  The Liberal government responded 
favourably by announcing in July that, with the exclusion of Ulster, the 
Government of Ireland Bill would be introduced as soon as possible.  
Furthermore, there would be a conference at the end of the war to decide 
the “permanent settlement of Ireland”9.  Thus the impression was created 
in 1916 that any scheme introduced then was only temporary; even the 
exclusion of Ulster would be re-examined at the end of the war. 
These announcements created optimism within the Irish nationalist 
movement.  Sinn Fein was becoming the dominant political group in Irish 
politics, due to its association with the Easter Rising.  Admittedly, at the 
time of the Rising, the majority of the Irish people and the Irish community 
in Scotland did not subscribe to the republican ideal.  It was principally the 
repressive counteractive measures employed by the British military regime 
in Ireland that would earn Sinn Fein the support of both communities.  
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Anti-British propaganda by Sinn Fein asserted the right of the Irish people 
to self-determination and blamed Irish problems on English (sic) 
oppression.  The treatment meted out to Sinn Fein after the Easter Rising 
only served to bear out these arguments and consolidate support for them 
in Ireland and in Scotland.  It was mostly the young who flocked to join 
Sinn Fein and involve themselves in its activities.  This new generation of 
Irish nationalists had not directly experienced the trauma of the 
Gladstonian Home Rule debacles; they had, though, witnessed years of 
political wrangling and compromise at the centre of which presided the 
Irish Party at Westminster.  Charles Townshend’s view of 1916 is that it 
was perhaps incidental in the process of Irish national mobilisation that 
occurred in 1918.  He acknowledges that the rebellion did “shift the 
horizons of possibility”, but the creation of the Irish Free State in 1921 
owed more to the popular mandate of 1918 than the “unmandated 
violence” of 191610.  His revisionist account, typical of recent histories, is 
compelling and it is right to view Sinn Fein after 1917 as a truly mass 
movement primed to take advantage of the conscription crisis and what 
followed.  Constitutional nationalism was beginning to seem redundant 
and ineffectual to this new generation of Irish nationalists, and Sinn Fein 
offered a dynamic and romantic alternative to the previous mainstream of 
Irish politics. 
The growth of support for Sinn Fein in Scotland was less rapid than in 
Ireland.  Iain Patterson attributes this to an “abeyance” of regular lines of 
communication between communities in Scotland and Ireland as a result of 
wartime restrictions11.  This may be true to a certain extent, but by the end 
of 1917, there were five active Sinn Fein clubs in west central Scotland: two 
in Glasgow, one in Govan, one in Motherwell and one in Clydebank12.  
Considering that there was only one Sinn Fein club in Glasgow before the 
war (named after James Connolly), this represents significant growth and 
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also highlights the impact of the Easter Rising on the Irish communities in 
Scotland.  Reaction to the treatment of the rebels in Ireland goes a long way 
to explaining this switch of allegiance from the Irish Party to Sinn Fein. 
The increasing lawlessness in Ireland from 1917 onwards was the result of 
the political impasse; some ‘proposals’ for Ireland were being discussed, 
but no details were being published.  Nationalists threatened the war effort 
over the perceived Ulster veto on Home Rule, and the first anniversary of 
the Easter Rising saw republican flags fly prominently throughout Ireland 
(including in Ulster).  Sinn Fein was the new Irish nationalist movement; 
strong and now decidedly republican in character.  The fact that Ireland 
was then in a state of emergency caused alarm in Unionist circles in 
Scotland.  This is best illustrated by the reaction to the Scottish Gaelic 
Society’s call for the compulsory teaching of Gaelic in Scotland – perhaps in 
itself a reaction to the regeneration of Irish culture by and through Sinn 
Fein.  The Glasgow Herald of 18 April 1918 bemoaned “…[we should 
have]…nothing to do with schemes where sentiment is more prominent 
than reason, and in which lurk the seeds of mischief”13.  The ‘we’ referred 
to were presumably loyal unionist Protestants.  This newspaper went on to 
leave its readers in no doubt of the origin of the proposal: Sinn Fein.  The 
Glasgow Herald dubbed the Gaelic Society in Scotland a “similar 
movement” to Sinn Fein14, which was “avowedly divisive and separatist”15.  
This anti-cultural movement had disparate roots but only one real purpose: 
to rekindle anti-Irish prejudice in Scotland and extol the benefits of the 
Union.  Many pro-Union Scots, perhaps even most Scots in the 
establishment, felt that the disintegration of Scottish culture (particularly 
Highland Scottish culture) was a small price to pay for the perceived 
benefits of the Union with England16.  However, there were still many Scots 
who supported some measure of Home Rule for Scotland and who strove 
to maintain some degree of Scottish culture beyond just kailyard and 
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tartanry.  Yet the First World War had, to an appreciable extent, galvanised 
the Union as only the unifying experience of a major war can do.  This 
galvanising effect on the attitude of the Scots towards the Union was not as 
great as that of the Second World War, but that is perhaps because the 
Second World War was far more concerned with democracy than the more 
imperialistic First World War.  Furthermore, there was no enduring ‘Irish 
Question’ waiting to be resolved during or after the Second World War17.  
Charles Townshend has also argued that the most damaging legacy of the 
First World War period was not political violence but the “finalisation of 
partition”18.  Most constitutional Irish nationalists hoped in 1914 that the 
common cause of war would be a unifying influence throughout Ireland 
but, in actual fact, they were slow to realise that the issue of Ulster could 
not be so easily resolved.  Although the Rising in 1916 made the imposition 
of conscription unlikely it was arguably the war itself, leading to the 
popular mandate of 1918, that cemented partition in Ireland.  In Scotland, 
the effects of the war led to economic upheaval and political 
reconstruction.  Elections in 1918 and 1922 confirmed the rise of the Labour 
Party (with the Catholic vote in central Scotland particularly significant 
here) as well as the decline of the Liberals.  The priority of Scottish society 
became social regeneration with improved housing, for example, as an 
immediate concern.  
Michael Rosie skilfully highlights the various factors which explain the 
anti-Irish prejudice being rekindled in the interwar period: religious 
acrimony, dislocating political flux, economic crises and fears over 
Scotland’s future identity19.  He argues against the orthodoxy that interwar 
Scotland was a sectarian society.  He sees religious separatism, even 
religious bigotry, but not sectarianism20.  He is persuasive when he argues 
that we do not currently use the term ‘sectarianism’ with care as a concept.  
He defines sectarianism as “systematic discrimination which affects the 
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quality of life of an entire religious group”21.  There is still an ongoing 
debate about sectarianism in Scottish society, and perhaps what is usually 
referred to as ‘sectarianism’ would be better described as bigotry or even 
prejudice22.  Rosie rightly emphasises that national identities are not fixed 
or constant, and the debate on ‘sectarianism’ must be seen as part of the 
broader debate on the identity of the Scots23.  Many Catholic Scots in 
central Scotland today would argue that the descriptions ‘Irish’ and 
‘Scottish’ are not in fact mutually exclusive and it is possible to have a dual 
identity or hold a variety of identities simultaneously.  Every Scot is also 
British and a European as well, and other ethnic identities could also be 
thrown into the mix: in northern Ireland many would have recognised the 
term ‘Ulster-Scots’, for example, just as the term ‘Irish-Scots’ has been 
coined to refer to the Irish immigrant community in Scotland.  Events in 
Ireland certainly caused both Catholics and Protestants in Scotland to re-
examine their identities during the interwar years.  Protestant reaction to 
the Easter Rising in 1916 was perhaps the origin for the rekindling of anti-
Catholic hostility in Scotland as the Irish-Scots were viewed as disloyal and 
unreliable, and the War of Independence which followed only confirmed 
this opinion.  Irish immigration to Scotland had fallen considerably in the 
twentieth century and the vast majority of ‘Irish-Scots’ had been born in 
Scotland by the end of the First World War, so the term ‘Scots-Irish’ is 
perhaps more appropriate.  Their immigrant ancestors certainly 
experienced the ‘systematic discrimination’ referred to by Rosie in the 
nineteenth century, but the Catholic community in central Scotland was 
conflicted by 1918.  Technically, they were more Scottish than Irish, but 
many if not most still had strong emotional or familial ties to Ireland, so a 
dual identity persisted that brought them, and their religion, into conflict 
with the rest of Protestant Scotland.  Many Scots-Irish had volunteered to 
fight in the British army during the First World War, for example, but 
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many others would not do so24.  This was also an extremely politicised 
community that had participated fully in the Irish nationalist movement 
for Home Rule since the 1840s.  They were organised and determined, and 
only when the Education Act of 1918 was passed did this community 
perhaps begin to feel accepted as more Scottish and less Irish. 
Throughout May 1918, the Church of Scotland General Assembly, with 
invited delegates from Ulster, discussed the “Irish problem” in some detail, 
reacting to events in Ireland and the increase in support for Sinn Fein in 
Scotland25.  The strength of Sinn Fein in Glasgow in June 1918 was given as 
seven clubs with a large membership “ostensibly of a literary and 
educational character” but “inner circles”, it was alleged, met in secret and 
this referred to the IRB26.  This was an accurate reckoning, as Sinn Fein had 
been growing in Scotland since 1900, drawing on the support of the Scots-
Irish community (particularly in the west) of central Scotland, with an 
increasing supply of new recruits from Ireland.  Indeed, in July 1918, eight 
Glaswegians, four men and four women, were arrested at Ardrossan 
attempting to smuggle some explosives from Scotland to Ireland27.  In the 
subsequent trial in September, Michael Callaghan, one of the accused, 
informed the court that he was a member of the IRA and had no regrets 
over his actions.  This was the first of many trials for similar offences in 
Scotland between 1918 and 1922.  By the middle of 1918, the Glasgow 
Observer was mentioning Sinn Fein clubs in Coatbridge and Greenock (in 
addition to the five already extant), and was giving lukewarm support to 
republicanism in its articles28.  Irish republicanism needed the support of 
the press most likely to be read by the Scots-Irish for more substantial 
growth to take place. 
In the General Election that followed the end of the war in 1918, Lloyd 
George promised Home Rule for Ireland excepting Ulster, and a measure 
of Scottish Home Rule also.  Sir Edward Carson, the Ulster Unionist leader, 
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wanted reforms that would allow Ulster to go its own way.  However, Irish 
issues did not really dominate the election campaign as most minds were 
optimistically focused on the successful conclusion of a peace treaty with 
Germany.  Yet the demand and movement for Irish independence did not 
let up; in fact there were signs that support for an Irish republic was 
growing.  The TUC at Glasgow in September 1919 called for “Irish self-
determination”, and Sinn Fein pressed for the Irish case to be heard at 
Versailles with some sympathy, but no success29.  The Irish Self-
Determination League (ISDL), which was based in Scotland, also called for 
an Irish republic at this time30.  There was a general feeling that Ireland had 
been made to wait for too long for a settlement which made republicans 
and Nationalists alike indignant, and Unionists nervous: “though it is first 
and foremost an Irish problem, [Home Rule]…is also an English, Welsh 
and Scottish problem”31.  This paralysis of public opinion in late 1919 
motivated the British government to establish a Speaker’s Conference on 
Devolution, a body of inquiry to assess the overall situation.  The 
Conference reported in May 1920 and proposed two schemes: subordinate 
legislatures for all parts of the United Kingdom (harking back to 1911) or 
‘Grand Councils’ instead.  It is interesting to note that both of these 
proposals have a decidedly federal character to them; as has been stated 
above, a federal solution to the Home Rule crises would probably have 
been the most effective. 
Unfortunately, there was a lack of political will behind any of these 
proposals, and all parties bickered over the faults and merits of each 
scheme.  Sinn Fein, by 1920 the undisputed main player in nationalist Irish 
politics, demanded full independence and nothing less.  When it became 
increasingly clear that this was not likely to be granted, physical force 
methods were increasingly utilised.  Accounts of shootings, ambushes, 
railway blockades, republican courts and general disturbances in Ireland 
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filled Scottish newspapers in the latter part of 1920.  These disturbances 
eventually developed into a major conflict, and the impact of this direct 
conflict in Ireland was significant on Scotland.  For example, the police 
were ordered to secure all detonators in circulation in October 192032.  
There are also accounts of battle manoeuvres being conducted by Irish 
Volunteers outside Glasgow, as well as the regular ‘molestation’ of 
pedestrians by Sinn Feiners33.  Other organisations, like the Glasgow 
Federation of the Independent Labour Party in particular, campaigned 
throughout 1920 on Irish affairs holding demonstrations and meetings 
regularly, as well as collecting for the relief of distress in Ireland caused by 
the reprisals of British government troops34. 
From 1921 ‘weekly crime statistics’ appear in the Glasgow Herald, but not 
just of “outrages” like the ambush of British soldiers in Ireland by the IRA, 
but of Irish republican activity within Scotland also35.  Most of this activity 
was focused on the central belt of Scotland, but particularly in the west 
around Glasgow36.  What is clear from the evidence available is that there 
was an Irish republican conspiracy in Scotland at this time to organise and 
assist their republican comrades in Ireland; usually with weapons, 
ammunition and explosives being smuggled from Scotland to Ireland.  
Once wartime restrictions ended by 1919, the movement of agents and 
supplies was facilitated greatly.  During 1920, the Clyde Valley Electrical 
Power Company was concerned about security at its power stations in 
Motherwell and Yoker, warning that “a large number of employees at 
these works are either Irish or of Irish extraction”37.  In response, the Chief 
Constable of Lanarkshire, H. J. Despard, advocated armed response units 
to the Scottish Office, but this idea was met with a cool response.  The 
Chief Constable of Renfrewshire was less belligerent; “…[if Yoker]…or 
police stations were invaded by armed Sinn Feiners the occupants would 
nearly be powerless against them”38.  The suggestion of a military guard for 
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the power stations was also made, but in the end ‘trustworthy’ workers 
were enrolled as Special Constables.  This shows that there was a real fear 
of republican activity in Scotland at this time.  The authorities took what 
they saw as the republican menace very seriously indeed, stepping up their 
intelligence networks throughout 1920.  Illegal drilling also caused 
particular alarm during the summer of 1920 when large groups of about 
100 Sinn Fein men at a time were observed regularly travelling from 
Glasgow and around to Lennoxtown by train, camped in the Campsie Glen 
and conducted illegal drilling39.  Correspondence between the Lord 
Advocate and the Secretary of State for Scotland confirmed that a statute 
existed for two years penal servitude if caught drilling illegally40.  Even 
allowing for the difference between perception and reality, there are 
enough accounts in the public records to be sure that illegal drilling did 
take place quite often outside Glasgow, and the authorities considered it to 
be worthy of further investigation. 
Skirmishes between rival factions did happen occasionally.  Sinn Feiners 
and Orangemen battled one another at a meeting in Motherwell being 
addressed by John MacLean in 192041.  Iain Patterson has suggested that 
Irish politics was the excuse rather than the reason for such violence, and 
there is perhaps some truth in this42.  There is evidence that the culprits on 
both sides were immigrants from Ireland, as this intelligence report 
suggests: “conflicts between the two factions of Irishmen are on the 
increase, and another of the weekly Saturday night brawls took place in 
Greenock on 26th June [1920].  Two policemen and several civilians were 
severely injured by stones and bottles and 13 persons, mostly young 
Irishmen, were arrested”43.  More work needs to be undertaken on the 
Protestant Irish immigrant community in Scotland in this period, and this 
thesis agrees with Michael Rosie who bemoans the “invisibility” of the 
Protestant Irish experience44. 
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The strength of Sinn Fein in Scotland also caused considerable anxiety.  
Scotland Yard reported that over 6,000 attended a Sinn Fein meeting in the 
St. Andrew’s Halls in Glasgow in September 1920, coming from 
Lanarkshire, Ayrshire and Renfrewshire as well as Glasgow to hear Sean 
McFergus and Sean Milroy deliver speeches which were “frankly 
republican” according to the Procurator Fiscal of Glasgow45.  Moreover, 
Glasgow CID reported on a Sinn Fein meeting in Greenock the following 
month at which 37 clubs were represented.  This report states that there 
were 30,000 Sinn Fein volunteers in the west of Scotland, 20,000 revolvers, 
2,000 rifles and plenty of ammunition, not to mention that they had also 
acquired plans of Maryhill and Hamilton barracks.  Finally, “delegates 
were instructed to inform their several battalions that an order might be 
received at any time to mobilise, and to be ready to act either in Ireland or 
in Scotland as might be required”46.  The authorities clearly feared the 
spread of violence from Ireland to Scotland, especially at a time of 
concurrent industrial unrest, but nonetheless these reports seem 
exaggerated and alarmist.  An offer from the Ulster Volunteers in Scotland 
to aid the police in September 1920 was sensibly declined47.  Yet this bears 
out the fact that the authorities had their resources fully stretched and 
simply did not have the manpower to guard every potential IRA target.  
Public buildings were feared likely targets and police activity intensified 
throughout 1920.  As a result, Sinn Fein in Glasgow and Dundee ceased 
organised drilling by the end of the year48.  There almost seems to have 
been a tacit acceptance of Scotland as a supply and training centre for the 
IRA as long as violence did not occur. 
Information and intelligence reports were regarded as the vital key to 
keeping the republican threat in check.  Documents were seized in Paisley 
in early 1921 which showed definite plans for carrying out ‘outrages’ in 
Scotland49.  Special Branch of New Scotland Yard were also successful in 
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curtailing some smuggling of detonators to Ireland throughout 1921, but 
many more would have got through successfully50.  Such information 
resulted in the capture of two men (Henry Coyle and Charles McGinn) 
who were caught driving a car which contained an array of explosives, 
guns and ammunition51.  They identified themselves as Sinn Feiners and 
admitted the load was for Ireland.  Deportation or internment of Sinn Fein 
and IRA activists was suggested by the legal community as early as 
December 1920 for the following reasons: “it is beyond all question that 
Republican troops are in this city with the avowed object of taking part in 
hostile operations, both in Ireland and here…They…are levying war 
against this country, and against the Executive Council of Ireland.  They 
are instigating disorder in Ireland, supporting the IRA with money, arms 
and ammunition, and I apprehend even supplying them with men”52.  This 
was the argument put to the Lord Advocate by the Procurator Fiscal of 
Glasgow, and backed up by the Chief Constable of Lanarkshire: “very 
active propaganda is being carried on in this county and…there is a large 
number of disaffected persons engaged in this work…the arrest of the 
leading Sinn Feiners in Scotland…would put a stop to the whole 
movement in Scotland”53.  It took until 1923 for deportations to occur, but 
these extracts show conclusively that Irish republicanism was seen as a 
problem worth spending time and resources on by the Scottish authorities.  
Attempts to establish a similarly strong grassroots Irish republican 
movement in the east of Scotland were much less successful.  The Chief 
Constable of Edinburgh stated; “one or two…who have a distinct tendency 
towards Sinn Fein have…come under my notice, but generally speaking, 
the movement does not seem to be deep-rooted here.  Several public 
meetings have been held in this city of late with a view to securing support, 
but these…have been attended with very little success”54.  This was for two 
simple reasons.  The west of Scotland was home to the overwhelming 
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majority of Irish immigrants and their descendants, and the east of 
Scotland did not have the same geographical proximity and thus the 
opportunity to deliver aid in a similar manner.  It would not be true to say, 
however, that all Irish republican activity occurred in the west of central 
Scotland, but it would be true to say that Irish republican activity in central 
Scotland was concentrated in the west, particularly in and around 
Glasgow. 
Peter Hart has recently argued for more historical attention on the IRA’s 
activities in Britain between 1920 and 1923, and this thesis accepts that 
these activities were “much more extensive and effective than is usually 
assumed”55.  He has traced the development of active IRA units established 
in Britain between 1919 and 1921, and argues: “Man for man, and operation 
for operation, the Liverpool, Manchester, Tyneside, and London IRA 
outperformed many Irish brigades56.  The number of men in these units is 
difficult to pinpoint, due to their varied composition and constant changes.  
Hart estimates an average of 100 men in Liverpool and London in this 
period, for example, and around 1,000 men available in the crucial year 
between July 1920 and July 192157.  It is interesting to note that about half of 
that figure come from Scottish units who could muster a potential force of 
600 men by August 192058.  The business of most units consisted of 
meetings, collecting dues, drill sessions and occasional parades.  Active 
duty would require involvement in operations to steal weapons, 
ammunition or explosives from collieries in Lanarkshire, for example, and 
then transport these items to Ireland.  Some weapons were held back for 
training purposes and would have also been used in acts of violence or 
sabotage in mainland Britain.  These figures have been arrived at after 
examining both official records and personal records of those who served 
in the IRA.  Most of the latter were not placed in public repositories until 
after the Second World War, so even taking into account inclinations to 
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round-up membership or exaggerate strength of numbers to impress IRA 
HQ, a force of around 500 to 600 IRA men in Scotland in the early 1920s 
seems a reasonably accurate figure to base judgement on. 
The Irish Republican Brotherhood was the secret organisational centre 
within the IRA just as it had been within the Volunteers.  Although all IRB 
members would also be members of the IRA, it does not necessarily follow 
that all IRA men would also be members of the IRB.  Immigrant Irishmen 
were an extremely mobile group and so; “as a result of the migratory 
nature of work of the Irish in Scotland, it was very difficult to keep [IRB] 
circles together.  A circle might disappear in just a few months”59.  England 
as a whole reported 117 paying IRB members, whereas Scotland reported 
250 (the Irish figure was 1660) at this time60.  Peter Hart has shown that, for 
the first six months of 1921, IRA-related incidents were occurring twice a 
day across Britain, concentrated in and around London, Liverpool, 
Manchester and Newcastle.  These operations were usually carried out by 
IRA men living near the targets, operating from their own homes61.  
Probably the most spectacular English operation was the destruction of 
nineteen warehouses near Liverpool docks on the night of 28 November 
1920, which caused widespread panic and shock as the authorities had 
been aware of such plans62.  Hart also points out that local police forces did 
not attempt to infiltrate IRA units in Britain or to gather intelligence 
through systematic surveillance.  Instead, they tended to focus on 
apprehending those responsible for specific crimes and not on defeating 
the IRA as an organisation as a whole63.  This should have helped the IRA 
immensely, but they could not really take advantage of this because their 
campaign was really small-scale guerrilla warfare and not modern 
terrorism as we understand it today. 
If caught, however, Sinn Fein and IRA agents faced heavy penalties, 
illustrating the extent of establishment concern over the conflict in Ireland 
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spreading and thus having considerable impact.  The trial of sixteen people 
from Glasgow and Alloa at the High Court in Edinburgh in March 1921 for 
explosives charges resulted in heavy terms of penal servitude for the 
ringleaders, even though there existed only circumstantial evidence linking 
most of the accused to the materials discovered64.  The Lord Justice quite 
openly led the jury, stating that “reasonable men…[could]…make the 
inference” – so much for the burden of proof and reasonable doubt.  By the 
middle of 1921 the situation in Ireland was grave.  Reprisals by the Black 
and Tans and other government forces were by then common and 
indiscriminate65.  Debate on reprisals was stifled in the House of Commons 
on several occasions, and the curfew in Dublin was brought forward to 
9pm, a tacit admission that the government troops were not in control of 
the situation66.  Sinn Fein and the IRA were in a very strong position: they 
were fighting a guerrilla war on their own territory amid a largely 
supportive Irish population.  Added to this, they had good intelligence and 
skilful leadership from Michael Collins, allied to the political commitment 
of the IRB67.  They could also rely on support and supplies from mainland 
Britain as well. 
In Scotland Sinn Fein was very healthy, its headquarters at 171 Renfield 
Street, Glasgow68.  From these offices, the Scottish branch of Sinn Fein was 
organised by Sean O’Sheehan, and a newspaper, Dark Rosaleen, was also 
published.  “Our people in Scotland are confined in a closer area, and the 
expense and time required for travel is not so great as it is [in England]”69.  
New clubs were being established frequently, there being about 78 Sinn 
Fein clubs in total in Scotland by 1922 – all of them in the central belt; 
“clubs are holding meetings regularly almost every Sunday except in a few 
of the outlying districts where halls are not so easily obtained”70.  
Membership of a Sinn Fein club did not necessarily imply membership of 
an IRA unit as well.  Sinn Fein clubs had members of both sexes, some not 
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working, most working as clerks, bakers, labourers and such like.  Most 
members were part of the Scots-Irish community, although some were 
migrant Irish workers based in Scotland temporarily71.  All were Roman 
Catholic, and meetings generally took place on Sunday afternoons after 
attendance at Mass. 
As far as IRA numbers are concerned, estimates vary considerably.  Iain 
Patterson cites the total strength of the Scottish Brigade at between 2,000 
and 2,500 men by 192172.  He goes on to argue that this figure is much 
smaller than contemporary estimates which went as high as 4,000 in 
Glasgow alone in 192073.  Although this estimate has been routinely used 
by historians from Handley to Gallagher, it now seems clear that they were 
deliberately inflated by contemporary sources.  The figure cited earlier in 
this thesis would seem to be the most reliable: about 600 IRA men in 
Scotland in 1920.  A fair assessment would be no more than 1,000 active 
IRA men in Scotland by 1921, and perhaps the figures of 2,000 or even 
4,000 or more highlight the difference between membership and active 
membership, and this has already been discussed above and elsewhere74. 
The most dramatic act by Irish republicans in Scotland was undoubtedly 
the attempted rescue of one of their own from a prison van in the High 
Street of Glasgow in May 1921.  Eighteen arrests were made, including one 
priest, after the abortive ambush resulted in the death of one police 
inspector and the injury of another75.  With tensions running high and the 
police unable to control the anger of the Scots-Irish community, the army 
had to be eventually brought in to calm the situation and restore order.  
Twenty-seven men finally appeared in court accused of being connected 
with the ambush, and the police were still pursuing further suspects as the 
case went to trial.  As one of their own had been killed by the IRA, the 
police were especially diligent in their efforts; so much so that the Scots-
Irish community accused them of harassment.  A taxi driver named 
100 
 
McKechnie, who witnessed the attempted rescue but was reluctant to 
testify, feared “the callous punishment they [the IRA] inflict”, so 
harassment obviously worked both ways76.  It was perhaps the failure of 
this operation that convinced the IRA in Scotland to concentrate on 
alternative types of activity.  Violent acts perpetrated by Scottish units were 
actually quite rare, but operations to acquire weapons, ammunition and 
explosives were by far more successful and more commonplace in the 
1920s. 
At any rate, much anti-republican feeling was generated by this incident 
but the Scottish public seemed tired of the Irish Question by 1921 and 
wanted to see a resolution.  Alexander MacCallum Scott, the Liberal MP for 
Glasgow Bridgeton, urged a speedy conclusion to Home Rule for Ireland, 
excluding Ulster, and he was just one of many similar voices in favour of 
this77.  The fact that the Ulster Parliament (created by the 1914 legislation) 
had been elected, in May 1921, with a large Unionist majority allayed most 
fears in Scotland over the autonomy of Ulster.  Thus any anti-republican 
sentiment generated was less vehement than it might have been.  In this 
climate, collaboration between republicans in Ireland and Scotland 
intensified.  “Isn’t it a pity that their end of it was not more advanced at 
this juncture, but of course it is no use regretting” wrote Michael Collins, 
hoping that a simultaneous movement for independence in Scotland would 
stretch the resources of the British government to breaking point, and thus 
precipitate a favourable settlement78.  The organisation with which 
cooperation was planned was the Scottish National League (SNL).  
Dialogue had taken place since early 1920 through Art O’Brien, the leader 
of the ISDL (and the IRA’s man in London at the time), who was 
responsible for intelligence throughout Britain.  Meetings were held to gain 
support but were usually poorly attended.  This is part of a typical 
resolution: “this meeting…rejoices to hear of the awakening to national 
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consciousness of the people of Scotland – an independent nation”79.  
Ruaridh Erskine of Marr was the driving force behind the pan-Celticism of 
the SNL, but his organisational skills did not rival those within Sinn Fein or 
the IRA; “I agree it does not look too hopeful.  I am afraid they were too 
sanguine.  They have the same hard fight to go through as we went 
through, but their material is not so good or so prepared”80. 
However, it seems that the SNL were over optimistic about their chances of 
immediate success.  According to Michael Collins, “it seems to me that they 
do not appreciate the particular difficulties they are up against.  It will take 
a very long time, and I don’t think they have the same actual strength as 
we had at the very worst period of our history, say 1904 to 1908…it would 
be better to go on working as a handful, than to make an effort which 
would be founded only on false hopes.  Failure in this manner would mean 
much more even to this small group than years of tireless labour and non-
recognition”81.  Here Collins has not only highlighted the differences 
between the struggles in Ireland and Scotland, he has also shown how the 
IRA learned the lessons of the 1916 Easter Rising.  He clearly saw the war 
with the British government around 1920 as a culmination of republican 
activity dating back to the nineteenth century.  Scotland had no such 
tradition, and he was warning the SNL off any premature attempts at 
insurrection.  Yet it would seem that the SNL pressed on with a plan to 
stage a diversionary conflict in Scotland with the forces of the British 
government; “Erskine of Marr…does not wish to exaggerate the position, 
but he thinks they [SNL] are now well on the way to getting their people 
organised.  He thinks that within six months, they will be able to give us 
some effective help – this, provided their plans work out satisfactorily”82.  
However, the Anglo-Irish negotiations and treaty intervened towards the 
end of 1921, and the promised ‘effective help’ from the SNL failed to really 
materialise.  Yet it is significant that the republican movement in Ireland 
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had such an effect on sympathetic Scots, albeit only a small group of about 
a few hundred people. 
There was certainly a feeling within the British government that the rest of 
Ireland should have some form of settlement quickly.  “An offer to be 
publicly made to the people of Ireland of self-government on the analogy 
of a Dominion under the Crown” was how the Home Secretary put it83.  
There was indeed a feeling of inevitability about it; however, they wanted 
to secure a settlement on the best possible terms, and this was in the mind 
of Lloyd George when he made a ‘peace offer’ to Eamonn de Valera, the 
Sinn Fein President, in May 1921.  Talks about talks began in July 1921 at 
Downing Street amid a tenuous IRA ceasefire84.  Lloyd George proposed an 
Anglo-Irish conference to settle the issue, but asked that Sinn Fein give up 
the claim to self-determination.  The Ulster parliament rejected keeping its 
separate status in an All-Ireland constitution and it became increasingly 
clear that an Irish republic would not be granted.  A great deal of Sinn Fein 
activity in Scotland complemented these initial discussions.  A large rally 
in the City Halls of Glasgow in November 1921 was almost not allowed to 
take place85; there were also large Sinn Fein meetings at Paisley and 
Motherwell in late November 1921, all calling for an Irish republic:  
“Ireland is fit to be an independent nation”86; “We are in favour of the Irish 
republic.  We are in favour of an undivided Ireland”87; are good examples 
of resolutions passed at such meetings. 
Glasgow’s Chief Constable warned that the war in Ireland could spread 
easily to Scotland, as his officers had uncovered lots of evidence of Irish 
republicanism in Scotland88.  The police had orders to watch, search and 
arrest suspects89, and in raids throughout Scotland in 1920-1 found 
evidence of Sinn Fein drilling members in military fashion, much 
republican literature, explosives, munitions and weapons mainly in 
country districts90, documents that gave Scotland as a division of the IRB91, 
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and evidence of an IRA ‘flying squad’ in the Lothians.  All this collected 
evidence suggests the police were taking the republican threat seriously, 
and had devoted some considerable time to investigating it.  Moreover, the 
authorities gave careful consideration to the impact their actions would 
have elsewhere: “any action to be taken by the authorities in Scotland 
might therefore have to be considered in the light of its effects in England 
and, of course, with due regard to its bearing on the situation in Ireland”.  
As well as clearly showing the official mind, this illustrates the bilateral 
impact of Irish republicanism92. 
In fact, the IRA through Sinn Fein had been reorganising and renewing 
supplies from Scotland since early 1919 when Joseph Vize was sent to 
Glasgow to be responsible for the essential overhaul: “The present state of 
affairs is lamentable.  I found only two companies of volunteers known as 
A and B Companies; A which claims to be HQ is composed of a good 
number of undesirables and mixed citizen army and volunteers trying to 
run the whole movement here, but making no progress beyond their own 
company…However…there are quite a number of willing men here to help 
in…[the]…work”93.  Vize met with some initial intransigence, but moved 
quickly to adopt a new system; “Volunteer movement in Glasgow to be 
controlled by Dublin HQ, who will issue all orders for management of 
same”94.  After this, Vize went to work in earnest, establishing or affiliating 
companies in Townhead, Govan, Motherwell, Paisley, Greenock and 
Clydebank95.  Vize was so successful in drumming up numbers that IRA 
HQ in Dublin officially endorsed his recruitment drive: “your recruiting 
movement has the sanction of HQ staff who fully realise the necessity for 
making provision in countries outside Ireland”96.  The report on Sinn Fein 
and IRA activities in Great Britain from the Director of Intelligence at the 
Home Office gives the following information for early 1921: “the estimated 
number of Sinn Feiners in the Glasgow district at this date was 90,000 and 
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the membership of the Irish Volunteers just over 10,000; of these 1,233 were 
armed.  In this area the Irish have considerable hold on trade unions, 
especially in the unskilled trades”.  Government intelligence reports from 
this time clearly saw Glasgow and west-central Scotland as one of the main 
danger areas for Irish republican activity97. 
As has previously been stated, local police forces simply failed to come to 
grips with IRA activity in Britain.  Peter Hart has suggested that they were 
just poorly served by the agencies above them who were trying in earnest 
to combat Irish republicanism98.  Both Scotland Yard and Scotland House 
included the IRA within their post-war fight against what they deemed as 
subversive and revolutionary activities.  Fear of communism and 
increasing urban unrest led to the creation of counter-revolutionary 
strategies and organisations.  Basil Thomson, a colourful character, 
developed Special Branch and established the new Directorate of 
Intelligence.  The DOI included the IRA and ISDL in Britain on their list of 
‘revolutionary organisations’ to be kept under surveillance99.  The data 
compiled by the DOI was sent to the Cabinet in weekly reports, always 
delivered in a lively, almost sensationalist manner.  Many of these Cabinet 
reports are cited in the bibliography of this thesis because they underline 
how seriously the British government and its security agencies took the 
threat of the IRA between 1920 and 1922.  Even if these reports are to a 
certain extent alarmist, the fact that IRA activities in Scotland were 
discussed every week at Cabinet level demonstrates the impact Irish 
republicanism was having quite convincingly. 
Supplying the movement in Ireland was as crucial as providing manpower.  
Vize adopted the following supply route in early 1920: Motherwell to 
Liverpool by train; Liverpool to Waterford by boat; Waterford to Dublin 
(presumably by road as no details are given)100.  The indirect nature of the 
route emphasises the close attention the police in Scotland paid to the 
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regular ports.  Vize seems to have appropriated most of his supplies of 
guns and ammunition from military barracks usually, it seems, by bribing 
sentries.  He wrote to Michael Collins: “our new channels are Maryhill, 
Hamilton and Stirling barracks…Dunfermline is also…newly opened to 
us”101.  The police were never far away, however: “you will be sorry to hear 
I’m on the run again, four of them called at my old digs…looking for me, 
they are getting very busy now, but I don’t think you may be alarmed 
about it, whatever they know it must be from information received”102.  
This suggests that whoever informed the police was either unreliable or 
even, perhaps, a double agent.  In Dublin, Collins was contented rather 
than alarmed; “Yes, the goods are coming along quite safely and 
promptly”103.  Indeed, Vize was so successful in his activities that he was 
eventually sent help in the form of Sean Milroy, who was to continue 
reorganising the Sinn Fein clubs while Vize concentrated on supplying HQ 
in Dublin104.  The newspapers of the time pored over the details of 
republican activities and arrests, but more out of curiosity rather than 
contempt105.  Interestingly, a clear distinction was made between Sinn Fein 
and the IRA as separate, but linked, organisations from about June 1921.  
This is most easily seen in the Secret and Confidential Police Circulars of 
the time, which gave orders to deal with agents provocateurs, to encourage 
the report of lost or stolen forearms, and to safeguard all explosives from 
Sinn Fein or the IRA106. 
Peter Hart has described the operations of the IRA in Scotland as ‘minimal’, 
but what he is really alluding to is acts of violence to persons or property107.  
He calculates that Scottish operations only amounted to 9% of the total 
amount of all IRA operations in Britain between 1920 and 1921108.  
Statistics, however, can be interpreted in different ways.  This Scottish 9% 
is as much as the combined efforts of Teesside, Lancashire, Yorkshire and 
Birmingham units of the IRA in the same period.  Moreover, if acts of 
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violence are separated from acts of robbery to acquire arms and explosives, 
Scottish IRA units outperformed all other British units put together: 21 out 
of 25 acts of robbery were carried out in Scotland or, in other words, 84% of 
the total109.  This thesis accepts that violent acts by Scottish IRA units were 
rare and even inconsequential; but in the supply of arms, men and the 
provision of a safe refuge, the Scottish IRA excelled despite many internal 
problems.  Acts of violence more or less ceased after the abortive prison 
van rescue attempt in May 1921, and the Scottish IRA concentrated on 
operations of supply thereafter.  The work of Joseph Vize should also be 
highlighted, as he turned a disorganised group of republican sympathisers 
into a disciplined network of IRA units across the central belt of Scotland.  
There is no doubt that Scottish IRA units were very good at what they 
decided to specialise in, and their success is all the more remarkable 
because of the intense scrutiny they were under after 1919. 
Iain Patterson describes arms, munitions and explosives being purchased 
as well as stolen (which would not be included in Hart’s figures), and 
similar merchandise being smuggled by boat from Germany to Scotland110.  
Michael Collins himself had to intervene to prevent the Scottish IRA 
establishing an arms network between New York and Glasgow, which only 
underlines their enterprising nature further111.  Transporting these acquired 
arms, munitions and explosives from Scotland to Liverpool (route 
explained above) was probably the main problem faced by Joseph Vize.  
Liverpool served as the marshalling station and base for all weaponry 
acquired throughout Britain to be transported to Ireland and, as such, its 
importance as an IRA centre of activity has been perhaps exaggerated by 
Patterson and Hart.  The authorities’ attention on the west of Scotland, due 
to its large concentration of Scots-Irish, allowed Liverpool to continue with 
its work relatively undisturbed.  All ports on the west coast of Scotland 
were very closely watched, as has been explained above, so taking the 
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‘merchandise’, as Collins described it, south was the only realistic option 
for Vize, and this led to the establishment of the main supply route via 
Liverpool.  The success of Vize’s efforts also led to the Scottish IRA 
reporting directly to Dublin  instead of London HQ, so there can really be 
no doubt over the fact that the Scottish IRA punched well above its weight 
in a British context.  However, it is also clear that the difficulties involved 
in transporting the ‘merchandise’ down to Liverpool was one of the factors 
that ultimately led to the decline of IRA activity in Scotland after 1922112. 
An Anglo-Irish treaty was eventually thrashed out towards the end of 
1921.  Unlike the initial discussions, the conference delegation was led by 
Michael Collins.  De Valera, zealously committed to the republican ideal, 
sensed the futility of continued debate with the British government.  The 
treaty offered Dominion status (similar to that of Canada) with the option 
for Ulster to join an All-Ireland Parliament with the rest of Ireland.  A new 
oath of allegiance – to Ireland first and the Crown second – was delicately 
proposed as a sop to republican sentiment.  Lloyd George presented the 
treaty as a last offer, with veiled threats of the consequences of rejection113.  
In case the peace negotiations broke down, a plan was established to 
counter fears that the IRA in Scotland were preparing to attack targets like 
Scottish prisons, especially Barlinnie and Peterhead114.  Prison wardens 
were issued with rifles in readiness.  No such action was deemed necessary 
in England as the prisons there had no Irish republican inmates at that 
time115. 
It is a common misconception that Collins agreed to the treaty in London, 
but this was not the case; he did not have the power to do so.  He only 
agreed to take the treaty back to Ireland for ratification by Dail Eireann.  
Collins was in favour of the treaty in principle, and his support for it 
eventually cost him his life soon after, but he acted in what he believed 
were the best interests of Ireland at the time.  It was unlikely that a 
108 
 
continued war with Britain would ever be completely successful and 
Collins, as commander-in-chief of the IRA, was best placed to assess this.  
He did not achieve an Irish republic because he could not have achieved 
one in 1921.  Too much time had passed since the opportunity of 1914, and 
the Ulster Unionists had grown too used to their achieved position, and 
were by 1921 well entrenched.  What Collins achieved was the possibility 
of a future republic; he saw the Irish Free State as something to build on, a 
necessary stepping-stone to full Irish independence.  He was, though, quite 
naïve to believe that Ulster Unionists would one day willingly unite with 
the rest of Ireland to form an independent republic.  Ulster was fatally 
allowed to take a separate path after the suspension of the Irish Home Rule 
Act in 1914.  The First World War gave Ulster time to consolidate its 
position so, by 1921, any All-Ireland solution was dangerously impractical.  
Only perhaps an imposed federal solution before the First World War 
could have avoided the acrimony and bloodshed, both of which Scotland 
participated in.  Peter Hart sees the introduction of paramilitary 
organisation into Irish politics in 1913 as “one of the crucial dynamics of 
the revolution”116.  He suggests that a fully democratic outcome to the Irish 
Question was just not possible after this, and the events of 1916 to 1921 
only confirm this assessment117. 
On the 6th of December 1921 in Dail Eireann, by a slender majority of seven, 
the Irish Peace Treaty was ratified but this just created yet more conflict.  
The republican movement split into the ‘Free Staters’ who had voted for 
ratification and those against them who regarded the Treaty as a sell-out 
and wanted a republic or nothing at all.  Many Glasgow republicans were 
disappointed with the Treaty and came out in support of de Valera and the 
anti-Treaty side, who were soon dubbed as ‘rebels’ after refusing to accept 
the result of the elections held in Ireland on the Treaty118.  Candidates 
presented themselves as either for or against in June 1922, and there was an 
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overwhelming result in favour of the Treaty119.  Needless to say, the civil 
war in Ireland that began in July 1922 was not welcomed by the vast 
majority of the Irish population or the Scots-Irish communities in Scotland 
who feared it spreading: “the Irish people living under foreign misrule had 
every justification for resistance…we have taken and to take a very 
different view of happenings in…Scotland, where Irishmen have been 
concerned in the perpetration of deeds which clearly involved them in the 
criminal law…Acts of violence, either against property or persons 
perpetrated in Great Britain in the interests of Ireland, have no moral 
justification”120.  The authorities were not best pleased either, introducing 
permits for the control of passenger traffic between Scotland and Ireland121.  
After allegations in early 1922 that Irish gunmen were disembarking early 
at Greenock instead of completing the journey to Glasgow122, baggage was 
routinely searched and passengers carefully scrutinised yet young 
Irishwomen still occasionally carried explosives back to Ireland from 
Glasgow successfully123.  Although the direct route was rarely used for 
supply, the authorities did not relax these arrangements until 1924, which 
again underlines how seriously they regarded the problem124. 
The rebels or Irregulars had ignored the wishes of the Irish people, and 
believed themselves to be the guardians of the republican ideal.  They saw 
themselves in the same position as the men of Easter 1916, but their actions 
did not evoke a similar response.  After being handed a real opportunity 
through the Treaty, the last thing the Irish people wanted was more conflict 
and bloodshed.  Nevertheless, a faction of Sinn Fein in Scotland was 
determined to continue their “persistent quest” for arms and explosives for 
Ireland125.  The death of Michael Collins in August 1922 earned a 
sympathetic obituary from Scottish newspapers, as had that of Arthur 
Griffiths the previous month, illustrating the change in attitude towards 
Irish leaders and Sinn Fein126.  In Scotland, there still remained some rebel 
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republicans calling themselves the National Convention of the Irish in 
Scotland, who met at 114 Trongate, Glasgow, but were relatively small in 
number127.  Moreover, Special Branch of New Scotland Yard estimated that 
85% of Scots-Irish residents  were in favour of the Treaty, and only “the less 
responsible members of the Irish Colony” were supporting de Valera128.  
Most Scottish republicans still belonged to a Sinn Fein club, and a 
conference of Sinn Fein clubs was held in Coatbridge on the 17th December 
1922, at which they pledged their congratulations and loyalty to the Irish 
Free State government, and renamed themselves the Irish Exiles League of 
Great Britain, “in the name of the great majority of the Irish people in 
Scotland”129.  By the end of 1922 then, Free Staters and Republicans had 
drifted apart, with the Free Staters forming the Irish Exiles League 
mentioned above130.  Special Branch of New Scotland Yard scornfully 
described the minority who rejected the Treaty and the Free State, clinging 
to republican ideals: “it may safely be said that more than 90% of the Irish 
in Scotland are in favour of the Free State, and the remaining small 
minority are not among those who count socially, politically or in the 
commercial world.  They are mainly young men and women led by 
fanatics and intriguers.  A few may be dangerous but the majority have 
neither pluck nor intelligence”131.  The authorities seemed content.  In truth, 
the IRA had been compromised by in-fighting and factionalism since 
1916132.  In particular the Glasgow IRB within the IRA and Sinn Fein clubs 
identified with socialism much more than republicans in Ireland did, and 
this isolated them within mainstream Irish nationalism in Scotland.  It is 
therefore quite ironic that, once the Irish Question was settled to the 
satisfaction of most of the Scots-Irish, they began to turn to the Labour 
Party and looked to participate in mainstream Scottish politics, eschewing 
the path of revolutionary socialism that had been considered by the IRB in 
Scotland since the early 1900s133. 
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In conclusion, the period between 1916 and 1922 was a period of transition 
for Ireland and Irish nationalism.  After the Easter Rising of 1916, Sinn Fein 
gradually but surely replaced the mainstream Irish Party as the main Irish 
nationalist movement.  Active in Scotland since around 1900, in this period 
Sinn Fein became the focus of the new generation of Irish nationalists.  The 
First World War brought the language of self-determination to the Irish 
Question, and made republicanism more attractive and acceptable to 
nationalist communities in Ireland and in Scotland, and the Easter Rising 
just consolidated its position.  The fact that the promised Home Rule Act of 
1914 failed to be implemented for the whole of Ireland further boosted the 
position of Sinn Fein and republicanism.  Ulster was allowed to take a 
separate path, and this allayed most of the fears of unionist Scottish 
Protestants, allowing Sinn Fein to increase its activities, cultural influence 
and support in Scotland.  However, the authorities took care to be aware of 
these activities and made many arrests and prosecutions.  Indeed, weekly 
reports on Sinn Fein and IRA activity in Scotland were discussed regularly 
at Cabinet level.  The conflict in Ireland between the IRA and British forces 
made the Scottish people amenable to a settlement which did not include 
Ulster.  The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 was regarded as fair and sensible in 
Scotland, and the ‘Free Staters’ were given support in their stance against 
the anti-Treaty rebels.  In short, Irish republican activity in Ireland and in 
Scotland created a climate within which Irish separation could be 
reasonably put forward and discussed; in other words, Irish republicanism 
actually strengthened the Union between Scotland and England, making a 
rational evaluation of the ‘Irish Question’ possible.  The First World War 
had consolidated the Ulster veto and, once this fact was realised, many 
Scots accepted the status if not the claims of Sinn Fein.  The bloodshed and 
reprisals from both sides caused a paralysis of public opinion which only a 
negotiated settlement could ever have cut through. 
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Therefore, the years between 1916 and 1922 were almost years of drift in 
Scottish opinion over Ireland.  Irish nationalist activity intensified, public 
opinion weakened.  Many things occurred in this short period of time, but 
it is best regarded as a phase of reconciliation: some settlement of the ‘Irish 
Question’ became inevitable as a result of the sustained activity of Irish 
republicans in Scotland as well as Ireland. 
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Chapter IV: 1922 – 1931; “To stir the boiling pot?” 
 
The establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 provoked an increase in 
Irish republican activity.  Fighting between Irregulars and the forces of the 
Free State became a regular feature of Irish life at the beginning of this 
period.  In Scotland, Irish republicans were in the minority amidst a 
majority of ‘Free Staters’.  They lacked organisation and leadership, 
prompting Joseph Robinson to be given the job of restructuring: “I have 
ordered every soldier of the army to join the Sinn Fein club in their 
district…I am convinced my work will soon bear good fruit”1.  Robinson’s 
plan was to turn the Scots-Irish away from the Treaty and thus facilitate the 
continued use of Scotland as a supply and training centre for the IRA.  
However, the importance of the Scots-Irish community was not lost on the 
Free State government either, prompting the republican faction to step up 
their plans: “it is more important now than ever that the Chief [de Valera] 
should come for the Free Staters are making a big attempt to get the 
support of the Irish in Scotland.  Milroy, Collins and others are coming in 
the near future”2.  Their plans for the visit of de Valera had to be cancelled 
though, as they were refused a permit for an open-air meeting and the 
police warned the proprietors of all suitable halls not to grant their use; 
“These few facts might be used to show any wavering Irishmen or women 
how much the British people desire to have us in ‘common citizenship’ 
with them.  Their love for us is the same when giving us the ‘Treaty’ as it 
was when giving us the Black and Tans.”3.  The inability to hold regular 
public meetings severely weakened the republican movement in Scotland, 
as it was intended to do. 
The increase in republican activity in Ireland, tantamount to a civil war, 
was the rejection, by hardcore republicans, of the Free State itself.  To them, 
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its existence was an aberration; if north and south were permanently 
partitioned, their republican cause was severely weakened.  The British 
authorities wasted no time in taking advantage of the new arrangements, 
however.  Midnight raids, mainly in Dundee and Glasgow in March 1923, 
resulted in wholesale arrests and deportations of suspected IRA activists 
back to the Free State4.  The files that exist on internees show that quite a 
few seem to have been genuinely innocent, others only on the fringes of 
any political activity, and the rest probably guilty of active involvement in 
IRA gun-running, raids, organisation, etc.5.  Deportation and internment 
were introduced with the Defence of the Realm Act, and the arrangements 
made permanent with the Emergency Powers Act in 1920.  The Restoration 
of Order in Ireland Act targeted “any person who is suspected of acting or 
having acted or being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the restoration 
or maintenance of order in Ireland”6.  It was controversial enough to use 
such sweeping powers in wartime or in Ireland up to 1921, but to use them 
against civilians in 1922 and 1923 when the situation was much calmer 
was, as Peter Hart has put it, “a profound extension of the powers of the 
state”7.  These deportations are best seen as a knee-jerk reaction to the 
continuance of Irish republican activity in mainland Britain.  In many cases, 
hard evidence simply did not exist, and the allegation of being an ‘active 
republican’ was enough to be used as a pretext for deportation8.  Similar 
operations occurred simultaneously in Liverpool, Manchester and London.  
The reason given for the 38 Scottish arrests was that every person arrested 
belonged to the IRA, “that quasi-military organisation”9.  The authorities 
feared that Clydeside, in particular, was in danger of becoming a refuge for 
republican activists from either the Free State or Ulster. 
These deportations were looked upon with genuine curiosity and surprise 
in Scotland, and Scottish Labour MPs like James Maxton and David 
Kirkwood even tried to visit their deported constituents10.  When their 
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requests to visit the deportees were declined, they still pressed for their 
good treatment and legal claims.  One group in Scottish society would have 
particularly welcomed these deportations; the Church of Scotland chose 
1923 as the year in which it launched an attack against the so-called ‘Irish 
in Scotland’.  Indeed, from 1923 to 1939, the Church of Scotland led the 
other Presbyterian churches in a campaign of intolerance against those of 
Irish birth or extraction in Scotland.  This was no accident; they were 
attempting to make the Scots-Irish their scapegoats for the economic 
problems affecting Scotland at the time, calling them a “menace to the 
peace of the realm” for their political activities and maintained, compared 
with the Scots, that the Irish were “on a lower scale…intellectually, morally 
and spiritually”11.  As has been explained above, the unionist institutions in 
Scotland had a tradition of victimising the Scots-Irish at times of Irish 
political crisis or even when there occurred an increase in pro-Irish political 
activity in Scotland12.  This new campaign was just as aggressively 
Protestant as previous campaigns, but had other specific objectives: to 
assert Scottish ‘racial’ superiority, to limit Irish immigration into Scotland 
and to try to weaken the growing strength of the Roman Catholic Church 
in Scotland. 
Their campaign also indirectly weakened the Irish republican movement in 
Scotland: “the republican movement in Scotland has 94 Cumanns and 2 
District Councils; at present there is an average of 50 members in each.  All 
are doing their best to help, but with many out of work, and fighting to 
keep body and soul together.  The fight is hard.  With all against us, we 
shall fight on to keep the movement alive and assist Ireland all we can”13.  
It also did not take Joseph Browne long to assess his position: “it is 
questionable if a full-time organiser could justify his existence here 
meantime owing to apathy, unemployment and the effect of recent 
deportations; it is very hard to raise funds…I would be better employed in 
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Ireland at the present time”14.  The combined effect of the split caused by 
the Treaty, the deportations and the new campaign of anti-Irish prejudice 
severely weakened the Irish republican movement in Scotland.  Towards 
the end of 1923, there were only 32 Sinn Fein clubs left in Scotland and, 
apart from one in Dundee and one in Edinburgh, they were all situated in 
or around Glasgow15.  It was also stated that “only Glasgow D[istrict] 
C[ouncil] is functioning properly”16. 
The economic position did not help matters either, but it did help the 
Church of Scotland reinforce its objectives.  All these objectives were 
openly debated at the Church of Scotland’s General Assembly in 1923.  The 
majority of delegates agreed on the nature of the ‘problem’, despite the fact 
that no hard evidence was forthcoming, and the subsequent report entitled 
‘THE MENACE OF THE IRISH RACE TO OUR SCOTTISH NATIONALITY’ was 
nothing more than bigoted pamphleteering17.  The General Assembly 
welcomed the report and called for a government inquiry to look into the 
regulation of Irish immigration.  Needless to say, the constant reference to 
the ‘Irish menace’ caused widespread anger among Scots-Irish 
communities, and many Labour MPs (now the main recipients of Scots-
Irish votes) called the report slanderous18.  There did, however, exist 
evidence to refute the claim of the Church of Scotland that Scotland was 
being swamped by undesirable Irish immigrants.  Mr M A Reynard, the 
Inspector of the Poor and Clerk to the Parish Council of Glasgow stated in 
April 1923 that the rumours of a large influx of Irish immigrants to 
Scotland were “quite unfounded”19.  However, his and other reasonable 
voices went largely unheeded.  Slowly but surely, enmity was again 
generated against the Scots-Irish and their way of life by a significant 
group within the Church of Scotland who were consciously prodding a 
raw nerve with the Scottish public who had abiding fears for the security of 
Scotland as well as Ulster.  
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This campaign, now widely known as the ‘Kirk’s Disgrace’, certainly 
dented the confidence of Scotland’s Catholics who turned defensively 
inward, and embraced the Labour Party even more wholeheartedly.  
Michael Rosie has commented on the fear within Presbyterianism in the 
1920s that it was losing focus and influence20.  He also points out that the 
broad mass of clergy and laity were curiously silent throughout this 
campaign, agreeing with Steve Bruce’s contention that the Church of 
Scotland effectively sidelined the campaign into General Assembly 
subcommittee and it was thus not widely supported21.  Yet this campaign 
was led by ministers and other senior figures with great power and 
influence and, even if their views were not shared by the broader church, 
they condoned it by doing and saying nothing22.  Moreover, immigration 
from Ireland since the 1840s did not just mean the arrival of Roman 
Catholics to Scotland.  About one third of all immigrants from Ireland were 
actually Protestant (a mixture of Presbyterians, Episcopalians and 
Methodists) and their influence needs to be taken into account23.  There was 
certainly a crisis of faith amongst Scottish Protestant churchmen over the 
efficacy of evangelical solutions to the growing social problems of the 
twentieth century.  Individualist religious salvation was increasingly at 
odds with the ideology of collectivism which appealed to the working class 
so strongly.  As Callum Brown has put it, religious individualism “was 
tarnished with the same brush as modern capitalism”24.  Poverty, poor 
health, overcrowding and unemployment on a mass scale could not be 
effectively tackled by the traditional Christian values of thrift and self-
reliance.  The campaign against Irish immigration in the 1920s known as 
the ‘Kirk’s Disgrace’ should be seen as an act of desperation against the 
challenge from a secular salvation in the form of state social welfare.  The 
rise of Labour in central Scotland owes much to immigrant Irish Catholics 
(and their descendants), and the Protestant churches felt marginalised by 
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the 1920s as the social and political attitudes of the working class were 
adjusted to exclude their input.  By the end of the 1920s the Church of 
Scotland had been effectively disestablished and also lost its influence over 
education and poor relief with the abolition of Parish Council and County 
Education authorities.  Scottish Protestantism as a whole had “lost its 
image as the religious face of the Scottish civil establishment”25.  Although 
membership remained healthy until the 1950s, the Presbyterian, 
Episcopalian and evangelical churches were losing their social significance 
and did not seem to relish the prospect of coexisting peacefully with an 
increasingly confident Roman Catholic Church in Scotland. 
The idea that Scotland was an equal partner with England within the 
British Empire was also seriously tested in the 1920s.  “The impact of the 
Great War…ushered in a period of profound social, cultural, economic and 
political dislocation” as Richard J Finlay has put it26.  In particular, 
Scotland’s heavy industries were irretrievably damaged by the reluctance 
to modernise and compete.  Unemployment, at previously unknown levels, 
exacerbated the existing severe social problems of health and housing.  
Politicians referred to the ‘End of Scotland’, the idea that Scotland as a 
nation was in terminal decline.  This crisis of national identity had at its 
root the miserable state of the Scottish economy.  The implications for 
nationalistic endeavour were clear; Scotland desperately needed a fresh 
start and many looked to self-government to provide the catalyst for social, 
cultural, economic and political regeneration.  Yet the Church of Scotland 
looked to accuse and blame, hoping to increase their social standing and 
improve generally falling church attendances.  They aspired to provide the 
spiritual leadership they felt was lacking in Scotland, using the ‘Irish 
menace’ as a convenient scapegoat.  Usually the Irish were labelled as a 
separate ‘race’ in this campaign, but the word did not have the same 
pejorative meaning in the 1920s that it has today.  Those concerned with 
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the ‘End of Scotland’ were thinking of a separate religion and culture, not 
of different skin colours or other physical characteristics per se.  At the 
heart of this campaign was a desperate desire to maintain the ‘purity’ of 
the Scottish ‘race’, and the ‘Irish’ as the largest immigrant group in 
Scotland at the time, became the obvious focus for this campaign. 
The Irish Free State was trying to consolidate its position and exercise its 
authority throughout 1924 and the Labour Party, having its first experience 
of government, was trying to do much the same thing in Britain.  The Free 
State was paying the price of self-government as high taxation exacerbated 
the political tension in Ireland.  In Scotland, Sinn Fein and the Irish Self-
Determination League called on all Scots-Irish voters to question Labour 
candidates in the October 1924 General Election on the issue of political 
prisoners27, whereas Scottish Orangemen were instructed  to vote anti-
socialist28.  The IRA itself was undergoing changes at this time; the Scottish 
Brigade having to report to ‘HQ/Britain’ rather than to Dublin.  This 
illustrates the desire of the IRA to carry out operations on the British 
mainland in continued protest against the Treaty.  At this time, the IRA had 
more men in the Glasgow Brigade alone than they had in the whole of 
England, which emphasises the continuing influence of Irish republicanism 
on Scotland, even if only on the west of central Scotland.  There was clearly 
still a desire to do something for Ireland long after most of the Scots-Irish 
had moved on politically29.  Yet indiscipline and feuding continued to 
undermine republican unity in Glasgow in the 1920s as Brian Hanley has 
noted30.  IRA strength in Scotland declined to just 100 men by 192631, when 
it had become primarily a social organisation32.  The geographical position 
of west central Scotland is perhaps the most significant factor here; long 
after IRA units had disappeared elsewhere in the United Kingdom, never 
mind the rest of Scotland, there was always an IRA presence in and around 
Glasgow.  Numbers and activity had been steadily declining since 1922 but 
131 
 
not as sharply as elsewhere.  This was mainly because of the continuing 
movement of the Scots-Irish between Ireland and this part of Scotland.  As 
well as looking for employment (seasonal as well as permanent), there 
were regular visits back and forth to see family and friends as well.  The 
present writer has heard testimony from a variety of individuals about the 
‘Derry Boat’ linking the Clyde Coast with Donegal, for example, and this 
movement continued on a significant scale from the 1920s right up until the 
1960s33. 
Since the end of the First World War and especially after the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty of 1921, the Labour Party increasingly represented Scots-Irish 
communities, as attention was then focused on social and economic 
problems.  The Ancient Order of Hibernians named unemployment and 
housing as the two greatest problems facing the Scots-Irish in 192434.  The 
other main problem for the Scots-Irish was the attitude of their fellow Scots 
towards them.  The 1925 General Assemblies of the Presbyterian churches 
criticised the 1918 Education Act for the advantages gained by Roman 
Catholics from it.  They objected to the State funding of Catholic schools on 
economic, religious and cultural grounds, arguing that the practice was 
socially divisive.  In reality, denominational education had been a feature 
of the Scottish system since the introduction of public education in 1872 
and not just since 191835.  The negativity of the Presbyterian churches 
towards the Scots-Irish was sharply contrasted by the reports given on the 
Irish Free State on the fourth anniversary of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in the 
Glasgow Herald36.  The successes and failures of the Free State were 
appraised and, generally, the transition to self-government was regarded 
positively.  The Scottish Office also concluded in 1925 that the facts and 
arguments of the Church of Scotland on Irish immigration were 
“erroneous”37.  Indeed, their investigations showed that there were fewer 
Irish-born residents in Scotland in 1921 than in 1911, and the number of 
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‘Irish’ in receipt of poor relief had not grown actually or proportionately.  
There were more Irish immigrants entering Scotland than Scots emigrants 
leaving in 1924, but it was stated that the “Irish ‘danger’ was not 
appreciably increasing and does not justify any action by the British 
government”38. 
The Glasgow Herald and The Scotsman remained firmly unionist throughout 
the 1920s, and The Bulletin (from 1915) was also broadly a unionist 
newspaper.  The Daily Record had supported the Liberal Party in the past, 
but new owners moved it into the Unionist camp.  Only the Labour-
supporting Daily Herald and the Liberal-supporting News Chronicle tried to 
break this Unionist deadlock of the 1920s, without much success.  Both the 
Sunday Post and Sunday Mail had appeared in 1919, which only added two 
more unionist newspapers to the mix.  This was the culmination of a 
process began as a consequence of the First World War.  I. G. C. Hutchison 
describes the effect on the Liberal press as ‘annihilation’, and points out 
that the only two papers of quality still reliably Liberal at this time were the 
Greenock Telegraph and the Paisley Daily Express39.  This right-wing leaning 
of the vast bulk of the Scottish press only increased the Labour Party’s 
standing within Scots-Irish communities. 
Towards the end of 1926, the Presbyterian churches intensified their 
campaign against the Scots-Irish.  A deputation was received by Sir John 
Lamb, Under Secretary of State for Scotland, concerning Irish immigration.  
The church leaders claimed that over 700,000 Roman Catholic ‘Irish’ were 
then resident in Scotland and around 9,000 immigrant Irish were arriving 
every year, but could not or would not substantiate their figures for Irish 
immigration40.  Their point of view was considered carefully if not 
sympathetically at the Scottish Office, and it was decided to refer the 
matter to the Secretary of State for Scotland for a fuller examination.  This 
resulted in the Scottish Secretary, Sir John Gilmour, receiving a deputation 
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consisting of representatives from the Church of Scotland, the United Free 
Church and the Free Church of Scotland in November 1926.  The churches’ 
deputation was not taken altogether seriously; their figures were disputed, 
and it was also pointed out to them that it would be a very dangerous 
precedent to regulate migration from one part of the United Kingdom to 
another, especially since they had no objections to Protestant immigrants 
from Ulster to Scotland. 
It could be argued that this meeting at the end of 1926 should have meant 
the end of the Presbyterian churches’ campaign41.  Admittedly, the initially 
cool official response to the churches’ deputations did limit the campaign’s 
perceived success but, more importantly, the Presbyterian churches took 
this rebuffal as the impetus to redouble their efforts.  It should also be 
stressed that this campaign to regulate Irish immigration to Scotland was 
mainly based on anti-Catholic prejudice.  Irish immigration to Scotland 
was, in fact, negligible throughout this period42.  What the Presbyterian 
churches were really objecting to was the healthy growth of the Roman 
Catholic community in Scotland.  By the 1920s the Catholic population of 
Scotland was largely Scottish.  That is, most Catholics had been born in 
Scotland; very few indeed had been born in Ireland43.  It was the fact that 
the majority of Scottish Catholics were of Irish extraction that so upset the 
Presbyterian churches.  They argued that, with a separate religion and 
separate educational facilities, Scottish Catholics were a separate 
community; and furthermore, because they were mostly ‘Irish’ (of Irish 
extraction), they represented an alien presence, and an inferior presence at 
that.  Actually, the Scots and the Irish share much in terms of heritage and 
racial origins, even though most Scottish Protestants would not have felt 
able to recognise the similarities in the era of the 1920s44.  The modern Irish 
in Scotland had been encouraged over as cheap labour during the 
industrialisation of the nineteenth century.  By the 1920s they had served 
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their purpose and were regarded as an economic threat to ‘native’ Scots – 
despite the fact that most of the Scots-Irish were themselves native Scots by 
then.  For example, a 1927 Ministry of Labour survey of public-funded 
construction schemes showed that only 33 out of over 7,000 workmen were 
Irish-born45. 
It was essentially a question of identity.  As they were Roman Catholic, 
many Protestant Scots would not accept the Scots-Irish as truly Scottish.  
The Scots-Irish were solely blamed for being incompatible with the Scots 
‘race’ because they kept themselves to themselves as separate communities; 
when in fact no real attempts had been made at social integration by any 
Scottish institutions.  The Scots-Irish kept themselves to themselves 
because there was no practical alternative in the Scotland of the 1920s.  As 
well as being blamed for “racial antagonism”, the Scots-Irish were accused 
of polluting the Scottish national character and motivating great numbers 
of young Scots to emigrate in search of a better standard of living46.  
Although this is clearly scapegoating, it is perhaps understandable.  
Presbyterian suspicion of the Scots-Irish and their religion was not entirely 
irrational or unreasonable.  The 1920s were a time of unprecedented 
economic and emotional turmoil, and the presence of the Scots-Irish was a 
direct challenge to the fundamental nature of Protestant Scotland.  Scottish 
society, particularly in urban areas, struggled to successfully integrate the 
Irish, Irish-Scots and Scots-Irish in that order.  Although the reaction of 
Protestant Scotland was often hostile it was rarely violent, when this was 
not usually the case with immigrant or minority communities elsewhere in 
Europe between the wars.  Examples of this scapegoating can be seen in the 
works of George Malcolm Thomson and Andrew Dewar Gibb who, albeit 
right-wing, were both still Scottish nationalists47.  In reality, 
unemployment, poor living standards and Scottish emigration levels had 
little to do with the Scots-Irish.  As had previously occurred in the late 
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nineteenth century, at times of economic depression, the immigrant Irish 
were targeted and victimised.  However, unlike in the nineteenth century, 
in the Scotland of the 1920s the Scots-Irish were relatively well-established 
and vigorous, aided by legislation like the Roman Catholic Relief Act of 
192648.  It proved much more difficult to make the mud really stick this 
time and this was no doubt because the ‘Irish Question’ seemed to be 
settled.  Indeed, most of the Scots-Irish were beginning to see themselves at 
this time as primarily Scottish, and comparatively few still clung 
completely to a dual identity.  The Irish Free State was consolidating its 
political position and Home Rule, albeit without Ulster, had been achieved.  
Politics for the Scots-Irish in the 1920s implied the Labour Party and 
Catholic organisations.  Social welfare legislation became more important 
to Scots-Irish communities than Irish nationalism as they entered the 
political mainstream in the interwar years. 
The developing two-party system in British politics meant the Scots-Irish 
had no other choice but to support Labour if they desired a voice in 
Scottish politics.  This should be placed in the context of Scots-Irish 
communities seeking general advancement within Scottish society.  Most 
historians, from Handley to Gallagher, see the end of the Irish Civil War as 
also the end of the influence of Irish politics on the Scots-Irish.  While this 
thesis accepts that the 1920s saw the political integration of the Scots-Irish, 
they did not cease to be a distinct community altogether due mainly to the 
variety of their social institutions.  The Catholic Church itself became more 
assertive in the 1920s at the same time as the Protestant churches were 
experiencing a crisis of confidence.  Their reaction to this increasing 
integration goes a long way to explaining the ‘Kirk’s Disgrace’ and the 
activities of the PAS and SPL as Patterson, for one, has suggested49.  
Moreover, Tom Gallagher has shown that the 1918 Education Act 
“breathed life” into the ‘No Popery’ movement50.  John McCaffrey has 
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argued that radicalism within the Labour Party had to diminish after 1918 
because support from ‘Irish’ votes was conditional on Labour protection of 
Catholic interests and values, especially in education but also in housing 
and employment51.  This radicalism included support for an Irish republic, 
and so this dilution would also have allowed many Protestant Scots to 
support Labour.  Michael Rosie has highlighted the profound influence 
Presbyterianism had on the Labour Party in Scotland, emphasising that not 
all Presbyterians approved of the Kirk’s rightward drift in the 1920s and 
1930s52.  Many Protestants, including Orangemen, began to put the 
interests of their class above religious concerns, which assisted Labour’s 
advance in Scotland to a great extent.  Rosie describes Labour as providing 
a “secular canopy” under which individuals or groups of all religions and 
none found their social and economic interests represented53. 
However, the irrational fears of many Scottish Presbyterians still 
encompassed politics.  The Reverend Duncan Cameron of Kilsyth, for 
example, speaking in December 1927 warned of the continuing Irish 
republican menace in Scotland, dubbing all of the ‘Irish’ working-class as 
left-wing and having a “revolutionary character”54.  Although the IRA was 
still active in mainland Britain, it was effectively an underground and 
peripheral political movement since the establishment of the Irish Free 
State in 1922.  However, what is important is the belief that Irish 
republicanism was dangerously active still persisted in Scotland, 
particularly among those with most to fear from it or with most to gain 
from that fear being perpetuated.  Pressure from the Presbyterian churches 
brought about an Inter-Departmental Government Conference on Irish 
immigration in 192755.  There are signs that it deliberately took its time to 
collate and analyse information, no doubt waiting for the 1931 census to 
settle the controversy finally. 
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The same Reverend Cameron delivered a lecture on the “influx of Irish 
Roman Catholics” under the auspices of the Scottish Protestant League in 
the Town Hall, Greenock, in February 192856.  To aid the Presbyterian 
churches in their anti-Catholic campaigning two organisations, although 
not formally connected, were established in the late 1920s; the Scottish 
Protestant League in the west of Scotland, and Protestant Action in the east 
of Scotland, mainly around Edinburgh.  These organisations were both 
militant and refused to accept the rejections of their arguments.  Indeed, Sir 
John Gilmour, in reply to continued Commons questioning on Irish 
immigration, rejected calls for a Commission of Inquiry in the same month, 
February 192857.  He quoted the 1921 census figures as showing 91% of the 
Scottish population being Scottish-born and this had been more or less 
constant since 1861.  Moreover, the percentage of the Scottish population 
who were Irish-born had in fact fallen from 6.7% in 1911 to 3.3% in 1921.  
These official figures clearly show that Irish immigration to Scotland was 
not in fact the problem the Presbyterian churches and militant Protestant 
political groups would have had the Scottish public believe.  Nonetheless, 
another churches’ deputation was jointly received by the Home Secretary 
and the Scottish Secretary in July 192858.  At this meeting, held in London, 
the Scottish Presbyterian churches were informed that the regulation of 
population movement within the British Isles was not desired or practical.  
Yet this highest-level dismissal could not dissuade this Protestant 
movement to falter, which illustrates the xenophobic nature of their claims 
and demands:  “Government should not refuse those who demand that 
measures be taken to check the influx from Ireland”59.  Even a publication 
by the respected academic, Professor J W Gregory, entitled ‘SCOTLAND 
AND THE IRISH INVASION’ which dismissed the churches’ arguments did 
little to modify views already well entrenched60.  Michael Rosie has 
correctly argued that anti-Catholicism was just not strong enough to 
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sustain a party at local level in Glasgow, even in the economic situation of 
the 1930s61.  At its zenith, militant Protestantism attracted 23% of the vote 
in Glasgow (SPL) and 31% of the vote in Edinburgh (PAS), revealing what 
Rosie has described as a “cultural divide” between urban Catholics and 
Protestants within Scotland’s central belt62.  However, even though 
organised anti-Catholicism was short-lived, it did represent a significant 
minority and underlines the impact the healthy growth of Scots-Irish 
communities were causing.  Shared class interest would eventually benefit 
the Labour Party, as has been discussed above, but this significant minority 
of Protestant voters still felt strongly enough to put religion before class. 
Another significant organisation was established in Scotland in 1928: the 
National Party of Scotland.  Directly after the Irish Free State was 
established in 1922, the Scottish Home Rule Association demanded Home 
Rule for Scotland as Irish Home Rule had finally been taken care of63.  Ever 
since its foundation in 1886, the SHRA had to live in the shadow of the 
Irish Home Rule movement.  However, once the Irish Free State had been 
established, Scottish Home Rulers began to press their own claims for 
devolution more vigorously.  In 1924, the Unionist government stated after 
a debate on Scottish Home Rule in the Commons that it would take no 
further action on the matter64.  This did not prevent a Scottish Home Rule 
Convention drafting a new Bill in the same year which only floundered 
because it was too closely linked to Welsh Home Rule.  The idea of ‘Home 
Rule All Round’ or federalism, which first appeared in the 1830s and had 
received close examination in the 1880s and 1890s, still had support in 
some sections of the political mainstream.  The reconstituted SHRA, which 
had strong links with the Labour Party, held many who felt the solution to 
the Home Rule argument was a federal United Kingdom65.  For so long the 
question of Irish Home Rule dominated the devolution debate, and once 
the Irish Free State had been established, the SHRA’s influence receded to 
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be replaced with the idea of a nationalist political party in Scotland66.  Yet 
the attitude of most Scots towards Scottish Home Rule was decidedly cool 
at this time.  Anti-Home Rulers introduced difficulties such as the number 
of Scottish MPs to remain at Westminster in order to deliberately muddy 
the waters and thus postpone any serious examination67.  Unionist 
newspapers like the Glasgow Herald argued in 1927 that there was no desire 
for Scottish Home Rule; some administrative devolution perhaps, but not 
any degree of self-government.  In the same year the socialist Scottish MPs 
introduced a Government of Scotland Bill which failed due to lack of 
parliamentary cooperation68.  This motivated the SHRA to protest against 
what it considered to be government interference.  It is no great surprise 
that Scottish Home Rulers eventually realised that they would have to 
emulate their Irish predecessors by establishing a political party with the 
main policy of Scottish self-government. 
There were also many different ideas on strategy within the Scottish 
nationalist movement throughout the 1920s.  There was a demand for an 
independent national party as early as 1925 in the SHRA, but this was not 
the only alternative strategy being debated69.  Others advocated an 
independent Scotland separate entirely from the British Empire, some put 
the case for Dominion status within the Commonwealth and there were 
also those who argued for complementary self-government within the 
United Kingdom and Empire.  A referendum, petitions, a Royal 
Commission and even civil disobedience were considered by the three 
main nationalist bodies: the SHRA and the more radical SNL and Scots 
National Movement (SNM).  Disillusionment with lobbying and pressuring 
existing political parties provided the impetus for this reassessment, but 
the removal of the Irish dimension with the establishment of the Irish Free 
State had certainly helped to precipitate it.  The transition occurred at the 
AGM of the SHRA in Glasgow in April 192870; a motion was presented to 
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the effect that all SHRA members should join the new National Party of 
Scotland.  Interestingly, in its first manifesto, the NPS made no mention of 
the Scots-Irish community or the perceived ‘Irish invasion’.  The manifesto 
had, in fact, distinctly republican undertones71.  This was because the NPS 
had to ensure its various factions could interpret it as they wished.  Thus 
the more radical wing of the party (the old SNL) which was anglophobic 
and hostile to the British Empire expected more militant rhetoric and 
strategies.  Both of these are well expressed in an early letter from the NPS 
to Dail Eireann asking TDs for their support: “Scotland must 
demand…[self-government]…and must be prepared if necessary to take 
it…The righteousness of our cause and the memory of your own great 
struggle is [the] only justification for [our] appeal to you”72. 
Richard J Finlay has shown that the Celt cists within the NPS held up 
Ireland as their model to imitate73.  He sees religion, despite the efforts of 
the Presbyterian churches, as “coincidental” to the issue of the Irish 
Question which was shaped by notions of ‘race’ instead74.  Nationalist 
bigots like Andrew Dewar Gibb and George Malcolm Thomson vilified the 
Irish example because they viewed the Irish as racially inferior to the Scots.  
Finlay is correct to state that “although…the nationalist movement in 
Scotland was largely free of racial chauvinism, it cannot be denied that 
racial concepts, both directly and indirectly, contributed to its political 
development and consumed a fair amount of its intellectual energy”75. 
“Every Irishman coming into Scotland means a Scotsman on the dole”; this 
remark was made by Lord Scone, President of the SPL, in a speech in the 
St. Andrew’s Halls in Glasgow in October 192876.  As well as spuriously 
blaming the contemporary malaise on an imaginary influx of Irish 
immigrants, he called for a residency qualification of seven years before 
any privileges of Scottish citizenship were granted.  Lord Scone and the 
other leaders of the anti-Catholic movement never really quoted actual 
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figures to back up what they said, nor did they acknowledge the wealth of 
census and other evidence which made their arguments look so false and 
reactionary77.  However, these organisations did reinforce the traditional 
myths and stereotypes many Protestants Scots believed about the Irish and 
Scots-Irish, and these people heard what they wanted to hear in rhetoric 
like the example quoted above.  This was especially the case after the Irish 
Free State introduced its Public Safety Act in 1927 and there were fears that 
large numbers of undesirable deportees would arrive in the west of 
Scotland to increase the immigrant ‘Irish’ community78.  Some were 
motivated to direct action like the attack on the annual Ancient Order of 
Hibernians demonstration at Falkirk in August 1928 when stones and 
bottles were thrown79.   
The tide began to turn at the beginning of 1929 when the Glasgow Herald 
ran a series of five articles on ‘THE IRISH IN SCOTLAND’, in an attempt to get 
to the bottom of the ‘problem’80.  These articles were a genuine attempt at 
an examination of the situation in Scotland, but did not really tackle the 
issue of anti-Catholic prejudice.  The articles did, however, acknowledge 
that Irish immigration had slowed to a ‘trickle’ and, according to the 1921 
census, English and Welsh-born residents far outnumbered those who 
were born in Ireland.  There were also, it was conceded, no Irish-born 
recipients of the dole registered at that time, although figures for Scottish-
born descendants of original immigrants had proved regretfully hard to 
come by.  The Roman Catholic church was berated for encouraging large 
families among its members, whereas the Protestant churches, by 
encouraging smaller families, were partly responsible for the Scots 
becoming “a dying people”81.  All this melodrama stemmed from the fact 
that many Protestant Scots were finding difficulty in coming to terms with 
life in a modern industrial nation in decline.  This series of articles 
concluded by placing the onus solely on the Roman Catholic community 
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(which, it was stressed, was 90% ‘Irish’) to stop ‘segregation’, otherwise the 
problem of disharmony could never be solved. 
To continually label third, fourth or even fifth generation Scots-Irish as just 
‘Irish’, to accuse them of being socially inferior, to openly attack their 
professed religion while at the same time blame them for their reluctance to 
integrate fully into mainstream Scottish society was hypocrisy writ large.  
The Scots-Irish had not wholly and successfully integrated into mainstream 
Scottish society because mainstream Scottish society did not want them to 
integrate wholly and successfully.  Football clubs like Glasgow Celtic and 
Edinburgh Hibernian, for example, would never have come into existence 
if Roman Catholics had been simply welcomed into existing Scottish clubs.  
Needless to say, clubs like Glasgow Rangers deliberately obstructed social 
integration on the grounds of religious bigotry, specifically anti-Catholic 
prejudice, by refusing to sign Roman Catholic players and not 
discouraging the widespread singing of sectarian songs by their 
supporters82.  A vocal minority of militant Protestants perpetuated 
religious tension in interwar Scotland, but are we projecting our 
secularised values on them?  Michael Rosie has argued that these localised 
conflicts were “epiphenomenal to the broader secular cleavage in Scottish 
society”, and the decline of Empire combined with fears of increasing 
Anglicisation was much more important than religious squabbles83.  It may 
be the case that the extent of religious tension has been hitherto 
exaggerated in comparison with tensions caused by class or gender, for 
example, but Rosie and others place too much emphasis on individual 
factors in isolation.  This thesis contends that, certainly in central Scotland, 
religious tension and conflicts were as important as wider economic and 
cultural concerns.  For the contemporary actors, these religious tensions 
and conflicts were legitimate cultural factors. 
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Leaders in the Glasgow Herald following the earlier series of articles argued 
that the large community of Roman Catholics of Irish extraction in Scotland 
did represent something of an ‘invasion’, but at the same time questioned 
the accuracy of the Presbyterian churches’ views, whose leaders were still 
pressing the government for immigration regulation and calling the Scots-
Irish community “a persistent magnet”84.  The beginning of 1930 saw the 
Presbyterian churches pressing the new National government on Irish 
immigration and the arrangements for the census of 193185.   They 
proposed a ‘religious denomination’ column be added to the 1931 census86.  
The National government also established a Commission of Inquiry into 
the administration of Scottish affairs with a view to introducing eventual 
legislation.  Events in Ireland overshadowed everything else, however, as 
President Cosgrave resigned and Eamonn de Valera emerged as the 
strongest and ultimately successful candidate with a programme for full 
Irish independence.  Republican malcontents had been a thorn in the side 
of the Irish Free State government since 1922.  In Scotland too, throughout 
the 1920s, the authorities kept a careful eye on Irish republican activists by 
issuing orders to the police to safeguard firearms and explosives as well as 
compiling lists of places vulnerable to IRA attacks87.  De Valera had been 
the natural leader of the anti-Treaty faction since 1921, but had slowly 
realised the possibilities of building on the status of the Free State through 
democratic participation in the government.  The IRA had become 
marginalised, but was still the focus for those republican malcontents to try 
to continue the armed struggle.  Although lawlessness broke out gain in 
the Irish Free State during 1931, de Valera and his political allies were by 
then keen to attempt a democratic resolution and distanced themselves 
from such incidents88.  Sinn Fein had more or less ceased to be a major 
political player, and was replaced by Cumann na nGaedheal (pro-Treaty, 
Fine Gael after 1933) and Fianna Fail (de Valera’s populist republicans).  
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The continuing unrest provoked the Free State government to introduce a 
further Public Safety Act which caused another scare in Glasgow as it was 
feared that ‘Irish gunmen’ would flee there from Ireland.  Indeed, the 
authorities issued special orders to the police to report any Irish republican 
disturbances or propaganda amongst the Scots-Irish population89.  De 
Valera took the opportunity of restored calm to outline the new republican 
aims – no oath of allegiance to the British Crown and further dilution of 
any political links with the United Kingdom90.  However, de Valera did not 
propose ending the Free State’s membership of the Commonwealth 
because he hoped to use it as leverage to end partition.  Only when the 
Republic of Ireland was declared in 1949 were all links to the United 
Kingdom finally severed. 
Irish republicanism was therefore beginning to regenerate.  The IRA had 
begun to exploit the effects of the Great Depression at the same time as 
politics began to radicalise again across Europe.  Brian Hanley sees this 
phenomenon as explaining the growth of IRA recruitment and activities 
from 1930 onwards91.  He cites the establishment of the radical Saor Eire in 
September 1930 as an attempt to take advantage of the economic crisis 
through a dedicated political organisation92.  The IRA had also previously 
attempted to seize political control of the GAA immediately after the Civil 
War, without success.  Increasing activity in the north of Ireland can also be 
detected from this time.  Disputes between those in the IRA seeking 
military action and those who advocated a political solution would 
dominate the 1930s.  The IRA was experiencing a period of operational 
stagnation between 1922 and 1931, but would survive to advance an 
alternative ideological identity to what John Regan has described as “the 
crisis of treatyite politics”93. 
Irish nationalism had a more direct influence on the Scottish nationalist 
movement in this period.  After the Irish Free State was established, 
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Scottish nationalists looked on Scottish Home Rule as unfinished business, 
and several attempts and organisations failed to achieve any real success.  
The foundation of the NPS in 1928 was a realisation that, like Sinn Fein and 
Irish nationalism, Scottish nationalism also needed a party political focus if 
any tangible success was to be achieved.  Moreover, the Labour Party 
gained most Scots-Irish voters after 1922 who had been politicised by the 
Irish Home Rule movement and were thereafter concerned mostly with 
social issues. 
The main impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland in this period was, 
however, as an imaginary force.  The Presbyterian churches waged a 
campaign of intolerance and anti-Catholic prejudice against the Scots-Irish 
communities in Scotland for two main reasons:  from fear that the political 
beliefs of Irish immigrants (really their descendants) would take hold in 
Scotland, and from fear over the growing strength of the Roman Catholic 
Church in Scotland.  When the Presbyterian churches labelled the ‘Irish’ as 
inferior and revolutionary, they were referring to a community which was 
largely born in Scotland by the 1920s and were, in fact, Scots-Irish.  Their 
notions of race dictated that the Scots-Irish were not true Scots because 
they were not Protestants.  Militant Protestant groups like the PAS and SPL 
gained some respectability from association with the ‘Kirk’s Disgrace’ that 
they would not otherwise have enjoyed.  Although much of mainstream 
Protestantism was ambivalent or even opposed to these campaigns, many 
erstwhile Labour voters switched to militant Protestant parties in both 
Edinburgh and Glasgow, as Michael Rosie has shown94.  This had the 
double impact of increasing Labour activity and organisation in these 
areas, and fastening Scots-Irish Catholics more securely to this party.  Rosie 
is correct to stress that, just because we find that religion and politics mixed 
much more in the past is not tantamount to finding widespread 
sectarianism; “rather it is to find that the past was more religious”95.  The 
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imaginary influx of Irish immigrants (who were always Catholic and 
republican) manufactured by the Presbyterian churches was an attempt to 
exert undue influence on the British government at a time of economic 
uncertainty.  Many believed that Scotland really was a nation in decline 
and the imperial ideal was no longer secure.  Many Protestant Scots were 
very susceptible to these images of the ‘Irish’ as an invading and hostile 
race, plotting to corrupt the purity of the Scottish race; and this also 
explains the support for militant Protestant groups like Protestant Action 
and the Scottish Protestant League. 
In conclusion, the impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland in the period 
1922 to 1931 was keenly felt and never absent.  What matters when 
assessing this impact is not just how significant events seem with 
hindsight, but how significant people at the time perceived them to be.  
Irish nationalists in Scotland began to concentrate their efforts within the 
labour movement, and the Scots-Irish movement began to flourish.  
Examining the reaction to the anti-Catholic or anti-Irish campaign waged 
by the Presbyterian churches in Scotland it is clear that what mattered 
most, and hence what had the greatest impact, was anything that was 
perceived to threaten Scotland directly or could upset the hegemonic status 
quo of Protestant Unionism.  If the past was more religious, it was also 
more political.  Religion, identity and much more general concepts of race 
were all inextricably linked as political constants at this time.  Whether 
those Scottish Presbyterians actually believed in their imaginary influx of 
Irish immigrants or not is irrelevant; what matters most is that this 
ideological device was very successful in modernising as well as 
intensifying anti-Catholic prejudice in Scotland.               
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Chapter V: 1932 – 1939; “vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle” 
 
The tenth anniversary of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1932 saw elections 
taking place in Ireland.  De Valera’s Fianna Fail emerged as the largest 
party, and de Valera became undisputedly the political leader of the Irish 
Free State.  This caused concern in Ulster, where rioting broke out later in 
the year, ostensibly as a reaction to the sharp rise in unemployment1.  
Moreover, the Belfast Trades Council attempted to call a General Strike on 
the 12th October, but a few days later order had been restored by the 
authorities and the search for the communist agents who were suspected of 
agitating for the strike also began.  The skilled working-class of Belfast 
were susceptible to such overtures at this time because they felt vulnerable; 
the economic depression had hit industrial areas particularly badly, and it 
also seemed as if the Free State was actively preparing an attempt to absorb 
unionist Ulster.  The end of 1932 saw de Valera flexing his new political 
authority: within the Free State the split with the IRA became apparent 
after several confrontations between IRA marches and the police, baton 
charges often being used by the police; outwith the Free State de Valera 
precipitated stalemate over import duty negotiations with Britain2.  De 
Valera was testing the political climate with these acts of brinkmanship. 
After convincingly retaining power in the Free State elections in January 
1933, de Valera felt confident enough to introduce three separate 
constitutional Bills to the Dail in August of the same year.  These Bills were 
designed to bring an Irish republic a step nearer, involving the severing of 
all links with the British Crown and a new constitution.  Furthermore, de 
Valera expressed his desire for another election to approve the new 
constitutional arrangements.  Needless to say, de Valera’s proposals met 
with a cool response from the British government, who issued a statement, 
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entitled “THE PROTECTION OF ULSTER” which advised against any 
constitutional changes3.  In Ulster itself, the proposals were met with deep 
anxiety and the authorities there responded by prohibiting the display of 
republican flags and emblems. 
In Scotland, the influence of de Valera’s democratic republicanism was a 
factor in the foundation of the Scottish Republican Party in February 19334.  
The party had its headquarters in Inverkeithing in Fife, and its initial 
programme owed much to the original agenda of Sinn Fein in Ireland5.  As 
far as the broader movement for Scottish nationalism was concerned, the 
early 1930s held mixed fortunes.  Success was achieved with the election of 
Compton Mackenzie as Rector of Glasgow University in October 1931, but 
the NPS itself had a poor showing in the General Election of the same year 
with the National Government being understandably re-elected with a 
large majority.  A Scottish self-government conference in September 1932 
was not altogether popular either; the Glasgow Herald in particular 
opposing the idea of self-government strongly, arguing that Scotland had 
had more advantages than disadvantages from the Union.  After this 
mauling, Unionists in Scotland felt confident enough to declare in January 
1933 that there was a “waning interest” in Scottish nationalism6.  It was 
more a case of nationalists in Scotland licking their wounds.  Since the early 
1930s the NPS had become progressively weakened by internal divisions.  
The so-called fundamentalists, who advocated an entirely independent 
Scotland free from imperial concerns, came more and more into conflict 
with the moderate wing of the party who believed this stance was seeing 
off potential votes.  The moderates desired a more positive image which 
would improve relations with England7.  Both factions blamed the other for 
the party’s inability to achieve an electoral breakthrough, and the 
squabbling only served to disillusion ordinary party members. 
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Furthermore, the creation of the right-wing Scottish Party by establishment 
figures in the summer of 1932 heralded the inevitable split in the NPS 
which came at the party’s annual conference of 1933.  The fundamentalist 
wing was expelled by the moderates to facilitate greater cooperation 
between the NPS and the Scottish Party which led eventually to the 
creation of the SNP in April 1934.  The Scottish Republican Party 
mentioned above became the new focus for many of these expelled 
radicals.  Others moved into the Scottish Defence Force, a radical 
militaristic organisation which desired complete separation from England 
and had links with the IRA.  Strategy meetings were held in Glasgow 
during the summer of 1933 at which a number of ‘leading officials’ of the 
Irish republican movement in Scotland gave advice8.  Statements such as 
“we must be prepared to go out and do what Ireland has done; we must be 
prepared to make sacrifices” caused the authorities to monitor the 
organisation but it never seems to have been regarded very seriously.  It 
seems clear that the newly formed SNP was trying to come to terms with 
the modern Scottish political landscape of the post-Depression era.  Those 
who drifted into the Scottish Republican Party or Scottish Defence Force 
became marginalised, and any Irish influence on Scottish nationalism 
declined as a result.  The SNP in the late 1930s and beyond looked instead 
to Westminster, and not to Ireland, in their campaign for Scottish self-
government. 
The IRA had regenerated itself as a focus for opposition to the Irish Free 
State and, at its peak between 1932 and 1934, it had around 10,000 members 
in total9.  Two successive General Army Conventions in 1933 and 1934 
highlighted a figure of 12,000 members10.  However, de Valera’s populist 
republicanism began to satisfy most Irish republicans and the IRA began to 
split due to internal political turmoil.  The 1930s had an increasingly 
conservative atmosphere in Ireland and the Catholic Church, now 
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reconciled to Fianna Fail, would not tolerate the IRA’s dangerous 
radicalism.  Brian Hanley has noted that by 1936, as a consequence, “its 
increasingly desperate tactics had largely marginalised the IRA from 
broader republicanism”11. 
The leading industrialists, businessmen and landowners of Scotland, as 
Unionists, feared Scottish nationalism might capture widespread popular 
support during what they saw as a temporary economic crisis.  As they had 
shown with their activity against Irish Home Rule, they were adept at 
negative campaigning and began to work in a similar manner once more.  
To a certain extent, the renewed debate on Scottish self-government and 
nationalism followed the anti-Irish immigration furore that was effectively 
concluded after the results of the 1931 census were published.  These 
results showed that only 54,854 persons born in Ireland were then resident 
in Scotland, a further fall since 1921 and a total refutation of the main 
claims and arguments of the Presbyterian churches12.  However, and 
perhaps unsurprisingly, their anti-Catholic campaign staggered on until 
1939.  Certainly, the Scottish Office did continue to examine Irish 
immigration carefully, but not with any great enthusiasm after 193513.   
With only around 1% of the Scottish population actually Irish-born by the 
1930s, why did the anti-Irish campaign continue for so long?  The answer is 
that the Presbyterian churches never really distinguished between those of 
Irish birth or those of Irish extraction in their campaign.  Whether they 
would not or could not differentiate between the two is irrelevant; in their 
minds the Scots-Irish community was a foreign entity and they felt justified 
in their hostility towards it.  Moreover, the powerful forces behind 
Unionism in Scotland were very good at mobilising and shaping Protestant 
opinion in campaigns like this as they had so much experience of doing so 
for several generations.  Scots-Irish communities more or less ceased to be 
referred to incorrectly as ‘Irish’ and were referred to only as ‘Catholic’.  
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Needless to say, it was not so easy to maintain a campaign of open 
religious intolerance after it had become reasonably clear that the 
Presbyterian churches were guilty of bias and exaggeration.  Most 
Protestant Scots supported the Union, and ‘Home Rule’ was something 
they were used to rejecting; it always had strong Irish associations and was 
therefore suspect and opposed.  Michael Rosie has described the anti-
Catholic campaigns of the 1920s and 1930s as “the final kick, rather than 
the peak of ‘Protestantism before Politics’ populism”14.  It is easy to 
stereotype the Protestant churches as a whole, but these campaigns, 
although officially sanctioned, had marginal national influence.  The quest 
for a regenerated ethnic identity was something that most Protestants, who 
were not militant, eschewed in favour of a class-based identity and political 
participation through the labour movement.  Scotland did not have the 
“major secular cleavages” that existed in Ulster, and Rosie is right to draw 
attention to the limitations of the militant Protestant vote15, but the 
important point, surely, is that there was still such a thing as a Protestant 
vote in 1930s Scotland. 
The IRA newspaper An Poblacht issued a call to arms at the beginning of 
193416.  It called on all true republicans to prepare themselves to sever the 
link with the British Crown.  This provoked what few Irish loyalists there 
were in the Free State to begin to organise against the possibility of an Irish 
republic17.  Help was offered to them from Ulster and from Scotland.  De 
Valera responded by declaring that Ireland was entitled to its freedom, and 
would not be willing to look on the question of trade and import 
agreements favourably unless Ireland’s case had a sympathetic hearing18.  
Concurrently, the Scottish Home Rule Commission was visiting Ulster and 
the Free State on a fact-finding mission to establish the benefits of self-
government and to learn how each system operated19.  The delegation 
actually met with de Valera who was anxious to promote Irish-Scottish 
160 
 
relations20.  No doubt de Valera was also happy to acknowledge the debt 
the Irish republican movement owed to Scotland. 
All this must be placed within the context of the IRA split of 1934 that led 
to the emergence of the Republican Congress.  Many historians have 
viewed the Republican Congress as a socialist organisation, similar in some 
ways to Saor Eire, but as Richard English and Brian Hanley have argued, 
the truth is a little more complex.  In January 1934 the IRA published a 
pamphlet titled ‘Constitution and governmental programme for the 
Republic of Ireland’ stating that the document proposed its “ultimate aims 
and ideals”21, which were a mixture of gaelicism, separatism, republican 
militarism and radical social ambitions.  Richard English has demonstrated 
that the commitment to public ownership was tempered, as both personal 
and private property were unambiguously allowed22.  He notes also that 
there definitely existed a sincere commitment to communalism (as opposed 
to communism) within sections of the IRA which can be traced back as far 
as the writings of Patrick Pearse23.  The socialist aspects of the programme 
can be traced back to the writings of James Connolly, who saw the causes 
of Irish nationalism and Irish labour as inseperable24.  However, as English 
has rightly observed: “Republicanism was only a socialist faith if you were 
a socialist republican”25.  The Congress could not convert the IRA, so it split 
in September 1934 and thus divided the militant republican movement.  
The events of 1934 illustrate the discord between a socialist republicanism 
advocating class war, and a gaelicist, militaristic separatism which utilised 
the language of communalism.  In the words of Richard English: “the 
majority of the IRA were shown to belong to the tribe of Pearse rather than 
the tribe of Connolly”26. 
It appears that the IRA ‘call to arms’ was being answered in Scotland at the 
beginning of 1935, as several cases of illegal possession of explosives were 
then prosecuted27.  In Ireland itself, increasing tension over the economic 
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climate motivated the proposal of a bridge or tunnel to be built between 
Scotland and Ireland to alleviate unemployment28.  The scheme met with a 
lukewarm response in Scotland, and even caused the issue of ‘cheap Irish 
labour’ to be resurrected with questions in the House of Commons29.  They 
all met with the same response: there were fewer Irish in Scotland in 1931 
than there were in 1921, and the overall trend was declining.  Easter Rising 
celebrations were again banned in Belfast but religious rivalry and friction 
caused many disturbances there between April and July30.  In Glasgow, 
Orange Order processions caused severe disturbances in the Gorbals, 
Gallowgate and Shettleston areas of the city, and seemed more than the 
usual ‘marching season’ hostilities31.  Serious anti-Catholic disturbances 
also occurred in Edinburgh in 1935 which were the work of the militant 
Protestant Action Society, and showed that there was still support for anti-
Catholic campaigns.  There is surprisingly little detail in The Scotsman on 
the sectarian riots, but they were referred to as “a public menace”32.  It is 
interesting to note, however, that the authorities regarded John Cormack as 
responsible for the riots and official documents stress something the 
newspapers did not report – Cormack served in the Black and Tans in 
Ireland until 192133. 
By 1936 the possibility of another major European war seemed very real, 
and preparations for such an eventuality were well in hand.  Maurice 
Twomey, the IRA Chief of Staff, called the League of Nations “a snare for 
smaller nations” and urged republicans to fight against England trying to 
‘include’ Ireland in any forthcoming war34.  The IRA had been vying with 
Fianna Fail for the support of republicans ever since de Valera gained 
power in 1931, and had retained the support of only the most diehard 
physical force republicans in both Ireland and Scotland. 
The Bills that de Valera had introduced to the Dail in 1933 eventually came 
to fruition in May of 193735.  The constitutional relationship the Free State 
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had with the British Crown came more or less to an end.  The new 
constitution of Eire made explicit what was implicit before: that de Valera 
had always envisaged the separate self-government of Ireland.  The new 
state of Eire inevitably provoked political controversy.  Opinion in Scotland 
was equivocal – most Protestant Scots regarded the transition as acceptable 
as long as Eire did not interfere with the status quo in Ulster36.  In Northern 
Ireland, the authorities there took great care in stressing that the south had 
no power over the north and that they were anxious to reaffirm their 
loyalty to the British Crown37.  No negotiations took place between Britain 
and the Irish Free State, and this provoked several questions in both 
Houses of Parliament over the relationship Britain now had, if any, with 
Eire.  The status of Irish-born loyalists in Eire was again raised but quietly 
forgotten about38.  The most important and controversial issue was 
undoubtedly that the new constitution of Eire laid claim to all of Ireland, 
not just the territory previously known as the Irish Free State.  In a 
broadcast speech in December 1937, de Valera emphatically declared that 
Eire was a reality, and robustly defended the right of the Irish people to 
their freedom39.  Eire was a stepping-stone in his long game, and de Valera 
knew that he could not declare a republic in 1937; he also knew that the 
British would take some time to get used to such a change, but at the same 
time was aware of the realisation in Britain that the south of Ireland had 
been going its own way since 1922.  The Free State had taken most of 
Ireland out of the United Kingdom, with a status similar to that of Canada 
within the Commonwealth.  The new constitution of Eire was something of 
a halfway-house between this status and an Irish republic. 
Elections in Eire in January 1938 confirmed the constitutional changes as 
permanent and consolidated the dominant position of Fianna Fail in Irish 
politics.  De Valera was seen as a “dictator” by the unionist press in 
Scotland40; and he responded by calling for an end to the partition between 
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north and south in Ireland, prophetically stating that “a divided Ireland 
would be a permanent menace”41.  This statement caused the authorities in 
Northern Ireland to increase their security measures; so much so that 
republican demonstrations in Belfast in May 1938 at the graves of IRA men 
and United Irishmen saw armoured cars and a heavily armed police 
presence ensuring that there were no incidents42.  De Valera further 
exacerbated the political situation by announcing, in November 1938, that 
citizens of Eire were not eligible to be conscripted in any forthcoming war 
that Britain may be involved in.  The impact of these statements was 
limited by the public preoccupation with events on the continent and, in 
this sense, de Valera had chosen his time carefully and intelligently. 
1938 also saw the tenth anniversary of the National Party of Scotland (SNP 
since 1934) which held a conference at the McLellan Galleries in Glasgow, 
where members claimed responsibility for creating a “National 
Consciousness”43.  Needless to say, this claim was only their interpretation 
of events.  The SNP had developed the nationalist cause in Scotland by 
establishing an actual political party with Scottish self-government as their 
aim; but a Scottish ‘national consciousness’ of sorts had persisted since 
1707.  The vigour of the movement for Irish Home Rule which began in the 
nineteenth century encouraged nationalist Scots to ride the coat-tails of this 
movement and demand Home Rule for Scotland.  Many attempts and 
disparate organisations had been unsuccessful in securing even a measure 
of devolution for Scotland because a significantly national demand for 
Home Rule did not exist.  This is best explained as Scots feeling better off in 
the Union than out of it, as well as being concerned with other issues they 
saw as having greater priority.  The SNP’s aims were stated just as vaguely 
as the NPS’s to avoid controversy.  However, the issue of the imperial ideal 
dogged the party repeatedly until the Second World War.  From about 
1935, the SNP began to fragment into opposing factions.  As collective 
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security deteriorated in Europe many nationalists saw imperialism as the 
cause, and were reluctant to be part of a war to maintain the British 
Empire.  As Richard J Finlay has noted, the SNP’s anti-war campaign was 
“inextricably linked to a belief that somehow British imperialism was a 
major factor in creating international tension”44.  Many rejected the 
imperial ideal as outmoded and indefensible, and believed that Scotland 
had ultimately suffered from her connection with it.  Similar to the 
experience of Sinn Fein in Ireland, these radical Scottish nationalists tried to 
forge a particular national identity in the hope of gaining popular support 
as more traditional methods were eclipsed.  The SNP did create a party 
political focus for Scottish nationalists, but there were always other 
conduits: the Scottish Self-Government Federation, founded in May 1937; 
and the Labour Council for Scottish Self-Government, founded in April 
1938 are good examples of more radical organisations45. 
Although de Valera chose his time well to introduce constitutional changes 
in Eire he could never successfully control the IRA, which had gone 
underground in the mid-1920s.  In Scotland, any reports to the police 
concerning IRA activity were still thoroughly investigated46.  Indeed, the 
IRA leadership had threatened in April 1939 to initiate a war on English 
soil47.  The following month, when the British government was organising 
the details of probable conscription, the IRA denounced the concept of 
conscription and called on all its units to be ready for action.  In reality, the 
British government had purposely excluded the whole of Ireland from its 
Conscription Bill to try to avoid potential trouble, but still upset loyalists in 
Ulster48.  It was clear by 1939 that if war came, the civilian population 
would be affected much more than at any time before, and the British 
government just could not afford a similar anti-conscription campaign to 
that organised in Ireland by Sinn Fein during the First World War.  This 
renewed vigour from the IRA resulted in the government of Eire banning 
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the organisation outright in June 193949.  The IRA responded by declaring 
war on England and, in a statement published from New York, declared 
that “British air defences are at the mercy of Irishmen”50.  The British 
government slowly woke up to the danger the IRA posed to any future war 
effort, and began a “careful examination” of the IRA threat as an “urgent 
matter” in July 193951. 
Smuggled IRA pamphlets were discovered by Scotland Yard which 
claimed responsibility for past unresolved bombings, and referred also to 
future action.  This action was initiated in the IRA Army Order for Britain, 
issued in July 193952.  The order gave the “opportunity to serve Ireland”53, 
and motivated the British government to rush through the Prevention of 
Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act, which resulted in several 
deportations after its introduction at the end of July 193954.  There were 
protestations about the legality of this Act, as there had been with the 
deportations in 1923, but the authorities emphasised the “new direction” of 
the IRA from 1926 onwards and stressed the importance of national 
security55.  An indication of IRA policy came from Sean Russell, the 
acknowledged IRA commander, speaking in the USA in August 1939: “The 
Civil War ended in Ireland in December 1938…the only enemy we have 
now is England”56.  The IRA began to concentrate their efforts on mainland 
Britain, at a time when they knew that the British government was 
vulnerable to their type of guerrilla activity.  In Scotland, the police were 
ordered to “keep close watch on movements of Irishmen”57, as well as 
reporting any suspect explosions, search for hidden IRA weapons dumps 
and keep lists of all IRA suspects58.  The English Commissioner of Police 
responded by asking all hotels and guest houses to report all suspicious 
Irish persons59.  When the Second World War broke out at the beginning of 
September 1939, the government of Eire quickly declared its neutrality and 
introduced extensive powers to detain known IRA men for the duration of 
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the war for “activities prejudicial to the state”60.  At any rate, the activities 
of the IRA throughout the war did not prove to be particularly significant.  
The police were instructed to continue watching Irishmen and search for 
hidden explosives well into 194061, but their only real success was in May 
1939 with the discovery of some explosives in the offices of the Celtic 
Literary Society at 132 Trongate, Glasgow62.  This indicates that, despite 
dwindling support, the IRA in Scotland was still attempting to supply 
explosives for ‘the cause’ long after many historians have dismissed their 
input altogether.  Yet this thesis has established that Scottish IRA units 
outperformed all other British units put together in the supply of arms, 
men and the provision of safe refuge since the early 1920s; and this 
evidence would suggest that this state of affairs continued until the Second 
World War, at least in ambition if not in execution. 
In fact, Sean Russell had been trying to organise a bombing campaign in 
England since 1936 with the assistance of Clan na Gael funds from the 
USA63.  Russell represented ‘the tribe of Pearse’, and was arguably more 
extreme than most militant republicans.  He thought in uncomplicated 
terms and saw undiluted militarism as a return to traditional IRA activities 
after a period of political experimentation with Saor Eire, the Republican 
Congress and Cumann Poblachta na-h-Eireann.  In reality, the proposed 
introduction of conscription was just the catalyst which precipitated a 
series of explosions culminating in a bomb which killed five and injured 
many others in Coventry on the 25th August 1939.  In total, around 130 
incidents related to the IRA were recorded by the end of 193964, and these 
incidents only generated much anti-republican sentiment throughout 
Britain.  Richard English rightly draws attention to the “enormous gulf” 
between the IRA and Fianna Fail by 1939, and describes the “solipsistic 
quality of mind” within the IRA which failed to recognise that the populist 
republicanism of Fianna Fail had been embraced by public opinion65.  The 
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IRA, including their dwindling supporters in Scotland, were easily 
marginalised because their intransigence would not allow them to view 
any political alternatives as valid.  As Richard English puts it: “for 
republican zealots in this period, self effectively became confused with 
nation; when describing the supposed qualities, ideals and aspirations of 
the Irish nation, they were in fact merely describing their own”66. 
The period between 1932 and 1939 saw a change in the relationship 
between Britain and Ireland.  Both the Irish Free State and the government 
of Northern Ireland attempted to consolidate their positions and, in the 
case of the Irish Free State, altered its constitutional status to become Eire in 
1937.  This transition to Eire was largely managed by Eamonn de Valera, 
President of the Irish Free State from 1930.  He took the opportunity that 
Michael Collins had negotiated in 1921 to bring an Irish republic closer in 
1937.  These constitutional changes were regarded equivocally in Scotland; 
most Scots accepted the new status of the south of Ireland as long as the 
south did not attempt to interfere with the north of Ireland.  The 
constitution of Eire did lay claim to all of Ireland, but this fact was 
overshadowed at the time by other events in Europe. 
Internal divisions between fundamentalists and moderates within the NPS 
in the early 1930s eventually led to the creation of the SNP in 1934.  The 
SNP did establish a party political focus for moderate Scottish nationalists, 
but the fundamentalists or radical Scottish nationalists, in a similar way to 
the origins of Sinn Fein in Ireland, forged their own particular national 
identity and did gain some popular support. 
Although the 1931 census showed a further fall from 1921 in Irish-born 
residents in Scotland, the anti-Catholic campaign of the Scottish 
Presbyterian churches continued until 1939.  Militant groups like Protestant 
Action in Edinburgh were keen to instigate anti-Catholic riots to perpetuate 
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hostility towards the Scots-Irish community in Scotland.  Lawlessness in 
Ireland and the renewed campaigns of the IRA on the British mainland 
from around 1931 had impacts on Scotland, but these were limited due to 
economic and political uncertainty throughout Europe. 
In conclusion, the impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland in the period 
between 1932 and 1939 was varied and complex.  A crucial factor is the 
significance the contemporary actors attached to events at the time.  
Contrasting the reactions to the establishment of Eire, the continued anti-
Catholic campaign and the renewed activities of the IRA, it is clear that 
anything perceived to have been threatening Scotland or Protestant 
Unionism directly had considerable psychological impact.  This was a time 
of deep economic uncertainty, when many believed Scotland was a 
declining nation within an insecure imperial ideal.  Anti-Catholic and anti-
Irish prejudices had become constants in Scottish society at a time when 
racial and religious intolerance had dangerous parallels elsewhere in 
Europe.  It must be stressed, though, that Scottish society did not stray too 
far down the fascist path.  Political violence amid street politics was much 
more common in the 1930s than it is today, and the PAS and SPL never 
glorified violence in the same way that fascist movements of the period did 
elsewhere in Europe.  As one historian has noted, militant Protestantism 
was really conservative, not revolutionary67, but did flirt with fascism as 
did the IRA in the 1930s and beyond68. 
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Chapter VI: Conclusions 
 
There can be little doubt that Irish nationalism had an impact on Scotland 
between 1898 and 1939.  After the failure of the Home Rule Bills of 1886 
and 1893, the influence of republicanism grew as the influence of the Irish 
and Liberal parties began to wane.  In Scotland the movement for Scottish 
Home Rule began to intensify after 1900, and this was as a direct influence 
of Irish Home Rule agitation through the likes of the UIL.  Fears for the 
future of Ulster motivated many Scottish Protestants to view moves for 
Scottish Home Rule as a mere decoy for Irish Home Rule which would 
inevitably lead to an Irish republic, and so had to be resisted.  The likes of 
the Ancient Order of Hibernians, IRB and Sinn Fein became very publicly 
active in Scotland from around 1905 onwards, drawing steady support 
from the Scots-Irish communities, particularly in the west of central 
Scotland. 
The problem of integrating an increasingly militant religious minority in 
the north with the rest of Ireland’s Home Rule aspirations came to a head 
in 1911 when large Protestant demonstrations against Home Rule took 
place in Ulster and Scotland, and ultimately led to the signing of ‘Ulster’s 
Solemn League and Covenant’ in September 1912, echoing the tradition of 
the Scottish League and Covenant from 1643.  Sympathisers of both Ulster 
Unionists and Irish Republicans in Scotland became the most regular 
suppliers of arms, ammunition and explosives as well as men for ‘duty’ in 
Ireland. 
The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 signalled the eclipse of 
mainstream or ‘Westminster’ Irish nationalism and the ascendancy of Sinn 
Fein and republicanism.  A new generation had grown frustrated with 
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constitutionalism and moral force that failed in 1886 and again in 1893.  
Irish republicanism was treated with fear and suspicion by many 
Protestant Scots who directed these emotions at the Scots-Irish in their 
midst.  As most Irish immigrant communities were Roman Catholic, anti-
Catholic prejudice became even more widespread that it had been in the 
previous century.  The immigrant Irish were stereotyped as disloyal and 
republican, always conspiring to overthrow the Protestant faith and 
monarchy.  Unionist newspapers manipulated public opinion along these 
lines, and the Church of Scotland collaborated with particular zeal.  Even 
though support for Irish republicanism was not yet that strong, the fear of 
it amongst many Protestant Scots was significantly palpable. 
The Easter Rising of 1916 changed everything.  The repressive counter-
measures taken by the British government backfired and the constitutional 
path to Irish nationhood met a dead-end.  Although the war itself initially 
strengthened ties to the union in Scotland, the supply of weapons and 
explosives to the IRA actually intensified into the 1920s.  The British 
authorities redoubled their intelligence efforts but support for Sinn Fein 
grew steadily until there were more active members in Scotland than in the 
whole of England.  So much so that weekly reports on Sinn Fein and IRA 
activity in Scotland were discussed regularly at Cabinet level.  Such activity 
was concentrated in the central belt, but particularly in the west around 
Glasgow.  This was mainly due to the size of the Scots-Irish community 
there and, of course, its close geographical proximity to Ireland which 
made it ideal as a supply and training centre for the IRA.  Although the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 split the Scots-Irish community in Scotland, with 
the majority supporting the Free State position and rejecting further 
conflict, the IRA could always rely on some support from Scotland well 
into the 1930s.  It is clear, however, that the bloody conflict in Ireland 
between the IRA and British forces made most Scots desire some sort of 
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lasting settlement.  Even Protestant Scots were happy with the Free State as 
long as it excluded (most of) Ulster. 
The continued IRA activity in Scotland after 1922, albeit less intense, led to 
the authorities deporting IRA suspects and sympathisers to the Free State 
in 1923, and surveillance of groups with Irish connections continued into 
the 1930s.  The historiography of this period has tended to polarise on the 
issue of the strength of the IRA and the extent of its activities in Scotland.  
Historians like Handley and Gallagher have tended to exaggerate IRA 
membership in Scotland and the amount of assistance given to republicans 
in Ireland.  Moreover, historians like Hart and Patterson have tended to 
minimise the strength of the IRA in Scotland and denigrate their activities.  
The truth is somewhere in the middle.  This thesis accepts that, apart from 
a brief period between 1919 and 1921, support for Irish republicanism was 
minimal within most Scots-Irish communities in Scotland.  It is also correct 
to state that violent acts perpetrated by the IRA in Scotland were rare.  
However, in ‘supply activity’ or acts of robbery to acquire arms, munitions 
and explosives, Scottish IRA units performed very well when compared to 
their English counterparts.  Despite many incidents of feuding and 
factionalism, the Scottish contingent of the IRA still managed to play a 
significant role as a supply centre for Irish republicanism, and this should 
not be diminished or dismissed as it often has been in comparison to 
strength of numbers or acts of violence.  There has been something of a 
republican pedigree in Scotland since 1798, and it was arguably the 
centenary of that rebellion that rekindled this phase of Irish republican 
activity on both sides of the Irish Sea. 
To focus solely on the impact of Irish nationalism in relation to the Scots-
Irish would be to miss the point entirely, however.  There can be little 
doubt that the main impact was on those Scots who were not Catholic.  
Most Protestant Scots genuinely believed, to varying extents, that Irish 
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republicanism was a serious threat and danger to them in this period.  
They were fed this myth through the unionist-dominated press, and would 
have also been aware of the anti-Catholic campaigns of the Church of 
Scotland as well as the activities of the PAS and SPL.  The economic 
problems caused by reconstruction at the end of the First World War hit 
Scotland particularly hard.  Scotland depended too much on traditional or 
heavy industries which began to decline due to a combination of lack of 
investment, increasing foreign competition and poor labour relations.  As 
many contemporary observers predicted the ‘end’ of Scotland and the 
Imperial ideal, the Presbyterian churches and the Church of Scotland in 
particular, began to focus on the ‘problem’ of Irish immigration to 
Scotland.  They argued that there was a massive, unchecked and regular 
influx of Irish into Scotland which, if unchallenged, would result in 
Protestant Scots losing their jobs and the ultimate contamination of the 
pure Scots ‘race’.  Although this seems like scapegoating nonsense today, it 
was taken very seriously indeed in the 1920s and 1930s.  Influential figures 
within the Presbyterian churches saw themselves as a bulwark against the 
Irish ‘menace’, and campaigned viciously against the ‘Irish’ in Scotland.  
What they were really campaigning against was the healthy growth of the 
Roman Catholic community within Scotland.  In reality, the vast majority 
of Catholics in Scotland by the 1920s had been born in Scotland and were 
therefore Scottish.  It was more the fact that most were of Irish extraction 
and Roman Catholic that so enraged the Presbyterian churches.  It is 
important to emphasise that the belief that Irish republicans were 
dangerously active within Scotland was still very real throughout the 
1920s, amongst those with most to fear from it or with most to gain from 
perpetuating that fear.  The result was that this racial antagonism and 
religious prejudice caused many Protestant Scots to regard the Scots-Irish 
as not truly Scottish; it fuelled religious violence and held back social 
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integration, the lasting effects of which are still felt today, and not just 
between Catholics and Protestants.  There are lessons to be learned about 
integrating minority ethnic or religious groups from the interwar period 
that could inform relations between Christians and Muslims in British 
society today, for example. 
The success of the Irish Free State was one of the main causes of the 
foundation of the National Party of Scotland in 1928.  There was perhaps 
an opportunity for Scotland to emulate Ireland and achieve at least some 
form of devolution but popular support was curtailed by Unionist Party 
propaganda, a largely unionist media and the anti-Catholic campaigns of 
the Church of Scotland which did not allow any Scottish political or social 
unity to establish or endure.  The new repository of Scots-Irish votes, 
however, was the Labour Party which actively sought the votes of these 
communities in the central belt of Scotland after the ‘Irish Question’ 
appeared to be settled in 1921.  The growth of the Labour Party also led to 
the steady decline of the Liberal Party which would never form a 
government again without such support.  These Scots-Irish voters had been 
politicised by the Irish nationalist struggle for Home Rule and therefore 
played a significant part in the development of the Labour Party in the 
1920s and beyond; particularly in local government, as issues like housing, 
education and employment began to dominate their political agenda.   
Perhaps another indicator of impact was the rightwards shift that 
characterised the Scottish press in the interwar period.  The vast majority of 
daily newspapers became solidly Unionist in the 1920s, causing many 
Liberal papers to disappear altogether or merge with a Unionist stable.  
Ultimately this led to the increased participation of Scots-Irish communities 
in Labour politics as an alternative to political introversion.  Reaction to 
this growing political and social advancement goes a long way to 
explaining the ‘Kirk’s Disgrace’ and the activities of the PAS and SPL.  The 
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Labour Party had to check its initial radicalism towards Irish issues so that 
Catholic votes could be relied on, and this in turn led to Protestant voters 
trusting Labour with their social and economic interests.  Green and 
Orange, to paraphrase Iain Patterson, combined to produce a pale shade of 
Red1.  The 1920s and 1930s were much more polarised and impoverished 
than today, and perhaps we look back and see a sectarian society when in 
fact there was no ‘systematic discrimination’ of the Scots-Irish or Roman 
Catholics per se.  Prejudice and bigotry were certainly present, and are best 
viewed as symptoms of the search for new identities in the interwar period.  
As Michael Rosie has put it: “…the universal franchise, the rise of Labour 
and radical street politics of left and right.  The seemingly inexorable drift 
back to war; churches emptied by poverty; the unparalleled freedom and 
attraction of mass leisure: these were the defining features of the period”2. 
The 1931 census proved that Irish immigration to Scotland was negligible 
and declining, but the Church of Scotland simply substituted ‘Catholic’ for 
‘Irish’ and continued its campaign right up until 1939.  This was in part due 
to the Depression causing even more economic upheaval in the 1930s.  The 
creation of the SNP in 1934 shows that supporters of Scottish Home Rule 
wanted to enter the mainstream but without the radical tendencies and 
affiliations of groups like the Scottish Republican Party (1933) and the 
Scottish Defence Force (1934); both of which were committed to a Scottish 
republic and received advice from Irish republicans.  Weapons and 
explosives began to be shipped between Scotland and Ireland again from 
around 1935, which shows that there were still enough IRA sympathisers 
in Scotland to offer at least some assistance.  The new constitution of Eire, 
established in 1937, laid claim to the entire island of Ireland but passed 
without much comment in Scotland at the time because of the 
preoccupation with events elsewhere in Europe.  Nonetheless, by 1939 the 
British government saw the IRA as a real threat again and began to step up 
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their surveillance and intelligence efforts to levels only previously seen in 
the early 1920s. 
Many of the public records examined during research for this thesis were 
being made available for the first time, particularly so in the National 
Archives of Scotland.  The bulk of these records, from the NAS and PRO 
especially, are either Special Branch intelligence reports or secret and 
confidential police circulars.  These sources do show the official mind but 
many if not all of these were written from an alarmist point of view which 
compromises their value as historical evidence to a certain extent.  
However, after examining these sources in detail, there is no doubt that the 
British government took the threat from Ireland very seriously indeed, 
particularly in the 1920s, and their exaggerations should not lessen their 
indication of impact overall.  All of the most interesting or valuable sources 
are detailed in the bibliography of this thesis to encourage further 
examination and debate on this topic. 
In conclusion, the impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland had its many 
different aspects: the organisation of IRA supply and training activity; the 
military and intelligence responses from the British government; the 
reaction of the Protestant churches, and the anti-Irish or anti-Catholic 
campaigns of the Church of Scotland in particular; the influence on the 
movement for Scottish Home Rule and the founding of a nationalist 
political party with the NPS in 1928; and the electoral benefits enjoyed by 
the Labour Party from an already politicised ‘Irish’ vote.  This mixture of 
both positive and negative effects demonstrates a deep impact made on 
Scotland during a transitional period of economic adjustment amid 
continuing urbanisation.  It was in the industrial towns and cities of central 
Scotland that this impact was most keenly felt, on both sides of the 
religious divide, and thus presents itself as an underlying cause of the 
continuing religious bigotry felt, particularly in the west, of central 
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Scotland to this day.  For the historian, the discrepancy between the 
popular image and the reality of the impact of Irish nationalism on 
Scotland suggests that new approaches are needed if we are to fully 
appreciate the true nature and development of our own Scottish national 
consciousness. 
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Chapter VI: Notes 
 
 
1) PATTERSON, MPhil thesis, p.360. 
2) ROSIE, op. cit., p.6. 
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Appendix I: List of abbreviations used in the text 
 
 
AOH     Ancient Order of Hibernians 
CSS       Catholic Socialist Society 
DOI       Directorate of Intelligence 
GAA     Gaelic Athletic Association 
ICA       Irish Citizen Army 
ILP        Independent Labour Party 
IRA       Irish Republican Army 
IRB        Irish Republican Brotherhood 
ISDL      Irish Self-Determination League 
NPS       National Party of Scotland 
PAS       Protestant Action Society 
RIC        Royal Irish Constabulary 
SHRA    Scottish Home Rule Association 
SDF        Scottish Defence Force 
SPL        Scottish Protestant League 
SNL       Scottish National League 
SNM     Scots National Movement 
UIL       United Irish League 
UVF      Ulster Volunteer Force 
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Appendix II: Irish Immigration to Scotland, 1900 – 1920 
 
Year Number of Immigrants 
1900 322 
1901 259 
1902 246 
1903 200 
1904 149 
1905 198 
1906 253 
1907 189 
1908 147 
1909 108 
1910 125 
1911 113 
1912 91 
1913 108 
1914 87 
1915 177 
1916 183 
1917 211 
1918 181 
1919 209 
1920 99 
 
The above table shows the number of immigrants from the Irish provinces of Leinster, 
Munster and Connaught to Scotland.  The total figure comes to 3655. 
From the province of Ulster in the same period the total is much higher: 17,327.  This 
shows that the vast majority of Irish immigrants to Scotland were from Ulster [Official 
statistics of immigration shown in Handley, The Irish in Scotland, (1947), p.341].  By 
way of comparison, the total figure of Irish immigration to Scotland in 1876 was 8807 
[ibid, p.339 (1876 was the first year of publication)]. 
The census of 1911 showed 174,715 Irish-born persons in Scotland, falling to 159,020 in 
the census of 1921 and 124,000 in the census of 1931 [ibid, p.340]. 
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Appendix III: Chronology of modern Irish political history 
 
 
1541: Henry VIII declares himself King of Ireland as well as England 
1559-1560: Reformation overthrows papal authority and establishes Protestantism 
1603: James I and VI unites the crowns of England and Scotland 
1608-1610: The Plantation of predominantly Scottish Protestant settlers in Ulster 
1641-1652: The Great Rebellion by the dispossessed Catholic Irish is brutally suppressed by the Parliamentary forces                                     
under Cromwell and Catholic share of the land is reduced from 67% to less than 25% 
1660: The Restoration – Charles II allows a tolerant religious atmosphere 
1685: James II succeeds Charles II and attempts to reverse the Protestant ascendancy 
1688: The Catholic James II is replaced with the Protestant William I by revolution 
1690-1691: Battles at the Boyne and Aughrim give victory to William of Orange 
1703:  The Williamite settlement reduces Catholic share of the land from 22% to 15% 
1703-1723: Penal Laws introduced to exclude Catholics from all public life as well as forbidding them to buy land or                                                                                         
inherit it normally 
1750: The Penal Laws effectively reduce Catholic share of the land from 15% to just 7% 
1760s: The Whiteboy movement emerges – an agrarian secret society which aimed to redress the grievances of the poor 
with rough and ready justice 
1775: The Irish Catholic gentry express their loyalty to the crown at the outbreak of revolt in the American colonies 
1778 and 1782: The Penal Laws preventing Catholics from owning, leasing and inheriting land are repealed 
1782: Henry Grattan persuades the Irish Parliament to pass his Declaration of Independence from England 
1783: The Renunciation Act specifically renounces any British claim to legislate for Ireland 
1785: A new secret society, the Defenders, is established to protect Catholics from Protestant violence (the Peep o’Day 
Boys et al) 
1789: The French Revolution begins on the 14th July 
1791: The Society of United Irishmen is established as the first radical Irish republican organisation 
1793: The Catholic Relief Act allows Catholics the same voting rights as Protestants/War breaks out between Britain and 
France – an Irish Militia is established 
1796: The United Irishmen and the Defenders merge and secretly plan rebellion 
1798: Brutal repression follows the failed rebellion by the United Irishmen 
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1801: Act of Union between Ireland and Britain – the Irish Parliament is abolished 
1803: Robert Emmet is executed after his failed attempt to establish an Irish Republic 
1815-1824: sporadic violence from agrarian secret societies across Ireland 
1823: Daniel O’Connell founds the Catholic Association and begins his campaign for Catholic Emancipation 
1828: O’Connell wins the election in County Clare with an overwhelming majority 
1829: The Catholic Emancipation Act receives a pained and angry royal assent 
1832: The First Reform Act extends the franchise considerably into the middle-class 
1840: The Repeal Association is established under the control of O’Connell 
1841-1843: O’Connell organises ‘monster meetings’ for Repeal of the Union 
1844: The Irish National Society founded in London to encourage nationalism within Protestant gentry 
1845-1848: widespread potato famine grips Ireland killing 1 in 8 people 
1847: Irish Confederation established by Young Irelanders 
1848: Smith O’Brien’s Young Ireland Rising fails, Irish League founded to replace Irish Confederation and Repeal 
Association 
1850s: appearance of modern and independent Irish Part at Westminster 
1858: IRB founded in Dublin on St Patrick’s Day by James Stephens 
1867: Fenian Rising fails due to lack of popular support 
1869: The Church of Ireland is disestablished 
1870: Irish Home Government Association formed by Protestants against Land Bill 
1873: Irish Home Rule League founded by Isaac Butt with support of RC Church 
1879: National Land League of Ireland founded by Parnell for tenant ownership 
1882: Parnell establishes the Irish National League for Home Rule 
1884: the GAA founded to reinvigorate Irish national consciousness and culture 
1886: The First Irish Home Rule Bill is defeated by 341 votes to 311 
1891: Parnell dies prematurely and so do hopes for Home Rule for 20 years 
1893: The Second Irish Home Rule Bill passes the Commons but is rejected by the Lords/formation of Gaelic League 
1898: Centenary celebrations of the Irish Rebellion of 1798 
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1900: Cumann na Gaedheal founded in Dublin 
1904: Irish Reform Association (unionist) proposes ‘devolution’ instead of Home Rule 
1905: Cumann na Gaedheal changes its name to Sinn Fein 
1911: The Parliament Act removes the power of veto from the House of Lords 
1912: The Third Irish Home Rule Bill is introduced by Asquith 
1913: Ulster Unionists decide to raise the UVF from Orange Lodges/Irish National Volunteers founded in Dublin 
1914: The Irish Home Rule Act passes but is suspended for the duration of the war/Irish (or Sinn Fein) Volunteers split 
from (Irish) National Volunteers 
1915: Conscription Bill is introduced into the Commons 
1916: Easter Rising – the 14 leaders are executed at Kilmainham Gaol 
1917: Plunkett wins Roscommon, MacGuinness wins Longford, de Valera wins East Clare 
1918: Landslide for Sinn Fein in the General Election – Irish Party reduced to just 6 seats 
1919: Dail Eireann assembled at the Dublin Mansion House 
1919-1921: Irish War of Independence 
1921: Anglo-Irish Treaty creates an Irish Free State but excludes Ulster/Dail ratifies Treaty by 64 votes to 57 
1922: Irish General Election which returns 94 out of 128 members for the Treaty 
1922-1923: Irish Civil War 
1923: August election gives the Free State Party a majority over the Republicans 
1924: Boundary Commission promised by the Anglo-Irish Treaty established 
1925: Irish Free State confirms its existing boundaries 
1927: Eamon de Valera establishes Fianna Fail – Sinn Fein is reduced to just 7 seats 
1932: Fianna Fail wins Irish General Election 
1936: The IRA is declared illegal by de Valera 
1937: A new constitution of Eire replaces the Anglo-Irish Treaty by referendum 
1939: The IRA declares ‘war’ on Britain 
1949: Eire is renamed the Republic of Ireland and leaves the Commonwealth 
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Appendix IV 
 
 
 
The source of all the Chapter headings in this thesis is the collection of poetry entitled 
Michael Robartes and the Dancer by William Butler Yeats (1865 – 1939), published in 1920. 
 
Chapter 2 “all changed, changed utterly” is taken from the poem Easter, 1916. 
Chapter 3 “and shake the blossom from the bud” is taken from the poem The Rose Tree. 
Chapter 4 “to stir the boiling pot” is taken from the poem Sixteen Dead Men. 
Chapter 5 “vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle” is taken from the poem The Second 
Coming. 
Yeats was very close to the politics of Irish nationalism, but rarely engaged in direct 
political action.  Instead he collected Irish folklore and was instrumental in creating a 
national theatre.  His ‘imaginative nationalism’ was profoundly influential in the 
advancement of the Irish literary tradition.  Like most Irishmen he tried to come to 
terms with the changing cultural and political landscape after 1916 and in these poems 
he explores his responses to the Proclamation of the Republic of Ireland in Dublin on 24 
April 1916.  Yeats refused a knighthood from the British government in 1915 and 
became a Senator in the Irish Free State in 1922.  
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Appendix V: List of abbreviations used in the Bibliography 
 
 
 
GH        Glasgow Herald 
GO        Glasgow Observer 
GSE       Glasgow Star and Examiner 
GUL      Glasgow University Library 
IJHS      International Journal of the History of Sport 
IJSH      International Journal of Social History 
IHS       Irish Historical Studies 
IR         Innes Review 
MLG      Mitchell Library, Glasgow 
NAI      National Archives of Ireland, Dublin 
NAS      National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh 
NLI       National Library of Ireland, Dublin 
NLS      National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh 
PRO      Public Record Office, London 
SHR      Scottish Historical Review 
SLHSJ     Scottish Labour History Society Journal 
SM          The Scotsman 
UCDA     University College Archives, Dublin 
UNL       University of North London 
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